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Introduction
"When the crisis came, the serious limitations of existing economic and financial
models immediately became apparent. Arbitrage broke down in many market segments,
as markets froze and market participants were gripped by panic. Macro models failed
to predict the crisis and seemed incapable of explaining what was happening to the
economy in a convincing manner. As a policy-maker during the crisis, I found the
available models of limited help. In fact, I would go further: in the face of the crisis,
we felt abandoned by conventional tools." [108]
These words, extracted from former ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet’s Opening
Address at the ECB Central banking conference at the end of 2010, date back to two
years after the unfold of global financial crisis across the European Monetary Union
(EMU). Europe was, and still is, in constant need of improving its macroeconomic
and financial stability indicators.
The European Union, through Maastricht’s Treaty [46], imposed restrictions both
on governments accounting and financial variables. The Maastricht convergence
criteria provide a cap to debt level (60%) and primary deficit (3%), measured as
fractions of nominal output on yearly basis.
Furthermore, the difference between each member state and the average over the
three lowest inflations countries of both long term interest rates and inflation rates
must not exceed 2% and 1.5% level, respectively. This criteria trace the boundary
of a stability region the uniqueness of which had been investigated [94] early before
2008: multiple stability regions would originate multiple equilibria.
In particular, the impact on the growth of the economy of fiscal policies directed to
Maastricht convergence has been recently object of sharp debate.
The existence of a meaningful debt/gdp threshold beyond which target economy
suffers from recession was established in [98], and harshly criticised [59]; an interesting
study on convergence patterns across the Union is [25].
The outspread of the crisis caused all countries across the Euro-area to fail in abiding
by Maastricht’s caps on debt; several member states largely exceeded also the floor
on primary balance. Low inflation made of German long-term yield a meaningful
benchmark across European interest rates, despite the rise in debt/gdp level.
The spread vis-à-vis German yield thus became a benchmark risk measure for
Euro-zone economies, driving financial market sentiment.
The massive use of yields spreads as a monitoring instrument for EMU members
economic policies demanded for a rigorous analysis of its evolution over time [36].
It is interesting to deduce the exhogenous determinants of yields spreads, in order
to measure the reaction of financial market to shifts in its fundamentals.
This allows in turn to determine what are the risk factors driving the price of
European obligations on such different patterns across countries.
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The level of yields on financial markets commonly reflects risk premia over a risk
free benchmark. A brief review of current literature, see [5], permits to separate the
determinants of yields into common and country-specific factors: among the latters,
deterioration in creditworthiness is obviously included.
The difference between the target country and Germany’s long term yields cancels
common factors and, under the assumption that Germany is a risk-free benchmark 1,
discloses country specific risk premia.
The first objective of this thesis is to compare yields spreads with the measure of
credit risk premia supplied by credit derivatives market through the prices of Credit
Default Swaps (CDS). This allows to separate the amount of country-specific risk
premia embedded in yields spreads which is attributable to credit risk from that
deserving different explanations.
A similar approach to corporate entities can be found in [13]: results indicates that
bond spreads over a risk-free rate within a CAPM [105] framework performs better
than structural models or external ratings in predicting default.
The approach is strictly statistical, but the exhogenous factors which are considered
are not suitable to sovereign borrowers. The yields which are normally considered
risk-free rates are local government bonds, but the same reasoning applied to German
yields in the EMU might be coarsed.
Several studies (see [34] and references within) suggest that, especially after 2010,
yield spreads in Europe were mainly driven by negative market sentiments.
It is thus worth to compare yields spreads and CDS prices restricting the discussion
to financial markets alone. A possible approach is to jointly model bonds and CDS
prices within an exhogenous factor model: an example is [48].
The approach pursued here is different in that it remains steadily locked to financial
modeling also in the methodologies.
Market yields are not directly tradeable: they are implied using the most liquid
fraction of sovereign bonds by assuming the existence of a term structure for target
country’s obligations market and applying a numerical interpolation procedure [1].
The Nelson Siegel model [89] assumes the existence of an implicit term-structure
for the obligation market, which can be used to discount deterministic future cash
flows. Standard non-arbitrage assumptions provide this cash flow to be equal to the
bond price as determined by market transactions.
The term structure is retrieved by minimizing the (weighted) sum of square distances
between (model dependent) future cash flow and spot market price of each relevant
obligation.
1Yields are considered to be more informative than alternative risk-free rates (such as Eonia or
Euribor) since German debt market is accessible to a larger share of investors.
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A yield curve is implied for each of the EMU members, and the 10-year rates are
then considered2, which correspond to the yield of a theoretical zero coupon bond
(zcb) lasting ten years from trade date.
Hence, yields spreads vis-à-vis Germany correspond to the difference in the yield to
maturity between target country and Germany’s 10-year bonds paying no coupons.
This difference is the risk premium that the market demands to exchange a long
position from a German bond to target country’s obligation.
Note that no exhogenous factors are included: under the assumption that a zcb is
available for the 10-year maturity, yields spread is the percentage of face value which
is earned when purchasing a distressed bond selling-short a German one.
Two questions arise straightforwardly: the first is whether Germany can be retained
a reliable risk-free benchmark. The second is whether the spread effectively measures
credit risk of target borrower, or if it embeds additional risk premia attributable to
sources which are not included in such a modeling framework.
In order to answer both of them, we need an alternative method to extract credit
risk premia out of financial market: the idea is to use credit derivatives.
The CDS spread is the cost of buying the right to swap a distressed obligation for
face value in case of credit events affecting the issuer: this coupon is paid every
quarter and quoted on a yearly basis, see [22].
The determinants of CDS spreads across Europe were recently investigated by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) [58]. Results pointed out a strong link between
macroeconomic fundamentals3 and CDS spreads from mid-2009 to the end of 2012,
with a subsequent decrease due to postive outlooks towards European markets.
The process of price formation of CDS (traded on the market) in a pure financial
framework is considered to be informative on the perception of credit risk, as the
two counterparties agree upon the cost of swapping it.
Before 2009, the assumption of CDS prices being actually informative on credit risk
was however questionable. CDS contracts were normally traded over the counter
(OTC) and specifically tailored on the peculiar needs of the counterparties.
OTC transactions had been a major shortcoming of the financial industry during
latest crisis: within such a market "..there was no price discovery process and in
turn no easy and definitive way to value the securities. The failure of the price
discovery process aggravated the problems at banks and other financial firms .... by
making it more difficult...reporting requirements on the value of their securities and
derivatives positions." [40].
2It has also been proved, that even larger spreads are registered with mid-term (5-years) and
mid-short-term (2 years) maturities, see [36].
3The problem of mixing data with different frequencies arises when merging CDS market with
the macroeconomic conditions of the sovereign borrower [58]
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In particular, CDS contracts fell short of rigorously defining several fundamental
agreements entangled in the contract, such as relevant credit events or settlement
method of defaulted obligations.
An early attempt devoted to resolve such issues is dated 2003: the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) proposed a set of rules [62] to which
parties were invited to agree so as to take off contracts misspecifications.
Additional shortcomings of such market came from the use of credit derivatives as
speculative instruments. Allowing naked CDS positions and free entrance in the
contracts resulted in a cumulate purchase of protection outdoing the aggregated
face value of the underlying obligations [114].
Since the purpose is to compare CDS-implied credit risk premia with yield spreads,
it is also important to rely on the same techniques and modeling assumptions when
computing both of them. The methodology to imply yield curves is rather standard
across both private data provider and regulatory authorities [1].
The ideal would be to dispose of those same techniques in a wider market, where
combined positions in CDS and obligations, with hedging purposes, are tradeable.
Yields-to-maturities of such positions, bearing the cost of hedging, can be subtracted
from naked yields to retrieve the credit risk premium associated to target obligation.
Standardization of credit derivatives market [82] followed the outburst of the crisis
in the US, and interested European credit market from the second half of 2009.
Rules for standard CDS contracts included establishment of regulating authorities,
definition of credit events, hardwiring of post-default auctions intended to price and
settle defaulted obligations and introduction of an electronic trading platform backed
by a central counterparty [83].
The most important features of new contracts rely in the cash flow they provide.
Namely, a (spot) upfront payment to enter into the transaction plus a fixed standard
CDS spread to be paid on a set of (future) standard payment dates up to the chosen
standard maturity of the contract.
The introduction of this new scheme for CDS cash flow assimilated derivatives
contracts to their underlying asset: standard CDS are directly comparable to bonds,
as composed by (negative) deterministic future coupons plus a payment to be made
at inception (spot price of credit risk).
In the combined CDS-bond market, hedging each obligation with a CDS contract
results thus in a synthetic portfolio with higher initial price and lower future coupons
with respect to the correspondent naked obligation.
It is then possible to imply a CDS-bearing yield curve by assuming the existence of
a term structure of such portfolios, and using the same interpolation techniques.
The difference between naked and CDS-bearing term structures defines the term
structure of credit risk premia.
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The term structure implied in this way is strictly country specific: this allows,
on the one hand, to verify whether the assumption of Germany being credit risk free
is confirmed; on the other, it permits a direct comparison among 10-years credit risk
premium out of the implied term structure and 10-years yields spreads.
If Germany is one of the countries to be benched, an alternative benchmark rate
must be included in the analysis: coherently with CDS-pricing models, we select the
Euribor yield curve as bootstrapped from spot and swap Euribor rates [85].
Yields of hedged portfolios are actually obtainable4 by trading in the CDS-bond
market, hence the term structure of credit risk premia evolves in time under the
physical measure, as built up with the sole use of market quotes [31].
Furthermore, the set of hedging portfolios induce country-specific and credit-risk
free yield curves. Hedging strategies should in principle project naked yields on a
common credit-risk free pattern, where portfolios yields should differ from each other
by residuals attributable to white noise disturbances.
Nonstationarity or systematicity of differences among country specific CDS-bearing
yields might reveal the existence of arbitrages on the aggregated European sovereign
CDS-bond market. The eventual shortcomings in hedging strategies can in turn be
attributed to additional risk premia provided either in the CDS contracts or in the
bonds, which are generated by different sources of risk.
A relevant stream of literature focused on European yield curves in latest years,
often agreeing upon the fact that factors different from credit risk were affecting
Euro-zone countries obligations markets [99].
As an example, we quote [87], where liquidity risk is considered a major source
of additional premia: the regime switching modeling framework adopted allows for
Markov models gathering together credit and liquidity-related variables.
Similarly, the safe haven phenomena which determined the excess liquidity of German
obligations market is the principal determinant of yields spreads in crisis [36].
In 2011, Jean-Claude Trichet, on behalf of the European Central Bank, stated the
"intellectual challenges to financial stability analysis" which Europe was going to
face, discussing new objectives of economic research in the Monetary Union.
He criticised a pure statistical approach as it "..does not assume very high levels
of rationality of economic agents, strong tendency towards equilibrium situations or
universal efficiency of financial markets.." [109]. Specifically, one of the challenges:
"..concerns how financial instability interacts with the macroeconomy" [Ibd.], and
researchers were invited to "..integrate more realistic characterisations of financial
systems in macroeconomic models and to capture the relevant nonlinearities that are
so typical for the unfolding of financial crises..." [Ibd.].
4Provided target investor is allowed to easy access the CDS-bond market, which is the case for
large investment institutions holding most of European debt [35].
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The mutual impact of macroeconomy and the term structure of interest rates
has been widely investigated from a statistical perspective: an interesting overview
is provided in [115]. A relatively recent review [76] argues that the expected future
values of macroeconomic variables, as measured by international surveys on economic
forecasts, are likely to affect yields more than their current values.
The explicit inclusion of macroeconomic variables in statistical yields models traces
back instead to the seminal ideas in [12] and [39], refined in [38].
This approach jointly models macroeconomic and financial variables in factor models
[53] for yield curves. A recent investigation in this sense [93] provides for a structural
joint VAR modeling to be identified and estimated.
The idea is to express all variables according to short-term and long-term latent
factors and proceed to statistical estimation, so as to retrieve a complete model for
macroeconomic and financial (macrofinancial) variables.
Another possibility is to model financial variables in a Markov-chain regime switching
model [54], where macroeconomic variables induces a change in the status of the
economy as soon as they exceed estimated thresholds.
Despite the wide range of different approaches, none of the aforementioned is strictly
based on economic principles. Econometrics is used to model a priori the possible
net of relationships among variables, and not only as the mean to get to conclusions.
The second objective of this work is to follow the guidances of ECB and, backed by
economic theory, create a macrofinancial scoring system by constructing a physical
default probability measure in the spirit of [87].
Macroeconomic variables are expected to improve market-based distress measures by
providing for additional sources of risk which might explain the unexpected widening
of spreads across the Euro-area [36].
Liquidity of cross-countries obligation market appears to be a major source of
surprise effects in yields spreads, because excess demand of German obligations
caused a rapid decrease of the correspondent yields, with a consequent increasing of
spreads. On the contrary, Greece experienced default when no investor was willing
to purchase Greek debt anymore.
Demand for sovereign obligations is the relevant concept to be analyzed: when a
country is facing financial distress and is forced to issue more debt, the new debt
supply may demand for additional risk premia, which in turn depend on the risk
attitude of investors towards target obligations.
We consider each sovereign obligations market as a single-good market, where the
quantity supplied is public debt and the correspondent price is the (average) yield
on debt: a similar approach is pursued in [55]. In order to preliminarly assess our
intuitions, we start by modeling a linear demand function.
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Demand functions are generally unobservable, especially when dealing with public
finance [19]: the first approach to macrofinancial modeling will be straightforward.
Namely, feedback effects among yields and public debt are estimated within a
bivariate vector auto regression (VAR).
The first issue to be tackled is which yields are to be used. The ECB supplies
quarterly levels of interest paid on debt, out of which an internal yield can be
retrieved using custom accounting techniques [49]. Another candidate is current
market yield, with maturity equal to debt duration, averaged across Europe.
A statistical comparison among such yields is pursued, and the impact of debt/gdp
level on both these interest rates is inferred: meaningful coefficients will be rough
estimates of investors’ risk aversion towards target obligations market.
An interesting issue is suggested by the evolution of yields and debt market of
Portugal and Ireland: more precisely, a high level of debt variation (debt speed) was
registered in such countries as soon as yields spreads dramatically widened.
In a demand/supply framework, the role of debt speed is easily recognizable [102]:
if any distressed sovereign borrower is forced to issue more debt in a given period,
he must either gather new investors or demanding further trustworthiness from the
existing ones, by offering a higher yield in order to match the demand curve.
The main shortcoming of such a direct approach is the implicit assumption of risk
aversion being constant across pre and post crisis periods, which is clearly unrealistic
[104]. Risk appetites are hidden variables containing investors’ expectations on
future creditworthiness as well as forecasts on eventual additional risks [76].
Discovering the underlyings determinants of such risk appetites in a macrofinancial
context is simply another way to formulate the initial problem.
In line with the speech [116] of the Federal Reserve (Fed) current president Janet
Yellen, and inspired by the seminal ideas in [42], we advocate the background
supplied by H. Mynsky’s with his Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) [86].
Particularly, once the concept of loan is broadened to debt/gdp ratio, Minsky’s
classification of borrowers is considered. A Ponzi borrower within a generic loan
agreement is defined as the investor who, within a period between two interest
payments dates, is not able to repay neither a fraction of these interests, and is
forced to augment his debt level to face his duties of debtor.
Ponzi schemes in public debt had already been investigated in [21], but from a
macroeconomic perspective only. Here, according to Minsky’s original definition,
we take the positive part of debt speed over a quarter as representant of the amount
of Ponzi investment (which we briefly refer to as actual Ponziness) that target
borrower is demanding within that period. A possible consequence of perpetuated
Ponzi borrowing might be a liquidity drain up of the correspondent obligations
market [42].
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The idea is to monitor eventual Ponzi schemes of target sovereign borrower,
measured with respect to the whole financial market. Actual Ponziness is thus
transformed into market Ponziness by substituting the internal yield underlying
public debt with the yield quoted by financial markets.
Market Ponziness (or, briefly, the Ponzi score) is retained to be a relevant indicator
of financial distress which serves our purposes: namely, it embeds macroeconomic
and financial variables, it is economically founded, and also country specific.
Alternatively, a second score can also be constructed by taking differences among
target country and Germany’s market Ponziness, in the same spirit of market yields
spreads (spreaded Ponzi score).
The first issue to tackle is to ensure that the construction of such scorings is not
redundant, in the sense that they embed different signals from those included in
yields or yields spreads, respectively.5
In order to validate the two Ponzi indexes using econometric techniques, we must
firstly infer the statistical properties that two custom sovereign risk measures share
with each other. Comparisons among yields spreads and CDS implied default
probabilities is investigated in [60] and [80], as well as in the aforementioned [87].
Here, we chose to compare yield spreads to default intensities6 in a pure econometric
framework. The estimated feedback effects retrieved from statistics will be considered
relevant in assessing the linkages among the two.
The (positive) scores induce two physical default probability measures that can be
compared with CDS-implied default pobability by fitting bivariate VAR models.
In case the two implied measures share similar properties to that shown by yields
spreads and default intensities, then the scoring can be considered meaningful.
The econometric analysis will also be a way to monitor how much of the variability
in credit risk perception can be measured using a combined macrofinancial set of
variables, and also to see the distance between financial distress measures and a
score built up with a relatively small set of variables.
Since statistical analysis will be the mean to drag out conclusions, and guess possible
answers to the questions we asked, it is worth to disclose the methodology that is
used to gather informations from data.
The VAR approach which is pursued is object of critcisms as its endogenous nature
is often considered atheoretical and noncausal [32]. Particularly, the determinants
underlying the variables under analysis will not be exhogenously modeled here.
We start to observe that comparing different portfolio yields means to compare
statistical hedging techniques, thus a pure mathematical approach is fully justified.
5If this was the case, it could be possible to assert that inclusion of macroeconomic variables
improves distress measures with respect to market yields.
6As implied through the ISDA CDS Standard Model, see appendix C.
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Concerning yields and macroeconomic variables, the VAR approach is adopted
as the relationships are conditional expectations in a theoretical model. The aim is
to estimate a latent variable which is deemed to embed all the information that any
complementary set of exhogenous variables is able to supply.
As credit scores are compared, CDS-implied default probabilities and yields spreads
will always be considered as meaningful benchmarks, and their determinants not
exhogenously modeled.
Their mutual relationship will be useful in order to collect common features of risk
measures to be used as the basis for comparing default probabilities.
The variables will be typically nonstationary: the mutual feedback effects among
them can be splitted into short-run effects, including both feedback effects on lagged
differences and residual correlation, and long-run effects, measured by eventual
cointegrating relations. When the comparison deals with portfolio yields, the higher
data frequency suggests short-run analysis to be the most relevant. Cointegrating
relations will instead acquire major importance when a score is implied at quarterly
frequency on a larger time window.
The thesis is divided in three chapters plus a brief conclusion, and three appendices.
Chapter 1 introduces the set of econometric instruments which are needed in order
to proceed to statistical analysis. Univariate processes are presented in section 1.1;
useful results concerning both lag number selection procedure and unit-root tests
are provided in section 1.2. Vector processes are defined in section 1.3: the approach
to lag selection procedure is different because of the singularity of asymptotics
estimators of covariance matrices in case of cointegrated processes. Specifically, we
use the lag-augmented procedure defined in [41] so as to retrieve an algorithm similar
to the univariate case. Johansen’s framework for cointegrated VARs is presented in
section 1.4, and a two-stage parameter estimation is reported in section 1.5. Section
1.6 summarizes the general procedure, while section 1.7 discloses custom statistics
for checking whiteness of residuals.
Chapter 2 is divided in two parts: section 2.1 shortly discusses the standardization
process which interested the credit derivatives market, focusing on CDS contracts.
The discussion is based on [28], which in turn explores regulatory and technical
documentation of credit derivatives market, extracting the pricing model directly out
of contractual clauses. The second part deals with the construction of CDS-bearing
yield curves, and is based on the ideas explored in [27]: a brief revision of interpolation
methods is presented in section 2.2, while econometric results are gathered in section
2.3. Specifically, subsection 2.3.1 concerns Germany and its role of credit-risk-free
benchmark; subsection 2.3.2 compares yields spreads and CDS-implied credit risk
premia, while subsection 2.3.3 compares the two synthetic credit risk free yields and
analyzes the basis.
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Chapter 3 introduces some stylized facts about the evolution of accounting
variables in Europe since the introduction of Euro (section 3.1). Section 3.2 presents
the theoretical demand/supply framework and describes the dataset which will be
used. Section 3.3 proceeds with a direct econometric approach.
It starts with yields analysis (subsection 3.3.1) and proceeds to measure mutual
impacts of yields and debt level (subsection 3.3.2) and of yields (yields spreads) and
debt speed (subsection 3.3.3).
The last part revises and enhances the ideas in [29]: the problem of time variating
risk appetites in a demand/supply framework is introduced in section 3.4, where
the construction of the two scores is also presented, and econometrically discussed
in section 3.5. A comparison among scores and yields (yields spreads) is presented
in subsection 3.5.1, while subsection 3.5.2 investigates the relevant properties that
two custom distress measures share with each other. A direct comparison among
scoring and default intensities is pursued in subsection 3.5.3, while subsection 3.5.4
summarizes results.
After the conclusions, the thesis presents three appendices collecting statistical
tables as well as useful technical results which will be repeatedly used.
Appendix A, B and C contains statistical tables, econometric tools and financial
tools respectively: all references to equation, sections, tables and figures starting
with a capital letter refers to the correspondent appendix.
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1 Econometric modeling
Econometric models offer a wide range of different approaches devoted to withdraw
informations out of data: the choice is to lean towards the endogenous7 parametric
approach of vector autoregressive moving average (VARMA) processes.
The approach is maintained in both chapters 2 and 3, independently from the class of
dataset examined: it is preferable to rely on the same techniques so that conlcusions
out of observations are drawn using a uniform methodology.
The strategy is to assume a distribution (often gaussian) for stochastic innovations
in time, determine the degree of self-forecastability of the time series and construct
a model based on a parameters set which is retrieved out of data; construction of
the parameters estimators, together with their interpretation and siginificance, are
the object of this chapter. A theoretical model which is fitted to data will be also
called data generating process (dgp); cross-country analysis will not be performed
in a strict statistical sense: the country in exam will be considered as fixed, hence
results are presented avoiding additional indexations.
The topics discussed in the next two chapters are grounded on the econometric
analysis of time series sampled at different frequencies, hence time-steps among
observations will be specified therein, together with sample sizes.
A moving average process will also be performed ex-ante so as to smoothen time
series: the observations will be the smoothened data.
Any n-dimensional vector process under analysis is built up by stacking target n
variables into a matrix:
[Y 1 . . . Y n] ∈ RT×n
being T the (common) size of datasets and, given any matrix Θ, being Θ′ its
transpose; each row (Y 1t . . . Y nt ) will be the t-th observation coming out of the vector
dgp Y . Before a vector model is built up, it is necessary to step back in order to
discuss single variables modeling, which will be useful in addressing multivariate
estimation: this will be the object of section 1.1 and 1.2, while section 1.3 to 1.5
will deal with vector analysis.
Section 1.6 summarizes the estimation procedure while section 1.7 concludes the
chapter by focusing on the peculiar interpretation which will be given to statistical
results throughout this work.
Basic tools of univariate statistics are not reported here8; main results on multivariate
processes are instead summarized in appendix B.
7The epiteth endogenous refers to the dynamics underlying such processes, where no exhogenous
explanatory variable is provided; given an initial condition, trajectories evolves according to the
same process’ history plus a conditionally independent innovation.
8Refer to [56] and [57] for an exhaustive treatment.
11
1.1 Univariate data generating processes
Let y be a univariate dgp and assume that it can be written as:
y = x+ d∗ (1.1.1)
where the support process x represents the purely stochastic part of y and d∗ is a
deterministic trend component ; the most general deterministic function provided9
in the present work will be linear (affine):
d∗t = d
∗
0 + d
∗
1t (1.1.2)
Statistical properties clearly regards the stochastic part only, thus definitions will
be given for x and extended to y with little abuse of terminology.
Define the difference operator ∆ so that ∆ζt = ζt − ζt−1 = (1− L)ζt for any process
ζ, where L is the usual lag operator, defined so that LNζt = ζt−N , and 1 is to be
intended as the identity operator.
1.1.1 ARMA processes: general features
Definition 1.1.1. The (one-dimensional) dgp process x is an ARMA(p, p′) process
if defined by:
γ(L)xt = φ(L)ut , t ≥ 1 (1.1.3)
where ut is a (one-dimensional) gaussian white noise process (definition B.1.1),
γ(L) := 1 − γ1L · · · − γpLp is the AR part, φ(L) := 1 + Φ1L · · · + Φp′Lp′ is the
MA part, with γi, φh ∈ R; in particular, we call AR(p) and MA(p′) the subfamily
of models obtained by setting either φ(L) ≡ 1 or γ(L) ≡ 1, respectively. Obviously,
max{p, p′} > 1.
The choice here is to limit the analyses to the AR(p) subclass of models so
as to maintain conditional independence of the process from the whole history of
innovations ([78], chapter 12). The assumption x ∼ AR(p) can be combined with
(1.1.2):
xt =γ1xt−1 + · · ·+ γpxt−p + ut
d∗t =d
∗
0 + d
∗
1t
(1.1.4)
so as to define the dgp y out of equations (1.1.4) using (1.1.1). This implies:
yt = γ1yt−1 + . . . γpyt−p + d0 + d1t+ ut (1.1.5)
9Specific single-variables analysis concerning deterministic terms will not be performed: testing
deterministic terms in each component can be misleading in a multivariate context, when
cointegrating relation arise ([78], p. 244).
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where d0, d1 are suitable parameters retrieved from (1.1.4) with little algebra.
Equation (1.1.5) can be rewritten in vector form as:
yt = [γ d] · [ yt−1 . . . yt−p 1 t ]′ + ut (1.1.6)
where γ = [γ1 . . . γp] and d = [d0 d1]; rewriting y in VAR-operator form:
(1− γ1L− · · · − γpLp)yt = dt + ut (1.1.7)
allows to define the characteristic polynomial of the process:
(1− γ1z − · · · − γpzp) (1.1.8)
as the polynomial associated to the operator on the left side of (1.1.7).
All roots of (1.1.8) are assumed to lie on or outside the complex unit circle10; an
ARMA process x admitting real roots strictly outside the unit circle is called stable,
in symbols, x ∈ I(0). The definition of q-integrated processes comes straightforward.
Definition 1.1.2. A univariate ARMA process x is called integrated of order q, in
symbols x ∈ I(q), if ∆qx is stable or, equivalently, ∆qx ∈ I(0), and ∆q−1x is not.
1.2 AR processes: lag numbers and unit roots
This section is not devoted to parameter estimation, which will be the object of
multivariate analysis; the task here is to design procedures aimed to determine two
features of single-valued time series.
The first one is to determine a correct number of lags for univariate time series, so
that given any vector process Y = (Y 1 . . . Y n) a number of lag pˆj can be estimated
for any of the components Y j.
The second procedure is instead devoted to infer the eventual presence of unit roots :
two popular approaches (see [57], p. 435) are used when dealing with non-stationary
processes. Namely, trend stationary processes are those data generating processes
which become stationary after a linear deterministic time-trend is subtracted, while
unit-root processes will be those admitting z = 1 as a root of (1.1.8).
Before approaching multivariate modeling, both the number of lags and unit-roots
must be settled for any of the components: since the number of lags is independent
from the presence of unit roots ([78], Proposition 8.1, p. 326), it will be the first to
be retrieved.
10If the true model provided, for example, real roots inside the unit circle, then we would be
fitting models where true variances diverge with exponential rates: such models would however be
unrealistic for most economic data ([78], p. 242)
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1.2.1 Determining the number of lags
A first modeling restriction is the decision of selecting a uniform11 (with respect to
each component j of the vector) upper bound p¯ ∈ N: this represents the maximum
number of lags provided by each single-variable model; notice that, as a consequence
of uniformity, p¯ will also be the maximum number of lags for the vector process Y .
The estimated number of lags pˆ is retrieved for each component using an iterative
procedure (see [57], p. 530); a simple hypothesis testing is provided within each
of the iterations. The aim is to shorten the process’ memory in the true model so
as to diminish the number of lags as much as possible and reduce the number of
parameters to be estimated.
The starting condition is pˆ1 = p¯: for h = 1 . . . p¯− 1, the h-th iteration tests:
H0 : y ∼ AR(ph) , γph = 0 vs H1 : y ∼ AR(ph);
where the null is equivalent to y ∼ AR(ph − 1); using equation (1.1.6), the null at
the h-th iteration can be rewritten as:
H0 : [R
(h) 01×2] · [γ1 . . . γph d]′ = 0 (1.2.1)
where R(h) = [0 . . . 0 1] ∈ R1×ph . Iterations are made up of two steps, which are
repeated until the number of lags has been estimated: here, T is the sample size.
• Step 1: Compute the OLS estimator of γ in (1.1.6) and call uˆ ∈ RT×1 the
vector of realized residuals; compute the restricted OLS estimation (see [56],
pp. 157-163), with restrictions defined by (1.2.1), and define uˆR the vector of
realized residuals in the restricted model.
• Step 2: Under H0, the test statistic:
F(h) = (T − ph − 1) · (uˆ
′
RuˆR − uˆ′uˆ)
uˆ′uˆ
∼ F(1, T − ph − 1) (1.2.2)
has an F-distribution with (1, T − ph − 1) degrees of freedom (see [57], pp.
205-207), being T − ph the effective sample size under the alternative H1.
If the null is accepted, then ph+1 = ph − 1 and we repeat the procedure; else,
the estimated number of lags is pˆ = ph.
At the end of the procedure, an estimated number of lags pˆ is available for each
component of the vector process Y under exam; we keep on writing p so as to
lighten notations, but we stress that single-variables numbers of lags are assumed
to be known at this stage.
11The bound is assumed to be uniform so as not to privilege any of the components in terms of
self-explainability and source of informations within multivariate context.
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1.2.2 Testing for unit roots
The issue of unit-roots is fundamental for hypothesis testing on estimated parameters,
as well as for their interpretation; a wide range of different approaches can be
pursued, leading to different test-statistics: an interesting survey is [106].
The most common are the Phillip Perron (PP) [96] and the (Augmented) Dickey
Fuller (ADF) [37] tests: the former is based on a statistical adjustment for serial
correlation in a simple AR(1) model, while the latter adds lags to the autoregression
in the test statistic itself (details can be found in [57], chapter 17).
Since data samples will always be statistically small as compared to the number of
observations, we follow the indication in [103] and proceed with ADF test procedure;
three different tests will be performed:
• Test 1 (T1) :
H0 : yt = yt−1 + c1∆yt−1 + · · ·+ cp−1∆yt−p+1 + ut
H1 : yt = c0yt−1 + c1∆yt−1 + · · ·+ cp−1∆yt−p+1 + ut , c0 < 1
• Test 2 (T2) :
H0 : yt = d0 + yt−1 + c1∆yt−1 + · · ·+ cp−1∆yt−p+1 + ut
H1 : yt = d0 + c0yt−1 + c1∆yt−1 + · · ·+ cp−1∆yt−p+1 + ut , c0 < 1
• Test 3 (T3) :
H0 : yt = d0 + yt−1 + c1∆yt−1 + · · ·+ cp−1∆yt−p+1 + ut
H1 : yt = d0 + d1t+ c0yt−1 + c1∆yt−1 + · · ·+ cp−1∆yt−p+1 + ut , c0 < 1
Each test provide a true unit root in the null. Tests T1 and T2 provides the
alternative AR model with c0 < 1; the alternative under T3 is a trend stationary
process. The test statistic ZADF has a distribution which depends on the test being
performed: its explicit form is not reported it here, being it custom in most of the
econometric literature (see for example [57], pp. 523-25).
Furthermore, the asymptotic distribution of ZADF is non-standard, hence its value
has to be compared to specific p-values which were originally tabulated in [37]; here,
however, those reported in [57] (Table B.7, p. 764) are used.
It could happen to infer mixed responses from the three tests, hence discussing
results on a case-by-case basis will be opportune.
Next section collects multivariate econometrics results: each of the components of
vector Y is now equipped with an estimated lags number, and the eventual presence
of any unit root in them has been determined.
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1.3 Multivariate data generating processes
Modeling vector processes goes along the lines of univariate processes, although
several features originate only in such a multivariate context, thus a peculiar analysis
will be devoted to this case.
Let Y ∈ Rn be a vector dgp: similarly to the univariate case, equation (1.1.1), set:
Y = X +D∗ (1.3.1)
where the vector support process X again represents the pure stochastic part and
D∗ is the deterministic component, which again will be affine:
D∗t = D
∗
0 + tD
∗
1 ∈ Rn.
Statistical properties of process Y , are defined to be those of its pure stochastic part
X: definitions will concern this latter, and naturally extended to Y .
1.3.1 VARMA processes: general features
Definition 1.3.1. The process X is a n-dimensional VARMA(p, p′) process if defined
by:
Γ(L)Xt = Φ(L)Ut , t ≥ 1 (1.3.2)
where Ut is a n-dimensional gaussian white noise process (definition B.1.1) Γ(L) :=
In−Γ1L · · ·−ΓpLp is the AR part, Φ(L) := In+Φ1L · · ·+Φp′Lp′ is the MA part (with
Γi,Φh ∈ Rn×n) and In is the n× n identity operator; in particular, we call VAR(p)
and VMA(p′) processes the subfamily of models obtained by setting Φ(L) ≡ I or
Γ(L) ≡ I, respectively. Obviously, max{p, p′} > 1.
Results on matrix operators Θ(L) can be stated in terms of their correspondent
polynomials matrices Θ(z); observe that z ∈ C is a univariate variable because
the lag operator works equivalently on any of the components; given two generic
X,U ∈ Rn, consider:
Γ(z)X = Φ(z)U
left multiplication by Γ(z)adj yields
[det Γ(z)]X = Γ(z)adjΦ(z)U (1.3.3)
The characteristic polynomial of X is now det Γ(z): a process X is thus said to
admit unit roots if det Γ(1) = 0, which motivates the definition that follows.
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Definition 1.3.2. A VARMA(p, q) process X is called stable if
det Γ(z) = det(In − zΓ1 − · · · − zpΓp) 6= 0 ∀z ∈ C : |z| ≤ 1 (1.3.4)
that is, all roots lie strictly outside the unit circle.
It will always be assumed that the stability condition (1.3.4) holds for true
parameters Γi when |z| < 1, as mentioned in previous section.
Let q ≤ p be the exact number of unit roots of det Γ(z); using basic algebraic results,
we can rewrite (1.3.3) as:
[Ψ(z)(1− z)q]X = Γ(z)adjΦ(z)U (1.3.5)
with Ψ(1) 6= 0. We can exploit again duality between polynomial matrices and lag
polynomials, and rewrite (1.3.5) in terms of matrix operators; this yields:
[Ψ(L)(1− L)q]Xt = Γ(L)adjΦ(L)Ut (1.3.6)
It is worth to stress that the operator on the left side is diagonal, and acts equivalently
on any single component of Xt, so that for j = 1 . . . n:
[Ψ(L)]∆qXjt =
(
Γ(L)adjΦ(L)
)j
Ut (1.3.7)
and the operator Ψ(L) is scalar.
Since U is a (gaussian) white noise, direct inspection shows that (Γ(L)adjΦ(L)
)j
Ut
is a (gaussian) white noise process too, according to definition B.1.1: hence, (1.3.7)
is the ARMA form of ∆qXj with characteristic polynomial Ψ(L), for any j = 1 . . . n.
Moreover, since Ψ(1) 6= 0, the ARMA process ∆qXj is stable for any j, in the sense
of definition 1.1.2: this motivates the following.
Definition 1.3.3. A VARMA(p, p′) process X is called integrated of order q, in
symbols X ∈ I(q), if ∆qX = (1− L)qX is stable while ∆q−1X is not.
Let q be the (estimated) integration order of vector process X and qj the
(estimated) integration order of the j-th component Xj, so that ∆qjXj ∈ I(0),
for each j; if q∞ := maxj=1...n qj, then q∞ ≤ q because ∆qXj ∈ I(0) for each j, as
previously observed. The integration order of each component Xj is determined by
iterated application of unit root tests of section 1.2.2 to the process and its higher
order differences: the estimated qj ≥ 0 is the first positive integer for which the tests
unanimously rejects the null.
Most of the time series under analysis will show qj ≤ 1: eventual exception will be
specifically discussed when necessary. Hence q ≤ 1 is assumed, so that any VAR
process X ∈ I(1) if Xj ∈ I(1) for at least one j.
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1.4 VAR processes: cointegrating relations
The modeling framework will be that of VARMA(p, 0)≡VAR(p) processes, as in the
single variable case, and for similar reasons; thus Φ(L) ≡ I and p > 1.
Theoretical underlyings which are presented here will be limited to those needed for
I(1) random vectors12: as previously mentioned; expliciting the lag operator yields
the VAR(p) form:
Xt = Γ1Xt−1 + · · ·+ ΓpXt−p + Ut (1.4.1)
Another representation, which is very useful in the framework of integrated VAR(p)
processes, is the vector error-correction VEC(p− 1) representation:
∆Xt = C0Xt−1 + C1∆Xt−1 + · · ·+ Cp−1∆Xt−p+1 + Ut. (1.4.2)
where C0 := In − Γ1 − . . .Γp, Cp−1 = −Γp and Cj = −Γj+1 · · · − Γp.
The reason for the introduction of this second representation is the concept of
cointegration, pioneered by Engle and Granger [45]: here it will be introduced as
in Lütkepohl ([78], chapter 6), who in turns follows the general lines of Johansen’s
formalization [74].
Definition 1.4.1. The integrated n-dimensional VAR(p) process X ∈ I(q) is said
to be cointegrated if there exits β ∈ Rn and q′ ∈ N+ such that β′Xt ∈ I(q − q′); β
is called a cointegrating vector for X.
This definition is slightly uncommon in the sense that it does not explicitely
require that all components of X are I(q); for example, if X ∈ I(1) and Xj ∈ I(0),
then setting β = ej to the j-th vector of the canonical basis, e′jXt = Xj is a
cointegrating relation itself according to defintion 1.4.1.
The advantage lies in simplification of terminology and notations; single case of
study will isolate eventual spurious13 cointegrating relations ([78], p. 246).
Definition 1.4.2. The rank r = rkC0 of C0 is called cointegration rank of X and
C0 is called cointegration (or cointegrating) matrix.
Observe that X ∈ I(0) if and only if r = n; assume X ∈ I(1); then ∆X ∈
I(0) so, since U is white noise, C0Xt−1 ∈ I(0); in particular, the rows C0i are
cointegrating vectors (definition 1.4.1), thus justifying definition 1.4.2.
In this case, the assumption X ∈ I(1) implies that the cointegrating matrix has
reduced rank 0 ≤ r < n.
12Johansen [74] explores in detail the case of I(q) vector autoregressive models up to q = 2,
which he considers to provide a sufficiently broad class of dgp for most of the cases of interest.
13It is of particular importance to remove spurious relations especially when constructing EGLS
estimators, because of the normalization procedure, as will be shown in next section.
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In order to complete the underlying building blocks, and define the dgp Y , an
affine deterministic term is introduced, ; the VEC(p− 1) form of Y is:
∆Yt = C0Yt−1 + C1∆Yt−1 + · · ·+ Cp−1∆Yt−p+1 +D0 +D1t+ Ut. (1.4.3)
with
D0 = C0(D
∗
1 −D∗0) + (I − C1 − · · · − Cp−1)D∗1 ,
and
D1 = −C0D∗1
The peculiar form for deterministic component must be estimated together with the
cointegration rank, so as to identify the best-fit model subfamily, as cointegration
tests are very sensitive to the form chosen for D.
In this sense, it is useful to present a further representation of Y which will be useful
in estimating different cointegrated models, corresponding to different restrictions
on the deterministic component.
Namely, assume that the cointegrating rank r = rkC0 is known: C0 can thus be
written as C0 = AB′, being A,B two n× r matrices of full column rank.
The r-dimensional column span of B is called cointegrating basis ; equation (1.4.3)
can be rewritten as:
∆Yt = D0 + tD1 + AB
′Yt−1 + C1∆Yt−1 + · · ·+ Cp−1∆Yt−p+1 + Ut. (1.4.4)
Now projecting D on A allows to decompose:
D0 = AD
‖
0 + A
⊥D⊥0
D1 = AD
‖
1 + A
⊥D⊥1
(1.4.5)
being A⊥ ∈ Rn×(n−r) an orthogonal complement of the column span14 of A, where
D‖(·) = (A
′A)−1A′D(·) ∈ Rr and D⊥(·) = (A⊥′A⊥)−1A⊥′D(·) ∈ Rn−r are the projections
of D(·) on A and A⊥, respectively; we can thus rewrite (1.4.4) as:
∆Yt = [AB
′ Dco0 D
co
1 ]
Yt−11
t
+ [C1 . . . Cp−1 Dex0 Dex1 ]

∆Yt−1
...
∆Yt−p+1
1
t
+ Ut (1.4.6)
14For Θ ∈ Rn×r with rk(Θ) = r < n, the orthogonal complement is any Θ⊥ ∈ Rn×(n−r) :
Θ′Θ⊥ = 0.
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H H∗ H1 H∗1 H2
dcot [ ] [t] [ ] [1 t] [ ]
dext [1 t] [1] [1] [ ] [ ]
Table 1.1: Deterministic terms in identified Hˆ ∈ H (Lütkepohl [78], p. 256)
where:
Dcot =A
‖D‖0 + tA
‖D‖1 = D
co
0 + tD
co
1
Dext =A
⊥D⊥0 + tA
⊥D⊥1 = D
ex
0 + tD
ex
1
Collecting the T observations the matrix form of the model is obtained:
∆Y = [C+0 C
+]
[
Y+
∆Z+
]
+ U , (1.4.7)
where:
∆Y =[∆Y1 . . .∆YT ] ∈ Rn×T Y+ =
[
Y0 . . . YT−1
dco0 . . . d
co
T−1
]
∈ RK×T ,
∆Z+ =
[
∆Z0 . . . ∆ZT−1
dex0 . . . d
ex
T−1
]
=

∆Y0 . . . ∆YT−1
...
...
...
∆Y−p+2 . . . ∆YT−p+1
dex0 . . . d
ex
T−1
 ∈ RJ×T
U =[U1 . . . UT ] ∈ Rn×T
C+0 =[C0 D
co
0 D
co
1 ] ∈ Rn×K C+ = [C1 . . . Cp Dex0 Dex1 ] ∈ Rn×J
(1.4.8)
with d(·)t chosen from table 1.1 according to the specific model Hˆ presented in next
section. An empty component in any d(·)t is to be intended as the correspondent
deterministic component being not present.
In this sense, the dimension dim(d(·)) will be equal to the number of elements
appearing therein, which allows to explicit:
K = K(n, Hˆ) = dim(dco) + n
J = J(n, p, Hˆ) = dim(dex) + n(p− 1).
Furthermore, {Y−p+1 . . . Y0} will be the vector collecting p initial conditions.
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1.5 VAR processes estimation
The notation introduced deserves a further comment: it is evident that LS estimation
out of equation (1.4.7) does not distinguish model H, H∗ and H∗1 (table 1.1) as long
as restricted LS estimation is not explicitelty performed.
If instead ML estimation is used, the estimation technique provides cointegrating
basis to be concentrated-out first and projected on ∆Z+, and (1.4.8) is the correct
formulation to be used (see B.3.1) .
The procedure devoted to lag number estimation will be presented in the beginning,
as again its results are independent from true cointegration order r ([78], p. 326).
The in-chapter discussion will be strictly limited to what is necessary to disclose the
procedure that will be used when dealing with data analysis; detailed description of
both the estimators and their asymptotic distributons are provided in appendix B.
1.5.1 Estimating the number of lags p
As observed in [78] (Proposition 8.1, p. 326, which follows Paulsen [95]), a consistent
estimate pˆ of the total number of lags can be retrieved using standard information
criteria, even in the presence of unit roots.
A relatively15 short dataset requests however much more precision than the one
provided by either the Akaike (AIC) or Bayesian (BIC) Information Criteria : it
would be preferrable to dispose of a procedure similar to that of the univariate case.
Namely, considering the VAR form 1.4.1, a sequence of portmanteau tests in the
form:
H0 : Γj = 0 vs H1 : Γj 6= 0
should be performed for any j going from some upper-bound value down to 1.
Andrews [10] shows that, defining Γ = [Γ1 . . .Γp] and given a generic matrix of
coefficients restrictions R ∈ RK×n2p with full row rank K, the test statitistic λR
used for general tests of the form:
H0 : R vec(Γ) = 0 vs H1 : R vec(Γ) 6= 0
might cause distortions in refusing the null or viceversa.
Indeed (see observations B.2.2 and B.5.1), the asymptotic distribution of LS/ML
estimators is gaussian but with a singular covariance matrix; hence the restricted
estimator does not lead to standard F-tests like univariate cases, because relevant
Wald statistics have not a standard F-distribution.
15Relative with respect to the number of parameters to be estimated.
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Dolado and Lütkepohl [41] tackled this issue by proving the following proposition,
which is presented here as in [78] (Proposition 7.8, p. 319): it applies to VAR(p)
processes in level form, obtained by combining (1.3.1) and (1.4.1).
Proposition 1.5.1. Let Y ∈ I(1), Y = X+D be a n-dimensional V AR(p) process,
with X in VAR form (1.4.1); let Γˆ = [Γˆ1 . . . Γˆp] be the unrestricted16 LS estimator
of Γ = [Γ1 . . .Γp]. Let
Γ(−i) =[Γ1 . . .Γi−1 Γi+1 . . .Γp]
Γˆ(−i) =[Γˆ1 . . . Γˆi−1 Γˆi+1 . . . Γˆp]
be the matrices obtained by removing Γi and Γˆi from Γ and Γˆ, respectively. Then:
√
T
(
vec(Γˆ(−i))− vec(Γ(−i))
)
d−→ N (0,Σ(−i)) (1.5.1)
where Σ(−i) ∈ Rn2(p−1)×n2(p−1) is non-singular; a consistent estimator is:
Σˆ(−i) = T [(Y(−i)Y
′
(−i))
−1](11) ⊗ ΣˆU (1.5.2)
where ΣˆU is the LS estimator of ΣU , [(Y(−i)Y′(−i))−1](11) is the north-west Rn(p−1)×n(p−1)
minor of [(Y(−i)Y′(−i))−1] ∈ Rnp×np and Y(−i) = [Y (−i)0 . . . Y (−i)T−1] , being
Y (−i)t = (∆i−1Yt−1 . . .∆i−pYt−p)
′ ∈ Rnp×1 , t = 0 . . . T − 1
and ∆jYt := Yt − Yt−j for any j ∈ Z.
This proposition is useful in this framework in view of the following:
Corollary 1.5.1. In the framework of proposition 1.5.1, a test statistic for the null
of the form:
H0 : R vec(Γ(−i)) = 0
being R ∈ RK×n2p a full row rank matrix, can be defined as:
λR = T Γˆ
′
(−i)R
′(RΣˆ(−i)R
′)−1RΓˆ(−i) (1.5.3)
and λR
d−→ χ2(n2).
16Results are independent from the form of the deterministic component ([78], p. 300), hence
no restriction is needed; the estimators Γˆi can easily be obtained from Cˆi, see observation B.2.1.
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In practice, the corollary provides to estimate Γ in a VAR(p + 1) model, with
the underlying prior that Γp+1 = 0; the null Γp = 0 is then tested using the
first p estimated matrices, since standard asymptotic distribution can be retrieved
whenever at least one of the matrices Γj is not restricted under the null.
Boundaries for minimum/maximum number of lags to be tested are retrieved out of
one dimensional tests by defining:
pˆ−∞ = min{pˆj : j = 1 . . . n} , pˆ+∞ = max{pˆj : j = 1 . . . n} (1.5.4)
the maximum number of lags estimated among single components of vector Y ∈ Rn.
A sequence of tests can be performed to estimate pˆ in the vector process; the initial
condition is pˆ0 := pˆ+∞, and the h-th test, h = 0, 1 . . . pˆ−∞, tracks three steps:
• Step 1: Estimate the VAR(pˆh + 1) model via LS (Proposition B.2.1 and
observation B.2.1) to retrieve an estimator for the AR matrices Γˆ.
• Step 2: Define Γˆ−(pˆh+1) the estimator collecting the first pˆh autoregressive
matrices, as described in Proposition 1.5.1, and R = [0 In], where 0 is the
zero-matrix of Rn2×n2(pˆh−1).
• Step 3: Test the null H0 : R vec(Γˆ−(pˆh+1)) = 0, using the estimator λR as
defined in (1.5.3) with Γˆ(−i) = Γˆ−(pˆh+1); by proposition 1.5.1, λR
d−→ χ2(n2).
If the null is accepted, we set pˆh+1 = pˆh− 1 and go back to step 1; else, we set
pˆ = pˆh, and the procedure ends.
At the end of the procedure, an estimated number of lags pˆ is retrieved, which
serves as a first proxy to be used when performing residual analysis: this point will
be clearified in section 1.5.4; next section describes the cointegrated VAR framework
of Johansen [72] and defines procedures to estimate the cointegration rank r.
1.5.2 Estimating the cointegration rank
Differently from lags number estimation, test results on cointegrating rank are not
independent from the form of deterministic terms which are included.
The general framework is that of equation (1.3.1): restrictions to deterministic terms
have already been introduced in table 1.1 and will be justified in this section.
The null hypothesis in cointegration tests does always assume that cointegrating
rank is equal to some r, so it is worth to work under equation (1.4.6), that is,
decomposing C0 = AB′ and projecting D on A; restrictions on projections will
characterize different models.
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H(0) ⊂ . . . H(r) . . . ⊂ H(n)
∪ ∪ ∪
H∗(0) ⊂ . . . H∗(r) . . . ⊂ H∗(n)
|| ∪ ∪
H1(0) ⊂ . . . H1(r) . . . ⊂ H1(n)
∪ ∪ ∪
H∗1 (0) ⊂ . . . H∗1 (r) . . . ⊂ H∗1 (n)
|| ∪ ∪
H2(0) ⊂ . . . H2(r) . . . ⊂ H2(n)
Table 1.2: Relations between the possible n-dimensional VAR(p) processes when the
vector is I(1). (Johansen, [74], Table 5.1, p. 82)
Johansen ([74], pp. 79-80) distinguishes five different possible submodels in the
I(1) framework: cointregration tests wll be constructed by combining within the
null the assumption of cointegrating rank equal to r and additional restrictions. A
set of submodels, each corresponding to a specific null, can thus be constructed:
• H(r) : rk(C0) = r;
• H∗(r) : rk(C0) = r, A⊥D⊥1 = 0;
• H1(r) : rk(C0) = r, D1 = 0;
• H∗1 (r) : rk(C0) = r, A⊥D⊥0 = 0, D1 = 0;
• H2(r) : rk(C0) = r, D0 = 0, D1 = 0.
Table 1.2 shows the mutual relationship between the various models defined by
previous restrictions. Fixing a row provides a sequence of nested models, which has
the same form in the deterministic terms; fixing a column provides a set of nested
models with the same cointegrating rank r and number of restrictions increasing as
the column is scrolled upwards.
Johansen ([74], pp. 89-100) provide a set of test statistics based on ML estimation
(proposition B.3.1), and the procedure is independent17 from Dt.
Defining L(H˜0|H˜1) the likelihood ratio test statistic for generic H˜0 in H˜1, with the
null H˜0 nested inside an alternative H˜1, we can collect Johansen’s result in the two
propositions that follows.
17Obviously, the form of the matrices Sij depends on the specific VAR ([78], p. 299), as well as
the eigenvalues λi.
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Proposition 1.5.2. Let Y ∈ I(1) be a n-dimensional VAR(p) process in the form
(1.4.4); let λi be the eigenvalues as determined by the ML estimation procedure
in any of the different models presented in table 1.2 ; then, for any H˜ ∈ H =
{H,H∗, H1, H∗1 , H2} the likelihood ratio test statistic −2 logL(H˜(r)|H˜(n)) is:
− T
n∑
i=r+1
log(1− λi) d−→ tr
[ ∫ 1
0
(dW )F˜ ′
(∫ 1
0
F˜ F˜ ′
)−1 ∫ 1
0
F˜ (dW )′
]
(1.5.5)
where W is a standard n − r dimensional Brownian motion and F˜ is a n − r
dimensional random vector which distribution depends on the specific H˜; the statistic
(1.5.5) is commonly referred to as trace statistic.
Proposition 1.5.3. Let Y ∈ I(1) be a n-dimensional VAR(p) process in the form
(1.4.4) and consider two consecutive column nested models of the form (H,H∗) or
(H1, H
∗
1 ). Let λi, λ∗i be the eigenvalues in the trace statistic (1.5.5) out of the ML
estimation of each of the two models, respectively; the likelihood ratio test statistic:
− 2 logL(H∗(r)|H(r)) = T
n∑
i=r+1
log
(
1− λ∗i
1− λi
)
d−→ χ2(n− r) (1.5.6)
and the same holds for −2 logL(H∗1 (r)|H1(r)).
Next proposition solves instead the issues related to different models in each
column of table 1.2, collecting the results in [74](Theorem 11.3, p. 162).
Proposition 1.5.4. Let Y ∈ I(1) be a n-dimensional VAR(p) process in the form
(1.4.4) and consider two consecutive column nested models of the form (H1, H∗) or
(H2, H
∗
1 ). Let λi, λ∗i be the eigenvalues in the trace statistic (1.5.5) out of the ML
estimation of each of the two models, respectively; the likelihood ratio test statistic:
− 2 logL(H1(r)|H∗(r)) = T
r∑
i=1
log
(
1− λi
1− λ∗i
)
d−→ χ2(r) (1.5.7)
and the same results hold for −2 logL(H2(r)|H∗1 (r)).
Results from previous propositions can be rewritten in terms of the trace statistic
(1.5.5), through simple algebraic manipulation.
The distributions of F˜ in (1.5.5) is always non-standard, whatever H˜ is tested: a
formal definition is given in Johansen ([74], Theorem 11.1, p. 156), and distributions
are also tabulated therein ([74], pp. 214-216).
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Despite statistics are available so that any model can be tested with respect to
those lying upwards, downwards and left or right in table 1.2, testing two non-nested
models (in diagonal positions) is not possible; this implies also that if two different
models induce two different cointegration ranks, there is no formal way to decide
ex-ante which of them fits best and, so neither which the correct r is.
Johansen [73] suggests an iterative procedure aimed to jointly test cointegration
rank and the form of deterministic terms, which prioritizes vertical movements in
the table: indeed, in the last resort, a model must be prioritized by choice (see [3])
since no total order is available in two-dimensions.
Here no selection procedure will be performed: a prior model will instead be chosen
according to some preliminary stylized facts the analysis is expected to match.
First of all, no deterministic trend is expected within the cointegrating relation and
no quadratic trend is expected in the data, thus excluding models H and H∗; a
constant is instead envisaged within the cointegrating relation, thus model H2 is to
be excluded too; these prior exclusions will be justified in section 1.7.
Two possible models,H1 andH∗1 are left, the latter nested into the former: proposition
1.5.3 supplies the correct test statistic to be applied so as to discriminate between
these two models; such tests refuses the null of modelH∗1 only in four cases among the
over one-hundred models which are explored within chapters 2 and 3 thus assuming
the prior Hˆ = H∗1 does not bring forth heavy restrictions.
This choice enables the iterate use of proposition 1.5.3, in testing the null H∗1 (r)
against the alternative H∗1 (n), with r = 0 . . . n− 1.
The section that follows presents a two-stage parameter estimation which is devoted
to vector processes exhibiting a cointegrating rank rˆ > 0 only: indeed, if rˆ = 0, then
A = B = 0, hence model H∗1 reduces to a simple regression18 in differences:
∆Y = C∆Z + U
which is estimated by standatd LS, as it involves stationary variables only.
Furthermore, it is worth to stress (see section B.4). that spurious cointegrating
relations (where Y j ∈ I(0) for at least one j) must be taken off in advance at this
level; whenever the null of unit root is refused by all tests in 1.1 for Y j, cointegrating
rank will be priorly settled to rˆ = 0.
It could be argued that a true cointegrating relation may arise among the other
variables: in this work however, only two-dimensional models will be analyzed, hence
the prior rˆ = 0 becomes fundamental not to run up against modeling shortcomings.
18Observe that with model H∗1 no constant is provided outside the cointegrating relations.
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1.5.3 Two-stage parameter estimation
This section presents the procedure used to estimate the parameter set of the
cointegrated VAR when cointegration rank is estimated to be rˆ > 0; the selected
model is Hˆ = Hˆ∗1 but general notations will be kept along for the sake of completeness.
This procedure is particularly useful as it can be adopted for testing hypothesis on
the cointegration basis separately from the other parameters; moreover in small
samples EGLS is preferrable to ML estimation, see [23]; details concerning the
construction of the estimators are instead provided in section B.4.
As aforementioned (section 1.5), if the cointegrating rank is known to be r then
the cointegrating matrix C0 can be written as C0 = AB′, where A,B ∈ Rn×r and
rk(A) = rk(B) = r; in order to identify the decomposition, a custom choice, equation
(B.4.1), is normalization :
C+0 = A · [Ir B′n−r D‖0 D‖1] = A · [Ir B+
′
n−r] (1.5.8)
so that equation (1.4.7) can be rewritten19 as:
∆Y = [A[Ir B
+′
n−r] C
+]
[
Y+
∆Z+
]
+ U (1.5.9)
with B+n−r ∈ R(K−r)×r; in this way, we can exploit superconsistency of the estimators
of the cointegrating matrix and retrieve proxies of the true parameters of the model
following a two stage procedure (further details are provided in section B.4).
• Step 1: Retrieve ML estimators [Cˆ+0 Cˆ+] of the parameters underlying the
identified model Hˆ as well as of the white noise covariance matrix ΣˆU (section
B.3). Under the assumption of cointegrating rank r and of a normalized model
in the form (1.5.9), we can use the first r columns of Cˆ+0 as an estimator Aˆ
and construct the normalized EGLS estimator ˆˆB+n−r defined in (B.4.3).
• Step 2: Superconsistency of ˆˆB+n−r allows to substitute it in (1.5.9) treating it
as it was thet rue parameter, and to estimate the parameters left by ordinary
LS. The exact form of the estimators [ ˆˆA ˆˆC+] is given in equation (B.5.8).
The two step procedure allows to measure parameters significance separately for the
long and short run dynamics of the model: standard asymptotic distributions can
be retrieved out of linear transforms of the estimators, yielding meaningful t-ratios,
which will be presented alongside the estimates.
19Observe that this would not be possible if any of the components was stationary.
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Consider the normalized EGLS estimator in vectorized form vec
( ˆˆ
B+n−r
) ∈ Rr(K−r)×1
as retrieved out of the first step of parameters estimation procedure.
Proposition B.5.2 shows the asymptotic distribution of the (vectorized) estimator
to be N (0,Σ∗) for some Σ∗, retrieved out of equation (B.5.3); hence:
vec
( ˆˆ
B+n−r
)
i
Σ∗ii
∼ t(T − rK + r2) , i = 1 . . . r(K − r) (1.5.10)
being t(N) a student-t distribution with N degrees of freedom.
Similarly, by corollary B.5.1, the EGLS estimator of the short-run parameters
vec
(
[
ˆˆ
A
ˆˆ
C+]
) ∈ Rn(J+r) has an asymptotic gaussian distribution N (0,ΣA,C), where
ΣA,C is defined in (B.5.6). Hence:
vec
(
[
ˆˆ
A
ˆˆ
C+])i
(ΣA,C)ii
∼ t(T − nJ − rn) , i = 1 . . . n(J + r) (1.5.11)
1.5.4 Whiteness of residuals and lags refinement
Last step is to inspect whether the white noise assumption for the innovations U
is satisfied a fortiori, by checking whether estimated autocovariance matrices are
significantly different from zero. Define the residuals20:
Uˆ = ∆Y − [ ˆˆA ˆˆB+ ˆˆC+]
[
Y+
∆Z+
]
(1.5.12)
being ˆˆA, ˆˆB+n−r,
ˆˆ
C+ set up as in (B.4.3) and (B.5.8); the estimated autocovariance
matrices are defined as:
Ωˆi :=
1
T
T∑
t=i+1
UˆtUˆ
′
t−i , i = 0 . . . h (1.5.13)
where h is chosen depending on T , as it will be clear in what follows.21
Lütkepohl ([78], Lemma 8.1, p. 346) shows that the asymptotic distribution of the
estimated autocovariance matrix is the same whether single or two-step procedure
is used, again because of the superconsistency of ˆˆB+n−r.
As a maximum number of lags h is selected, define:
Ωˆh = [Ωˆ1 . . . Ωˆh] ∈ Rn×nh (1.5.14)
A first portmanteau test statistic can be constructed so as to test the null:
H0 : Ωh = 0 vs H
∗
0 : Ωh 6= 0 (1.5.15)
20In case of cointegrated VAR, Uˆ = ˆˆU, the residuals out of the two-step procedure. In case of
pure VAR in differences (A = B = 0), residuals comes out of LS estimation.
21Clearly, setting i = 0, we retrieve the estimated autocovariance matrix Ωˆ0 = ΣˆU .
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As relatively small datasets are examined in this work, we use the corrected test
statistic:
λW (h) := T
2
h∑
i=1
(T − i)−1 tr (Ωˆ′iΩˆ−10 ΩˆiΩˆ−10 ) (1.5.16)
Under H0, for22 large T and large h, Qh ≈ χ2
(
n2h− n2(p− 1)− nr); h must then
be chosen large enough so as to ensure a well defined χ2 distribution.
Particularly the distribution of the test statistic (1.5.16) might not be well defined
for small values of h, and thus a correct test statistic for low order autocorrelation
would not be available. It is thus convenient to define a second statistic based on a
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. First of all, we rewrite Ωi as:
Ωi = UGiU ′ =
T∑
t=i+1
utu
′
t−i i = 1 . . . h
where Gi ∈ RT×T is conveniently defined (see [78], p. 158), stack the matrices in
G = (G1 . . .Gh) ∈ RT×Th and define U := (Ih ⊗ U)G.
The estimated quantities Ωˆi and Uˆ are defined by substituting Uˆ to U ; notice also
that (1.5.14) can be rewritten as Ωˆh = UˆG(Ih ⊗ Uˆ ′).
Consider the auxiliary regression model :
Uˆ = CZ +DUˆ + E (1.5.17)
where E = [E1 . . . En] ∈ Rn×T collects the trajectory of a white noise and the
regressors [Z Uˆ ] are defined from:
Z = [Y+∆Z+]′ C = [C+0 C+] D := [D1 . . .Dh] ∈ Rn×nh
hence Uˆ = ∆Y − CˆZ are the usual estimated residuals of the LS estimator (B.2.5)
(see (1.4.7)). Each column of matrix equation (1.5.17) can thus be rewritten as:
Uˆt = CZt +D1Uˆt−1 + · · ·+DhUˆt−h + Et , t = 1 . . . T
The aim is to retrieve a consistent statistic out of the portmanteau test:
H0 : D = 0 vs H1 : Dj 6= 0 ∃j = 1 . . . h (1.5.18)
using the Lagrange multiplier principle. The idea (see [78], p. 696) is to consider an
estimator of [C D] in (1.5.17) restricted under the null in (1.5.18):
Uˆ = CZ + E
Ordinary LS estimation implies:
CR = (ZZ ′)−1Z ′Uˆ = (ZZ ′)−1Z ′(∆Y − CˆZ) (1.5.19)
22Differently from the stationary case, a VAR model with unit roots yields a χ2 asymptotic
distribution whose degrees of freedom depend on the cointegrating rank too.
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The first order conditions used to retrieve the estimators imply ([78], p. 696):
Z ′(∆Y − CˆZ) = 0. (1.5.20)
Hence, combining (1.5.19) and (1.5.20), and under the null D = 0, the model
(1.5.17) yields Uˆ = E , that is, residuals are white noise. Hence the null in (1.5.18)
tests exactly the white noise assumption of Uˆ ; the available test statistic is ([78], p.
172):
λLM(h) = vec (Uˆ Uˆ ′)′ ·
(
[Uˆ Uˆ ′ − UˆZ ′(ZZ ′)−1ZUˆ ′]−1 ⊗ In
) · vec (Uˆ Uˆ ′) (1.5.21)
that can be retrieved out of the original model using the LS estimated residuals Uˆ
and substituting Z according to (1.4.8).
The following proposition ([78], Proposition 4.8, p. 173) defines the asymptotics of
the test stastistic:
Proposition 1.5.5. The test statistic (1.5.21) has an asymptotic χ2(hn2) distribution.
We will perform both this latter test for any h = 1 . . . h¯, being h¯ a maximum
number of backwards lags selected in advance, as well as test (1.5.16) from the first
h ≤ h¯ for which the distribution is well defined up to h¯.
The analysis of residuals is useful to refine the estimated number of lags out of
the two-step procedure in 1.5.1; in case any of the two statistics rejects the null in
(1.5.15) or (1.5.18) for any of the h, then an additional lag is provided in the model
and estimation of cointegrating rank, basis and short-run parameters is repeated,
until the respective nulls are accepted for any test and any h.
1.6 VAR estimation procedure: summary
We conclude this section by summarizing the estimation procedure pursued in any
of the vector models. The significance level of test statitstics is set to 5%.
1. Take raw data out of the provider and smoothen them with the correspondent
moving average of each component Y j of Y = (Y 1 . . . Y n).
2. Estimate each process’ number of lags pˆj according to the procedure described
in 1.1 and define pˆ−∞ and pˆ+∞ according to (1.5.4).
3. Perform ADF test for unit-roots for each of the processes with number of lags
equal to the estimated pˆj, and estimate their integration orders qj.
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4. Construct the vector process Z and estimate the number of lags pˆ with the
restriction pˆ−∞ ≤ pˆ ≤ pˆ+∞
5. Estimate23 the cointegrating rank rˆ with prior Hˆ = H∗1 (table 1.2) and number
of lags pˆ. If rˆ = 0 , proceed with LS estimation (B.2.5) with C+0 = 0 and go
to step 8, else proceed. Condifence level is set to 10% in cointegrating tests.
6. Estimate model in the form 1.4.7 by LS (equation (B.2.5)) and retrieve a first
estimate Aˆ and Cˆ+.
7. Construct the normalized EGLS estimator ˆˆBn−r through the procedure in 1.5.3,
and retrieve the two-stage estimators ˆˆA and ˆˆC+
8. Use estimated parameters to compute residuals Uˆ and test for autocorrelation
of residuals using test statistics (1.5.16) and (1.5.21) for h = 1, . . . h¯.
If both tests fail in refusing the null for any h, then we have a model for Z;
else, we augment pˆ in step 4 and repeat the procedure.
1.7 Concluding remarks
It is clear that the statistical procedure which is used to infer relationships among
observations is a choice among a large number of possible alternatives.
It is thus worth to justify this choice by commenting the way that economic and
financial conclusions are taken out of statistics in the next chapters. The aim of
this section is to distinguish the results which are considered relevant to drag out
conclusions, and to legitimize leaving others out of discussion.
The observations in chapter 2 collects portfolio yields; chapter 3 focus on credit risk
scores involving macroeconomic and financial variables. Concerning the former, one
purpose is to isolate credit-risk premia through statistical hedging strategies and
compare them to the canonical spread vis-à-vis Germany. The other is comparing
the elements of the resulting set of credit-risk free portfolios, as mutual comparison
might reveal eventual market shortcomings.
The first part of chapter 3 deals with standard econometrics while the second is
instead devoted to the construction of physical default probability measures. These
are compared to standard CDS-implied default probabilities, to measure the portion
of market-implied creditworthiness which is explained by a relatively small set of
macroeconomic and financial variables
The common drawback of endogenous approaches is that they cloak the underlying
determinants of the processes.
23If n = 2 and any Y j ∈ I(0), then the cointegration rank is set to rˆ = 0.
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When comparison involve custom benchmarks, these latter will be considered
reliable, and their underlying determinants will not be explored. This reasoning
applies both to chapter 2 and the second half of chapter 3. The econometric
analysis which is pursued in the first part of chapter 3 is rather standard, but the
coefficients to be inferred came out of a theoretical model and their determinants
are not investigated.
The amount of feedback effects among the components of any vector process might
help to explain risk determinants without explicitly defining them.
This also clearifies the choice to prioritize model H∗1 (and H1) among Johansen’s
alternatives; a quadratic trend is excluded from data (model H) so as to be coherent
with single-variables unit root tests models under the alternative.
A trend in the cointegrating relation (model H∗) is also to be excluded: if the
purpose is to construct processes replicating the in-crisis behavior of custom credit
risk measures, their behavior must not be trended in equilibrium.
A constant is instead allowed in the cointegrating relation (hence H2 is excluded),
because a constant in the cointegrating relation is the minimum number of parameters
to be included so as to take into account different measurement units24.
A rigorous statistical analysis of each of the models, would be necessary to exhaust
the discussion, but this would result in a huge amount of data analysis which would
move the discussion away from the scope of present work.
The amount of statistical results which is presented here is retained to be a good
trade-off among econometrics and its interpretation: on the one hand, it is sufficient
to validate conclusions, on the other it remains not the core of the thesis.
The choice is to present as much intuitions as possible, and expose the minimum
number of results needed to validate them.
In this sense, no multiple restriction tests on models parameter will be performed.
Any parameter will be retained to be significant and discussed each time that
single-valued t-statistics out of 1.5.10 and 1.5.11 are greater than 2.25
Furhtermore, the first AR matrix C1 is presented only, and comments on short
term dynamics will be limited to this latter; major interest is devoted to short-term
feedback effects, while diagonal elements of C1 (the pure autoregressive component
of each single process) will be almost overlooked.
Time series in each respective chapter are sampled at different frequencies (weekly
and quarterly, respectively) and on different time windows (3.5 versus 13 years).
Hence, despite the same approach is pursued, a different relevance must be given to
the outcomes of the econometric analysis across the two chapters.
24See [3] and references within.
25The value which yields roughly the 5% p-value for tw-tailed student-t tests with degrees of
freedom between 40 and 200 is roughly 2.
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Short-run analysis is very important in chapter 2: as the time frequency is
higher and the time window shorter. The effectiveness of hedging strategies and
the possible arbitrages portfolios sharing the same risk factors have to be measured
locally. Bivariate models with highly correlated innovations will be indicators of the
hedging strategies being effective, as the combined position presents the same source
of randomness as one of the two components.
Cointegrating relations are instead not expected here. The short time window
covered by weekly-frequencies datasets in chapter 3 delineate a perfect framework
for local analysis but prevents from drawing conlclusion on the long-run.
Quoting Johansen ([74], p. 41): ". . . the long-run relations. . . are relations between
the variables in the economy, as described by the statistical model, which show
themselves in the adjustment behaviour of the agents in the sense that the agents
try to force the variables back towards the attractor set defined by the relations".
Cointegrating relations are equivalent to underlying economics relationships which
lingers in time, from which the two variables are moved and towards which they
tend, thus justifying the epiteth structural.
Cointegrating basis will thus be given major importance in chapter 3, as containing
information on long-term relationship among vectors components.
First of all, following Johansen’s interpretation, within a larger time window it
should in principle be more likely that cointegrating relations arise.
Secondly, credit risk measures embedmarkets expectations on future creditworthiness
of target borrower. A long-term equilibrium among two different credit risk measures
is thus interpretable as the information sets lying behind each respective model are
sharing the same long run expectations on target borrower.
Concerning short-run analysis in chapter 3, values for matrix C1 and covariance
matrix Σ are as well reported here, for the sake of completeness, but retained of
minor relevance.
Short-run significant feedback effects among mixed macroeconomic and financial
variables at this frequency are less expectable and less meaningful becuase of the
relatively small size T of the observation sets.26
26The innovation processes should be modeled in a mixed-frequency framework, so that VARs
can be retained significant at slower (quarterly) frequencies.
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2 Sovereign yields and credit risk premia
Financial markets registered early announces of the burst of debt crisis in Europe
before the general cross-country rise in debt level, when a uniform increase in credit
risk perception affected the whole Monetary Union.
Bond yields spreads of Euro-area countries vis-à-vis Germany became a major
indicator of member states financial state of health.
Yields spreads are assumed to embed country-specific risk premia, while Germany is
used as a risk-free benchmark: the difference is commonly computed between long
term (10-years) interest rates.
Credit conditions remained stable from 2000 up to 2008: significant nonzero spreads
across different countries during this period were limited, and normally attributed
to negligible country-specific factors. [36]. Sovereign bonds yields remained globally
aligned one with the other, and also with European benchmark money-markets.
In 2010, upward shifts of sovereign yields in many distressed countries raised German
obligations to the role of preferred investments across Europe.
Demand for German obligations exceeded normal levels because the country was
perceived as the most reliable credit-risk free borrower across the Euro-market.
Observing the rising importance of spreads magnitude in recent years, that severely
affected policy making too, the reliability of such a number when used to reckon
European countries creditworthiness is to be investigated.
The use of yield spreads as a proxy for credit risk relies on the assumptions that all
country-specific yields embed a credit-risk premium, which is defined as the excess
rate with respect to German one, perceived as credit risk-free.
Nonetheless, yields can be statistically explained using a wide range of different
factors [36]; this suggests that credit risk could be only one of the determinants
of Euro-area spreads. A second issue to be enquired is thus whether each specific
long-term sovereign rate includes other premia: by other, we mean any premium
that is neither directly attributable to credit risk nor to systemic movements in the
EMU (and thus still remains country-specific).
It is common across literature to model sovereign yields according to three different
latent factors: a credit risk premium, a liquidity risk premium and an international
risk factor, see [79]. Observe that the latter is a common across any sovereign yield
in the EMU, while the formers are strictly country specific.
Figure 2.1(a) presents the underlying decomposition of sovereign yields across the
Euro-zone that will serve as a building block throughout this chapter, namely:
y = pi + L+ b (2.1)
where pi is credit-risk premium, L is a common Euro-area benchmark and b collects
the (eventual) additional risk premia [27].
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Figure 2.1: (a): European yields determinants and yields spreads; (b): CDS-bearing
yield spread on Euribor yields the basis (a) while CDS-bearing spreads between different
countries yields basis difference in (b) should be zero if bS ≡ bR.
This decomposition is different from that proposed in [79] in at least two aspects.
The first one, is that the international risk factor27 has been substituted by an
ad-hoc European benchmark rate. It would be faulty to assume that this latter
embeds international risk factors, as the general decrease of risk-free rates in Europe
coincides with the harshest crisis moments for peripheral EMU countries.
This will not be a major shortcoming however when yields spreads are considered,
as European yields common factors should cancel.
The second is that the country-specific component b is not directly attributed to
liquidity risk at the moment. The idea is to assume that yields spreads reflect credit
risk premium only, observe the eventual discrepancies among European portfolios
where credit risk is hedged, and reckon the determinants of such misalignements.
Liquidity risk will obviously considered as one possible candidate.
Following decomposition (2.1), we assume that differencing yields on Germany
corresponds to assume that piDE and bDE are negligible.
The first issue to be tackled is to spin off within any other sovereign yield the portion
which is attributable to credit risk per-se, without using Germany as benchmark, so
as to isolate the portion b deserving different explanations.
In order to decouple these components, the choice was to use credit derivatives: the
basic vanilla instrument is Credit Default Swap (CDS).
Briefly, CDS contracts swaps (up to a certain maturity) losses due to eventual
credit events (section 2.1) with a periodic premium (the CDS spread), which value
is actively traded on the market. The protection buyer pays the premium each
quarter up to any credit event.
27In [11], yields covary importantly with financial measures of global risk: the Volatily Index
(VIX) is then chosen as proxy, similarly to [36].
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If this latter occurs, the contract triggers and the (protection) seller reimburses
the difference between face value and post-default price.28
CDS were thus created to hedge target obligations from credit risk : CDS-based
hedging strategies exploits the countermonotonic movements of CDS spreads and
bond yields. As an example, consider a case of credit crunch: any combined long
position on CDS and bond benefits from the rise in the derivative position and
is affected by the rise in yields. Market efficiency implies that the difference of
these two variations is zero, thus hedging is complete; a rather detailed survey upon
statistical hedging techniques built up with credit derivatives is [31].
We define CDS-bearing bond a combined long position on bond and correspondent
(in terms of maturity) CDS, and let y¯ be the correspondent yield-to-maturity (CDS
bearing yield) of such portfolio.
If the hedging is perfect, the resulting y¯ is released from credit risk premium: the
difference y− y¯ = pi represents exactly the credit-risk premium comparable to spread
vis-à-vis Germany. In this way, we can also test the choice of benchmarking over
Germany can be tested through the computation of piDE.
Taking differences y¯ − L over a risk-free rate L reveals the existence of additional
country-specific risky factors. Furthermore, given two different countries A and A′,
the difference y¯A − y¯A′ allows to infer eventual misalignements independently from
the chosen benchmark L.
This chapter investigates such issues: beyond Germany (DE), the risky countries
under exam are Italy (IT) and Spain (ES).
The first step is to retrieve portfolio yields, which is a typical issue in fixed-income
analysis [26]: fixed future cash flows are combined with current price to retrieve a
continuosly compounded yield-to-maturity, using absence of arbitrage.
Term structures are implied using yields to different maturities, and interpolating
a set of time-continuous functions, which in turn are described through a relatively
limited parameter set: details are provided in section C.1.
It is worth to stress that, by setting y−y¯ = pi, we implicitly assume that CDS-hedging
is perfect, that is, y¯A is a credit-risk free yield for any country A.
In this sense, the standardization process [82] which interested European CDS
market in late 2009 [83], provides a correct and computationally efficient framework
to pursue our objectives. Before 2009, credit derivatives were specifically tailored
to counterparties writing them, and traded OTC, thus the assumption that their
prices contained information on credit risk only could be questioned.
The ISDA CDS-Bang standardization process was aimed to regulate the CDS market
which suffered from (and was cause of) several shortcomings during latest financial
crisis.
28Details can be found in section C.2.
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New contract features include the introduction of regulating authorities: a Central
Clearing House (CCH), aimed at reducing both counterparty and liquidity risk, and
a Determination Committee, endowed with the power of taking binding decisions on
credit events deemed to trigger any of the relevant credit derivatives.
This new standardized market provides changes in specific contract features too:
standard CDS have standard payment dates, standard maturities and fixed coupons.
Moreover, an upfront payment made at inception is introduced: this spot price of
credit risk, floating according with the microstructure of this new market.
The characteristics of new cash flows can be exploited so that custom fixed-income
methodologies can be used for market-implied term structures. The presence of a
CCH is assumed to justiffy this approach in considering CDS-spreads not to contain
any counterparty or liquidity risk premium, thus reflecting credit risk only.
The process b in (2.1) is named after basis and deserves further comments: indeed,
imperfections in hedging strategies based on CDS already captured the attention of
central banks and regulators.
Particularly, given any obligation, the CDS-bond basis can be defined as the difference
between the CDS spread and the asset swap spread (ASW) (see [35] and [48]).
This latter, quoted on the market, is the difference between the obligation’s yield
to maturity and a benchmark rate, often the Euribor rate itself. If CDS spread S is
equal to credit risk premium pi then:
pi − ASW = pi − (y − L) = L− (y − pi) = L− y¯ = −b
and b is the CDS-bond basis as in [35] and [118], except for the change in sign.
The choice was however to maintain the minus sign to stress the interpretation of
the basis as an additional risk premium to be paid in distress times, and will still
be addressed to as the CDS-bond basis.
The term structure of interest rates {y(t, T )}T≥t is implied for any of the countries
together with the correspondent CDS-bearing term structure {y¯(t, T )}T≥t.
The money market L(t, T ) offer spot rates only when T ≤ 1 year: rates with longer
maturities are bootstrapped using swap rates, see section C.3.1.
Equation (2.1) is considered with T = 10 years, so yt = y(t, 10), Lt = L(t, 10) and
y¯(t, 10) = y¯t; this implies that pit = pi(t, 10) and bt = b(t, 10).
Standardization of CDS market across Europe became effective in July 2009, but
six months are left to the market to digest new features: the sample period, with
weekly frequency, starts in January, 2010 and end up in June, 2013.
The chapter is organized as follows: section 2.1 provides for a description of the
aforementioned standardization process which underlies the construction of the term
structure experiments, out of [28]. The description is rather detailed but it will be
useful on the one hand to justify the methodology used in the hedging procedure,
and on the other to guess possible determinants of the basis itself.
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Section 2.2 provides for a brief description of the Nelson-Siegel [89] framework for
implying yield curves: section 2.2.1 specializes that to CDS-bearing yields.
Section 2.3 presents the econometric results based on the procedure described in
section 1.6: the role of Germany is tested in subsection 2.3.1, by computation of
piDE and direct comparison with L. Subsection 2.3.2 compares credit risk premia
pi and yield spreads vis-à-vis Germany, and the performances of hedging strategies
are monitored by comparing y¯ with L for distressed countries. The comparison of
synthetic credit risk free yields is disclosed in subsection 2.3.3, while results are
commented and collected in subsection (2.3.4).
2.1 CDS and the crisis: a standardized market
The credit derivatives market experienced rapid growth in the last decade, attracting
several types of investors. It also became the subject of intense debate, involving
financial economists, institutions and regulators, as well as a large share of the
public, especially after recent financial turmoil.
The birth of this market can be traced back to the early nineties, when the first
vanilla instruments (CDS), were created with the purpose of hedging credit risk
exposures to a given reference entity.
The buyer pays a periodic coupon in order to receive protection against deteriorations
in the creditworthiness of such entity which might cause permanent impairments to
the value of its obligations. When a credit event affects the reference entity, the
protection seller bears the financial loss of the buyer and partially refunds him up
to a certain notional amount ℘∗ (usually the obligation face value) of the reference
obligations issued by that entity29.
CDS contract could be likened to a traditional insurance contract: there are, however,
at least two relevant differences. Firstly, stopping premium payments is typically
sufficient to unwind an insurance contract, while, as for most of derivatives, closing
out a CDS position means to sign another CDS contract and taking the opposite side
of the trade. Secondly, there is no need for the buyer to actually hold the obligations
on which the CDS is written: he could be willing to take purely speculative positions
and trade naked CDS [90].
Notwithstanding speculation, CDS are attractive as hedging instruments too: when
competition increased across markets in the nineties, causing a relevant number of
bankruptcies (for example, Enron and Worldcom), banks were forced to monitor
and manage their credit portfolios more actively [114].
29Notice that reference obligation of a given entity includes a wide range of obligations; before
standardization, no limits were imposed to relevant obligations for a transaction, as long as the
buyer found a counterparty willing to accept them.
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Figure 2.2: Semiannual evolution of CDS market, 2001-2010. (Source: BIS [113])
CDS allowed credit risk to be managed separately from loans: by buying CDS
protection, banks could mitigate the risk profile of their portfolios without altering
their compositions.
As an example, consider a small commercial bank who wants to hedge credit risk
of a corporate borrower towards whom the bank is already largely exposed; by
transferring this credit risk to another bank through a CDS, the bank can keep
lending to this customer, but avoids excessive concentration risk, reduces the resources
committed to the borrower and frees capital for different investments.
CDS were originally highly tailored to the needs of the counterparties, which were
free to privately agree on any of the clauses in these contracts; among them, the
payment dates for the buyer’s premium or the different types of credit events leading
to the triggering of the contract (the activation of the seller’s payment) and the
post-default settlement of the contract.
Particular mention deserves the latter of these clauses: choosing different settlement
methods is indeed strictly connected to the determination of the post-default value
R of the reference obligation.
Cash settlement provides a reimbursement equal to the difference between the par
value and the post-default value of the buyer’s position. Since forecasting this
recovery rate R was rather challenging for both counterparties, 73% of CDS contracts
had Physical Settlement as a settlement clause until 2005 [114].
Physical settlement eliminates the problem of determining the final price R: indeed,
it provides for physical delivery of the reference obligation for a face value of ℘∗ in
exchange for the seller’s post-default payment.
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Figure 2.2 shows the impressive increase in trading volume of CDS on a global
scale, measured as the aggregated outstanding notional of any outstanding contract,
which reached its peak of nearly $60 trillions in the second half of 2007.
As observed in [113], the subsequent decline was not due to a decrease in the appeal
of the CDS market, but rather to trade compression procedures aimed to reduce the
outstanding notional.30
Despite the benefits stemming from risk management and hedging procedures, the
crisis revealed several structural and operational shortcomings of credit derivatives
market. In particular, because of the OTC nature of this latter, relevant information
about the real credit risk borne by protection sellers was partly concealed, preventing
regulators from collecting complete information on existing trades. [91]
Moreover, the bilateral nature of CDS contracts exposes them to counterparty risk,
that is, the risk that one of the two parties does not fulfill its obligations. [9]
Counterparty risk is not independent from credit risk; as an example, consider a rise
in credit risk of the reference entity: this deterioration in creditworthiness weakens
the seller of protection, by increasing the likelihood that he will be asked to pay,
and increases counterparty risk for the buyer.31
The growth of the CDS market required the creation of a framework of greater legal
certainty, capable of reducing the number of disputes and facilitating supervision by
market authorities. The main obstacle was the highly tailored nature of different
contracts, self-assessed by the parties to each transaction.
Standardizing credit derivatives market was therefore considered a necessary step
towards a better regulation of the CDS market: a first attempt in this direction was
made by the International Swap and Derivatives Association32(ISDA) through the
2003 Credit Derivatives Definition [62].
The financial turmoil started in mid-2007 brought the CDS market to the attention
of regulators again, while many weaknesses of the financial system were exacerbating
a widespread impact due to the interconnections across different markets.
Several regulatory statements included guidances for the CDS market: among them,
the most influential was the President’s Working Group33 (PWG)’s Policy Statement
on Financial Markets [91], dated 2008.
30 Any CDS, since bilaterally traded, is also double counted with this method so gross notional
reflects past trades but provides little information on real credit risk bore by a dealer in this market,
see again [114].
31 There is also an indirect connection between credit and counterparty risk, due to the posting
of collaterals [114]; recent studies [15] introduced also the concept of wrong way risk where the
interaction between the two is reversed.
32 ISDA is a private international association collecting more than 800 members including, among
others, dealers, issuers and law firms.
33 The PWG was originally established to respond to the “Black Monday”of 1987, and gathers
together several key representatives of US financial institutions.
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The main purpose of the document was to analyze the causes of the financial crisis,
and to provide recommendations in order to “..take the steps necessary to mitigate
systemic risk, restore investor confidence, and facilitate stable economic growth”.
Severe shortcomings in risk-management practices were revealed: these practices
caused significant losses and balance-sheet pressures, contributed to the tightening
of lending terms and negatively impacted economic growth too.
Among them, the inaccuracy and untimeliness of trade data submission, lack of
robust procedures for the resolution of trade matching errors, operational problems
(counterparties miscommunication, backlogs of unconfirmed trades) and uncertainty
in post-default settlement.
In order to tackle these issues, the PWG proposed to create an infrastructure
endowed with decisional power in any of the processing events over the lifetime
of such contracts, so as to ensure transparency and coordination in determining
relevant credit events for any transaction in the market. This infrastructure should
also be responsible for determining a post-default value acknowledged by any investor.
A precise ratification of relevant credit events was thus to be introduced: furthermore,
it was deemed necesessary to reach also a certain degree of standardization of clauses
which were formerly tailored to the needs of each pair of counterparties, in order to
facilitate an electronic processing similar to that of an exchange board.
A response to PWG’s guidances was the introduction by ISDA of two supplements
to [62], namely the March 2009 Supplement [63] , also known as the "CDS Big
Bang" followed by the July 2009 Supplement [64], named “CDS Small Bang”.
More than 2000 market participants, including banks as well as institutional investors,
voluntarily adhered to Big Bang protocol, see [9].
These latter, despite some changes to be globally applied, were specifically addressed
to North American corporate contracts: the following Small Bang protocol was
drawn to introduce the same amendments for European corporate and sovereign
CDS, as well as to deal with the problem of credit restructuring.
The main novelties introduced by the Big Bang contract are summarized as:
• introduction of Determination Committees ;
• introduction of an electronic Central Clearing House;
• introduction of an Auction Settlement Method ;
• restrictions on Restructuring conventions;
• creation of a Credit Event Backstop Date;
• introduction of a First Full Coupon clause;
• introduction of a Fixed Coupon plus Upfront fees.
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Figure 2.3: DCs composition: Voting and Non-voting members. (Source: Markit [82])
The Small Bang brought about these changes to European contracts; among
the novelties of this second protocol, the most important was the hardwiring of an
auction mechanism for restructuring credit event.
Standardization of CDS contracts34 is also a straightforward way to net out a large
number of opposite positions with the same features (entity, maturity..), offsetting
the cash flows that these positions generate.
Netting out opposite positions can significantly reduce payment volumes so that
cash shortages are less likely to cause a default. The total outstanding notional, as
measured after netting out positions, should also give a more efficient measure of
global exposures to credit derivatives market.
This section focuses on this standardization process, exploring its main features,
with particular interest for the standardization of coupons and payment dates, and
the introduction of upfront payments in CDS contracts, which are the cornestores
of the CDS-bearing yields framework (section 2.2).
Before 2009, counterparties priced a CDS contract by agreeing on the annual coupon
of the CDS itself (the spread S); after the introduction of a standard coupon in 2009,
counterparties started to price a CDS contract by agreeing on the upfront payment,
which represents the expected discounted value of the difference between the coupon
that would have been agreed upon in the old regime and the new one.
The upfront correspondent to any given spread must be determined in the same
way by all market participants: in order to accomplish this task, ISDA developed
a toolkit, the ISDA CDS Standard Model, that provides a one-to-one mapping of
these quotations (upfront and conventional spread), based on standard no-arbitrage
principles; details are presented in C.2.1.
34 Note that standardization applies to the whole credit derivatives market; here however, we
will deal only with single name vanilla instruments.
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Figure 2.4: Trade compression through CCH: A, B, C are dealers and arrows points
to the one buying protection for a notional equal to the number over it. Different colors
refers to different reference entities. Figure 2.4(a) shows a network of bilateral transactions
processed to a central counterparty in 2.4(b) and then compressed 2.4(c). The outstanding
notional is reduced from 24 to 8. (Source: Markit [82])
2.1.1 Credit Derivatives Determination Committees
The Big Bang introduced fiveDetermination Committees (DCs), one for each relevant
region35, and each of them having responsibilities with respect to that region.
Rules to determine the composition of any DC are explained in detail in [82]: the
final composition of each of the five is shown in Figure 2.3.
DCs are mainly addressed to harmonize industry and avoid misinterpretations as any
credit event affects the reference entity. According to the 2003 rules, the potential
occurrence of a credit event was determined through a private notice delivered from
one party to the other: this of course creates often disputes, both on relevance and
timing of that event. It could be also the case that triggering a CDS in any of these
bilateral transactions led other backlogged transactions to demand for payment,
creating unpredictable reactions in the market.
The Big Bang intended to rule out these problems introducing a simpler principle:
any of the ISDA members, with the sponsor of a DC member, is endowed with the
right to request the DC to be conveyed in order to take a decision on whether and
when a specific credit event for the transaction occurred. [63]
The DC credit event/No credit event Announcement is the day ISDA effectively
takes its binding decision on target credit event: in case this latter is announced, it
will be the DC again to decide the terms of the post-default Auction (see section
2.1.3) and the set of Deliverable Obligations.
35Namely the Americas, Asia-ex Japan, Australia-New Zealand, EMEA (Europe,Middle-East
and Africa) and Japan itslef.
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The presence of a determination committee is also fundamental in order to
introduce a Central Clearing House (section 2.1.2): it standardizes the occurrence
of the credit event and draws out the rules to determine the Final Price, so that
any of the positions of the CCH referred to the same reference obligation and credit
event will be dealt with according to the same rules.
2.1.2 Central Clearing House
The introduction of a dedicated central counterparty in the credit derivatives market
was a further step towards counterparty risk reduction [82].
Common feature to achieve this goal was the idea of trade compression, that is,
reducing the number of redundant contracts.
This was achieved through private operators collecting multilateral information from
the network of counterparties. These operators, maintaining the same risk profile
of each of the participants’ positions, proposed then a renewed set of trades that
becomes compulsory for each of the parties agreeing to it.
Before the CDS Bangs, the CDS market exhibited a complicated network of bilateral
transactions, each of them possibly providing different clauses that were to be
mathematically translated in a huge amount of stand-alone variables interacting
in the same network, see Figure 2.4(a).
The introduction of multilateral agreements urged coordination of investors: the
Central Clearing House is an improvement for the netting procedure, see figures
2.4(b) and 2.4(c), and it also substitutes bilateral counterparty risk with the risk
of its own failure. The drawback of such a market is that market participants are
forced to abandon the opportunity of meeting their demands for specific products36.
2.1.3 Auction Settlement
Early in the life of CDS contracts, most of defaulted obligations were settled according
to physical settlement, in order to avoid forecasting post-default values when marking
the contract to the market. This system was coherent with the use of CDS as
hedging instruments, but the growing interest of speculators in this market enhanced
the number of entities for which the outstanding notional of CDS surpassed the
outstanding debt they referred to [9].
When a credit event occurred, speculators on buy-side were forced to purchase
obligations to be delivered in order to settle the transaction and thus receive payment
from the CDS contract, creating artificial price pressures and distorting the market.
36Moreover, clearing houses are not particularly efficient with illiquid financial products, as is
precisely the case with customized derivatives, see [107] for a deeper analysis of the trade-off
between centralexchanges and OTC markets in this context.
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Figure 2.5: Short squeeze of Dana Corporation bonds at the turn of default. On February
24, Dana starts debt restructuring and on March 3 filed under Chapter 11 for Bankruptcy.
After that, rush to buy bonds resulted in a sudden price rising of a yet defaulted obligation.
(Source: Amadei et al. [9])
An interesting example is the short squeeze of the price of Dana Corporation
bonds which followed its bankruptcy in March 2006, see figure 2.5.
Cash Settlement was introduced in order to avoid these issues: payments owed to
buyers due to triggered CDS did not request any delivery. The problem to be faced
was to find a mechanism to set a transparent and trustworthy final price R that the
whole market could use.
Following the recommendations of the PWG and in the same standardization spirit,
Auction Settlement is introduced in the Big Bang supplement.
As pointed out in [82], several auctions had been hold also before the CDS Bangs :
their weakness was that participants were requested to sign separate protocols to
adhere to any of the auctions, which was not particularly efficient compared to the
hardwiring of an auction methodology into standard contracts.
The main benefit of holding an auction is to set a market price to be used to set
all trades across the market. Physical delivery at different times could expose the
buyer-side counterparties to further profit or loss due to the investors scrambling to
buy bonds, even if those same buyers’ positions remained flat.37
37Physical settlement was maintained in standard CDS as a fallback settlement method in case
the DC, due to an insufficient number of dealers willing to trade defaulted obligations, decides not
to hold any auction.
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2.1.4 Restructuring Clause Convention
Among credit events, restructuring is the most difficult to define: it refers to changes
in the covenants of reference obligations, like delaying or change in the currency
composition of payments.
Restructuring used to be considered a credit event only if related to deterioration of
credit worthiness of the borrower, a relationship yet difficult to be determined.
It could happen, for example, that these changes are not disadvantageous for the
buyer, and yet he finds profit in triggering the CDS, or viceversa.
As an example (see [83] and [92]), in 2000 Conseco Finance restructured its bank
debt to include new guarantees and increased coupons: these changes were not
disadvantageous for the holders of these obligations, and this fact was reflected
by their price which was almost unaffected. However, some banks on buyer-side of
transactions triggered the CDS, delivering cheaper longer dated bonds and receiving
this almost-par value for their restructured bonds.
According to ISDA [62], four different types of restructuring clauses can be specified:
Old Restructuring (Old R), Modified Restructuring (Mod R), Modified - Modified
Restructuring (Mod-Mod R) and No Restructuring (No R). The differences among
the first three focus mainly on maturity/transferability of deliverable obligations;
the last name speaks for itself.
Trading contracts with restructuring obviously demand for additional premia: before
2009, CDS on North American Investment Grade typically traded with Mod R while
North American High Yield traded with No-R; most European contracts instead
provided Mod-Mod R clause.
The Big Bang ensured DCs the authority to hold auctions to settle contracts after
either a failure to pay or a bankruptcy event. It however prohibits from authorizing
auctions to settle trades after restructuring events: under the US jurisdiction, many
restructuring scenarios are filed as bankruptcy under “Chapter 11 ”.
On the contrary European jurisdiction separates bankruptcy and restructuring in a
much more sharped way: as a result approximately 96% of European CDS contracts
used to trade with Mod-Mod R [82].
ISDA decided to include restructuring among the significant credit events in Europe,
yet still an auction mechanism was to be designed distinctively for such events, and
the CDS Small Bang is addressed exactly to tease out this problem.
Briefly, the problem was that the combination of maturity limitation of deliverable
obligations and maturity of CDS could require a too large number of different
auctions to settle all contracts, hardening price discovery and increasing operational
risk as well as mispricing between one auction and another. We will not enter into
details, which are examined again in [82].
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In order to deal with these issues, DCs were granted with the power to aggregate
deliverable obligations into maturity buckets, and to set auctions only for those
buckets, so that multiple auctions are allowed, but their number is restrained.
DC can also decide not to hold any auction for a given bucket38 if it is likely that
the auction will be conducted on illiquid credits, or be redundant across different
buckets. If no auction is held for a given maturity bucket, a movement option is
provided: the buyer can move to the closest following bucket for which an auction
is being held and the seller can move to the 30 years maturity bucket.
The last clause dealing with restructuring is the so called Use it or Lose it feature:
in case of restructuring, a triggering deadline of five business days following the
publication of the final list of deliverable obligations is established; this is aimed to
prevent protection buyers not to trigger a CDS even if the reference obligation is
traded below par value, in order to wait a subsequent event and get a higher payout.
As a result of both CDS Bangs, North American CDS provides No R clause while
European Corporate and Sovereign trade with Mod-Mod R.
2.1.5 Credit Event Backstop Date
Before the CDS Bangs, CDS Protection started in most of the cases the first calendar
day after the trade date; the introduction of a lookback period for credit events was
deemed to be mandatory in order to reduce backlog of trades and allow the DC to
announce an eventual a credit event without affecting the market with the time they
spend in taking any decision.
In order to clarify this point, we follow the example in [82]: assume an investor enters
into a short position on a CDS. One week later, in order to offset this position, he
enters a long position on a CDS with the same exact features of previous one.
Assume that DC has been convened within these two transaction dates and later
on they decide that a relevant credit event occurred during this rather small time
interval. The two positions are not truly offset, since the investor must reimburse
the buyer because of first transaction but gets no money from the second, because
the relevant credit event is timed before this latter, see figure 2.6(a).
In order eliminate this residual stub risk a credit event backstop date was introduced.
Let t be the trade date: the Big Bang provides that the effective date for protection
to be be the backstop date t− 60, that is the trade date itself minus sixty calendar
days, see figure 2.6(b).
38Unless the so called 300/5 criterion applies, that is, if five or more dealer members of the DC
are involved into more than 300 transactions triggered by that credit event.
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2.1.6 Payment dates and Full First Coupon
As far as 2003, the dates when the buyer paid the coupon to the seller were
specifically agreed by the two parties: the Big Bang explicitly standardized the
CDS dates39 defining them to be the 20th of March, June, September and December,
business adjusted, which are also the standard days of contracts maturities.
The first payment date is the first of these days following t+1: for example, trading
a CDS with Maturity T = 5 years in January 2013 means the 20th of March 2013
will be the first payment date and the 20th of March 2018 will be the maturity.
Observe that payments are postponed on the buyer side: the coupon he pays the
seller on each payment date for the protection offered in previous period. If trade
date t is set up off a standard payment date, the amount and date for the uncovered
period must be refunded to the buyer. In order to determine the accrued amount,
it is sufficient to count the number of days in this time stub and compute the
correspondent fraction of the annual payment S.
It is left to be established when this payment is due. Before the Big Bang, the
procedure, established by the 2003 definitions [62], was yet rather tricky.
The payments schedule depended on whether the trade date occurred before or
within 30 days from first payment date. In the first case the payment was accrued
within a short stub period going from t to the first payment date T1 following t, and
made on T1; else, the payment was accrued on a long stub period, going from t to
the second payment date T2, and made on this latter date, figure 2.7.
This mechanism clearly jars the request for standardisation, and mantains the
complications in payments offsetting because discounted future cash flows are a
discontinuous function of trade date.
The proposed solution was to introduce a Full First Coupon Payment : the payment
is due on T1 and accrued on the whole period elapsing from previous standard CDS
date T0. In order to compensate the buyer for the unprotected days he paid for, a
Riskless Accrued Premium APt = S · AP01t = S · (t − T0) is then40 owed by the
seller at inception, seefigure 2.8(b).
2.1.7 Standardized Coupon
The last relevant issues concern the CDS spread, which was to be standardized so as
to match as many contract as possible in the central clearing procedure and facilitate
trade compression, see figure 2.8(a).
39Although it was already common practice, to blend positions in CDS and bond market.
40Here S indicates generically CDS spread, since this clause is not necessarely subordinated to
standard coupons conventions whether the contract is traded OTC. Observe that, on the seller’s
side, this is equivalent to the accrued coupon of an obligation that is received when purchased
between two payment dates.
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It was typical to trade CDS according to their annual coupon S, quoted in basis
points per year. Since late 2008, it became common practice to trade CDS for highly
distressed/high yields names, with a fixed coupon (typically 500 basis points) and
an attached upfront payment to be made at the time of inception t.
It is clear (see [100]) that a fixed coupon coupled with an upfront payment facilitates
unwinds of contracts, as only a cash adjustment is needed to exchange a CDS when
a fixed cash flow would income in the future, and the source of variability is that of
the term structure used to discount cash flows.
Upfront payments make it easier for sellers to deal with early default that triggered
relevant quantities of contracts, thus reducing counterparty risk by pumping liquidity
in the market itself. Moreover, this trading convention prevents speculators to enter
the market of CDS, as attracted by zero entry costs.
The Big Bang standardizes coupon for North American contracts, either to 100 bp
or 500 bp: the choice of the latter value was due to common market practices for
highly volatile names while the former was chosen to let the most number of names
to trade greater or equal than par with respect to previous quoted spread.
In this way the market avoids to request a huge amount of payments from the seller
to the buyer in order to match any of the transactions, which would be the case if a
value lower than average was chosen as standard. The Small Bang addressed these
issues to European corporate and western sovereign CDS, but leaves a wider range
o f standard coupons41 with respect to correspondent American contracts.
Even if upfront payment becomes in this way the real metric for CDS market, most
dealers are still quoting the CDS spread rather than their upfront.
These conventional, or par, spreads are the values that sets to zero the expected cash
flow of a CDS trading without any upfront payment. Such a computation requires
a model that marks the CDS contract to the market.
It is important to stress that a unique methodology must be set for the whole market
to convert spreads to upfront payments.
ISDA developed an algorithm, the ISDA CDS Standard Model42, which allows to
convert quotes with a standardized algorithm, in line with the purpose of the Bangs.
An interesting question arise from such new contracts: modeling hedging strategies
that use CDS requires indeed the analysis of their real cash flow, which is not the
one provided by the par spread.
Next section explores yield curves modeling framework and shows the crucial role
of this new payments schedule when the CDS-bearing term structure is defined.
41Namely 25bp, 100bp, 300bp, 500bp, 750bp and 1000bp; a reason for introducing such different
coupons is the cautiousness of customers to trade with large upfront points, see [83].
42Markit is currently the administrator of this code, providing support and mantainance, as well
as further development: the code is available with open source license at http://www.cdsmodel.com.
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Figure 2.6: Protection before 2.6(a) and 2.6(b) after the CDS Big Bang. Red (green) dots
shows the triggered short (long) positions. (Source: Markit [82])
T0 T1 T2
St · (T1 − t)
(a) Short Stub (T1 − t ≥ 30)
t T1 T2
St · (T2 − t)
(b) Long Stub (T1 − t < 30)
Figure 2.7: Cash flow of buyer’s first payment before the CDS Big Bang in case of Short
Stub 2.7(a) and Long Stub 2.7(b). Blue dots point out payment dates while S is the annual
coupon rate of the contract. (Source: Markit [82])
t T1
0 St ·∆T
t T1
Ut −APt S¯ ·∆T
T0 t T1
−APt S¯ ·∆T1
(b)
Figure 2.8: Transition from floating spread St to floating upfront Ut plus fixed spread S¯,
2.8(a). Cash flow of buyer’s first payment after CDS Big Bang, with full first coupon. The
minus sign refers to positive cash flows towards the buyer 2.8(b). (Source: Markit [82])
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2.2 Modeling the term structure of interest rates
Several interpolation methods can be used to extract a benchmark term structure
from government bond market43. All of them rely on common assumptions inducing
similar features. At time t, it is assumed that target country A admits a term
structure of its obligations market: that is, a zero-coupon-bond (zcb) exists for any
maturity T > t, so that it is possible to define a time-indexed set of maps:
{P (t, ·) : T 7→ P (t, T ), T ≥ t}t≥0 (2.2.1)
being P (t, T ) the price at t of a zcb paying 1 at T .
Consider a generic (coupon) obligation, with maturity TK : standard non-arbitrage
assumptions imply that current bond dirty44 price ℘(t), observed on the market,
must be equal to the sum of the obligation’s discounted future cash flow:
℘(t) = C ·
K∑
k=1
P (t, Tk) + ℘
∗ · P (t, TK), (2.2.2)
where T = {Tk : k = 1 . . . K} is the set of future payment dates, C is the bond’s
coupon and ℘∗ is the face value paid at maturity TK . Each of the zcb prices can be
used to retrieve the correspondent yield-to-maturity :
y(t, T ) = − log(P (t, T ))
T − t ∀ T > t . (2.2.3)
and this latter is in turn expressed as a function of the set of parameters θt.
In this way, y(t, T ) = y(θt, T ) so that, inverting (2.2.3), the term structure at time
t can be expressed as a function of those same parameters {P (t, T )} = {P (θt, T )}.
Assuming face value is the same for any obligation, we can write:
℘(t) = ℘(y(t, T ), C) = ℘(y(θt, T ), C) = ℘(θt, T , C) (2.2.4)
where with y(t, T ) we indicate the unknown function y(t, ·) evaluated on the grid
defined by the fixed time schedule of target obligation.
Observe that T and C are known at t, hence θt remains the only variable because
℘ = ℘(θt, T , C) does not depend on time explicitely.
Figure 2.9 outlines the reasoning behind this procedure: given any obligation, the
sum of current clean price and accrued coupon (both floating, as daily marked to
market) is expressed as a combination of fixed future cash flows on a fixed time
schedule. Market price ℘(t) is then a function of ℘(θt, T , C), defined in (2.2.4).
43See for example [88] for a rather exhaustive review.
44Bearing accrued coupon.
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Figure 2.9: Yield curve: for each obligation, combine floating quantities (red) with fixed
ones (yellow) and use interpolation techniques to retrieve a yield curve.
Now consider at time t the set of the JA obligations relevant for country A.
Specifically, define the set of dirty prices {℘Aj (t)}JAj=1, each with maturity TAKj, coupon
payment dates grid T Aj = {TAkj} and fixed coupon {CAj }. Country A will be fixed,
so the index is dropped in order to lighten notations.
The advantage of (2.2.4) is that it allows to write the price of each obligation as a
function of the same parameter vector θt. We collect such prices in the vector:
℘(θt, T , C) = (℘1(θt, T1, C1) · · ·℘J(θt, TJ , CJ)) = ℘(θt) (2.2.5)
where C = {C1 . . . CJ} and T = {T1} ∪ . . . {TJ} are the set of aggregated coupons
and relevant maturities for the obligations set, and the last equality comes from the
fact that these latter are fixed at t. The best-fit parameter vector θ∗t is defined as
the solution to the weighted least squares problem:
θ∗t = argmin
θt
(℘t − ℘(θt))′W (θt)(℘t − ℘(θt)) (2.2.6)
where ℘t = (℘1(t) . . . ℘J(t)) is the vector of observed prices at trade date t and
the weighting matrix W (θt) is chosen so that it refines interpolation in those time
intervals where most of the relevant bonds maturities are concentrated.
A set of maps of the form T 7→ ℘(θ∗t , T ) is dynamically implied for any t using the
sequence of best-fit parameters vector {θ∗t }, determined iterating this method in t.
The form of ℘(θt, T ) typically depends on the interpolating functions: here we chose
Nelson-Siegel method [89], as their algorithm and following refinements are the most
used among central banks [1].
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It is worth to stress that no default probabilities are taken into account when
computing yields. It is commonly assumed that the obligations market prices reflect
any risk premium attributable to credit events that are likely to occur in the future.
In this setting, θt will be a four parameter vector
θt = (β0t, β1t, β2t, β3t)
which allows in turn to express yields as:
y(t, T ) = y(θt, T ) = β0t + β1t · g1t(β3t, T ) + β2t · g2t(β3t, T )
where git are defined in section C.1, where a detailed description of the method is
also provided; it is common to refer to the parameters respectively as level, slope,
curvature and scale of the yield curve.
The reasons behind this terminology are beyond the aim of this paper, although
names are helpful in capturing different forms of shape changes of the curve along
time: a detailed discussion can be found in [39].
A typical shape is shown in figure 2.9: as mentioned earlier, the focus is on T = 10
years maturity, hence yt will simply indicate y(θ∗t , 10), where for any fixed t the
vector θ∗t is defined in (2.2.6).
2.2.1 Standard CDS contracts: CDS-bearing yields
As mentioned in previous section, standardization of credit derivatives provides the
correct framework to perform our tests using market data. The summary provided
in section 2.1 concerning the standardization process is sufficient45 to disclose it.
The main assumption validating the arguments which will follow is rather a stress
test for standard market.
More precisely, it is assumed that the whole market trade on a platform monitored
by a CCH (section 2.1.2), constituted by big dealers having easy access to credit
market which are effectively the major owners of European sovereign debt.
It is assumed that counterparty risk is now sufficiently scattered among them so
that standard CDS-contracts are unresponsive to counterparty risk.
Furthermore, it is also assumed that the CCH injects sufficient liquidity in the
market so that positions on any of the derivative contracts for any reference entity
are not charged with liquidity premia. Hence, CDS prices credit risk only.
It is clear that ascribing these assumptions to the introduction of the standard
market would be strained: as imperfections will come out from the hedging strategy
(section 2.3), a possible solution could be dropping any of these two hypotheses.
This could also suggest possible patterns for future market enhancements.
45A rigorous description of the standardiztion process is available: the interested reader can
consult the official documentation [63] and [64].
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The changes in the contracts cash flow, payment dates and coupons are instead
fundamental building blocks of the set up underlying the techniques which are used
to construct the hedged yield curve.
Figure 2.8(a) shows the changes in CDS coupons with the introduction of the
standard coupon S¯. The market switches free-entrance contracts with floating
spreads to contracts providing a floating entrance fee and a fixed future payment.
As aforementioned, the introduction of upfront payments contributed to discourage
purely speculative long naked CDS positions, because of the initial cost.
This enforces our choice to perform this analysis in the perspective of a hedger, as
this type of investor should be the most attracted by standard market improvements.
From a technical point of view, whether future coupons were priced daily, we would
obtain future cash flows varying in time, and this would add another source of
randomness and inaccuracy in the statistical results.
Upfront payment is immediately46 due to the counterparty and can be interpreted
as the minimum premium demanded by the market to transfer credit risk.
This premium is settled by imposing an additional percentage of the obligation’s
face value to be attached to the initial price together with a set of (standard) fixed
coupons to be paid at future (standard) dates.
The first full coupon clause introduced in subsection 2.1.6 provides the buyer to pay
full protection for a fixed accrual period (one quarter) between standard dates.
He is then reimboursed of the accrued premium APt = S¯ · (T − t), see figure 2.8
(b), which repays him for the credit risk protection period he did not benefit from.
The premium is then subtracted from upfront price to determine the cash settlement
amount u(t) = Ut − APt.
Credit derivatives market platforms continue however to quote CDS at time t in
terms of the time-varying spread St. ISDA provides a standard mechanism [84] to
convert quoted spread to upfront payment: section C.2 provide a rigorous description
of their algorithm.
It is worth to stress that the mechanism is uniquely defined for each participant in
the standard market, so that there’s no subjectivity in converting St to Ut.
As long as a unique pricing mechanism is used by any dealer to imply upfront
payments from quoted spread, we have a unique mapping from CDS quoted spread to
upfront payments, so any discussion on correctedness of ISDA modeling framework
is unnecessary here.
Any investor willing to enter into a CDS position observes market quotes for buying
protection and determines the same spot price for credit risk u(t), playing the role
of dirty bond price p(t).
46Ignoring small effects coming from settlement dates and day count conventions.
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Figure 2.10: CDS-bearing yield curve: standardization allows to rely exactly on the same
methodology commonly used for custom yields. Spot floating variables (red) are combined
with future fixed ones (yellow) and the yield curve is retrieved using the same interpolation
techniques.
It is clear how this standardization process calls for the use of fixed-income tools.
The cash flow of new CDS contracts includes a cash amount to be immediately paid,
computed combining a spot price and the accrual of a coupon, and a future cash
flow which is deterministic on the whole set of subsequent trade dates, both in terms
of payment dates and amounts (figure 2.10).
The cash flow of the derivative is now aligned to that of its underlying. It can
be argued that future CDS payments are contingent on default, hence default
probabilities should be taken into account as source of randomness in future cash
flows, and used in pricing equations.
However, as mentioned before, that same assumption lies behind any of the standard
methods used to imply yield spreads vis-à-vis Germany: the existence of a term
structure reflecting credit risk within the correspondent yields is postulated, and
differences with German yields are then taken exactly to isolate this component.
Consider now a credit risk hedging strategy, obtained by combining a long position
on the obligation with a long position on a standard CDS contract: we define
CDS-bearing bond such a hedging portfolio for target obligation.
The payoff of this portfolio is that of a more costly bond in terms of initial price
that will also repay the owner with lower coupons, due to the (quarterly) payment
of CDS standard spread. In order to build up the CDS-bearing yield curve, further
details must be specified about the construction of the hedging strategy.
First of all, the choice of maturity of the CDS contract: given any obligation
contributing to the naked yield curve construction, a standard CDS is purchased
and chosen the way an infinitely risk averse investor would.
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Standardized contracts are traded with only ten different standard maturities,
while at trade date t the set of obligations residual lives {Tkj} is generally larger.
The choice is to hedge the long bond position with the CDS expiring on the first
standard maturity which is able to cover the whole residual life of the bond.
This latter is an example of shortcomings stemming from standardized CDS market:
for example a large premium must be paid for early expiring obligations, which must
be covered up to the minimum standard available maturity, namely six months.
Credit derivatives could thus be less attractive at short maturities, and investors
might prefer to enter into specifically tailored over-the-counter transactions 47.
The marked-to-market value of the position at time t is given by the sum of the
obligation price and the upfront considering accrued coupons for both of them:
℘(t) + u(t)
As for naked bond positions, standard non-arbitrage principles set this value equal
to its discounted future cash flow.
Assume that there exists a term structure of such portfolios {P¯ (t, T )}, where P (t, T )
is the price of a zcb maturing at t which is protected by a standard CDS contract
with maturity T . In a non standard-market, this assumption adds nothing new to
those underlying the construction of naked yield curve, since whether the zcb exists,
a specifically tailored CDS with maturity T can be settled.
In a standard market, such assumption is a bit more strained, so again eventual
hedging imperfections could be solved by dropping it.
The discount curve P¯ (t, T ) differs from P (t, T ) in that credit risk is completely
hedged through a standard contract48. It can be thus used as a discount factor for
coupon portfolios where credit-risk is not present; the equivalent of equation (C.1.2)
is:
℘(t) + u(t) = C ·
∑
T∈T
P¯ (t, T ) + ℘∗ · P¯ (t, TK)− S ·
∑
T¯∈T¯
P¯ (t, T¯ ) (2.2.7)
where T¯ is the set of the correspondent CDS payment dates, T is the set of target
bond payment dates, including the obligation’s maturity TK , and C and S are the
fixed bond and CDS coupon, respectively.
Applying to each obligation the same reasoning which is used to retrieve custom
yield curve, the same procedure can be used to imply a CDS-bearing yield curve
y¯(θ¯∗t , ·) for any t; details are provided in section C.1.1.
47This however does not affect the analysis when long term rates are considered.
48Observe that the difference P (t, T ) − P¯ (t, T ) is by definition the theoretical cost of standard
CDS-protection for maturity T .
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Obviously, equation (2.2.7) can be written in terms of quoted spread St as
℘(t) = C ·
∑
T∈T
P¯ (t, T ) + ℘∗ · P¯ (t, TK)− St ·
∑
T¯∈T¯
P¯ (t, T¯ ) (2.2.8)
but the implied term structure {P¯ (t, T )}t≥0 will be different from {P¯ (t, T )}t≥0.
Indeed, see section C.2, the upfront payment satisfies the equality49:
u(t) + S¯
∑
T¯∈T¯
L(t, T¯ )Q(τ > T¯ ) = St
∑
T¯∈T¯
L(t, T¯ )Q(τ > T¯ ) (2.2.9)
where Q(τ > T¯ ) is the risk-neutral default probability and L(t, T ) is the zero discount
factor implied through Euribor rates, as provided by the ISDA CDS Standard model.
Hence (2.2.8) and (2.2.9) are equivalent, that is P (t, ·) ≡ P¯ (t, ·), only if P¯ (t, ·) ≡
L(t, ·)Q(t, ·), which cannot be as P¯ (t, T ) is credit risk free.
Again, the 10-years CDS-bearing yield y¯(θ¯∗t , 10) = y¯t is considered, so that, given
a generic country A, it is possible to imply out of market observations two time
series {yAt } and {y¯At }. Under the assumption that counterparty and liquidity risk
are negligible, the difference between the yields of naked and hedged portfolios is
due to credit risk only.
We define the credit-risk (yield) premium for country A at time t as
piAt = y
A
t − y¯At . (2.2.10)
Notice that, as this new payments schedule is composed of an additional cost to
bear at inception plus a sequence of negative coupons, y¯t will be lower than yt for
any t, so pit is a nonnegative process by construction.
Moreover, the yield y¯t is a country-specific credit-risk free yield, constructed within
the money and credit derivatives market of target country only.
It is thus interesting to measure that same credit risk premium piDEt for Germany, to
capture eventual movements in the perceptions of Germany being a risk-free country.
The central role of this country can be verified also by comparing German yields
to a credit-risk free curve. Euribor rate is chosen as the benchmark credit-risk free
term structure, so as to be coherent with CDS pricing and conversion methods50.
The resulting 10-years Euribor rate Lt = L(t, 10) is considered; the first econometric
results thus concern the VAR processes (yDE, L), (y¯DE, L) and (yDE, y¯DEt ).
The credit risk premium piA can be directly compared to spread vis-à-vis Germany
st = y
A
t − yDEt to reveal eventual mismatches possibly related to the choice of a
benchmark wich is not, in principle, credit-risk free.
49Accrual at default is not considered, yet it does not affect our argument.
50See section C.3.1.
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Hence, the VAR models (piIT , sIT ) (piES, sES) are explored too. Since the resulting
yields y¯A are in principle credit risk free yields, it is worth to examine the relationships
with Lt, so the models (y¯IT , L) and (y¯ES, L) will be discussed. The CDS-bond basis:
bAt = y¯
A
t − Lt (2.2.11)
is interpreted as the additional risk premium which is paid by an investor purchasing
a hedged bond position financing himself at Euribor.
This analysis could also be influenced by the fact that Euribor is not the correct
credit-risk free benchmark. it is thus worth to examine the VAR models (y¯ITt , y¯ESt )
and (bIT , bES). The CDS-bearing yield difference:
y¯ITt − y¯ESt (2.2.12)
is independent from L. Trended or systematic deviation from zero of (2.2.12)
invalidates any attempt of modeling the basis as white noise discrepancy, disclosing
structural imperfections of the CDS-bond market.
2.3 Econometric analysis
Data are sampled at daily frequencies from January 2, 2010 to June 21, 2013, this
latter being the latest CDS standard date for the first half of 2013. Bond prices are
taken from Bloomberg database, while CDS spreads and Euribor rates are supplied
by Markit. The ISDA CDS Standard model is applied to quoted spread to convert
them into upfront payments. Both naked and CDS-bearing yields are computed
using the methods presented in section C.1.
We imply the processes y and y¯ for each of the three countries and the Euribor
10-years par-rate L, and proceed to compute the yields spread s by taking differences
of naked yields on yDE, as well as the risk premia pi and the basis b using equations
(C.2.7) and (2.2.11). After this procedure is completed, for any of the processes
under analysis we take weekly averages and select end-of-week data, so that we are
left with a sample of T = 177 observations covering from 2010 to 2013 (first half).
Following the estimation procedure resumed in section 1.6, the first step is to select
the number of lags p for each single-valued process under analysis: values of the test
statistic (1.2.2) for testing one-lag reduction within a p lag framework for p = p¯ . . . 2
are reported in tables A.1 and A.2. Table 2.1 collects the result, having selected a
maximum number of lags p¯ = 4 uniformly across processes.
The risk premium and the basis are the process with shortest memory: only bDE
requires p = 2 lags; a result enforcing the efficiency of the hedging portfolio is that
the combined information of yields and CDS explains the variability of pi, releasing
him from dragging additional self-explanatory lags.
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IT ES DE EUR
y 3 2 2 −
y¯ 2 1 2 −
pi 1 1 1 −
b 1 1 2 −
s 2 2 − −
L − − − 2
Table 2.1: Unidimensional number of lags pˆj, estimated through the step-procedure
described in section 1.1, with pˆj ≤ 4 by construction.
The basis b, in the relevant (see section 2.3.1) cases of Italy and Spain, should in
principle be zero: a performing (statistical) hedging strategy is that which reduces
the difference between the two risk-free rates to white noise.
Particularly, self-memory of the process is expected to be short, and these preliminary
results seem to point in that direction. The most frequent estimated values among
all processes is pˆ = 2, with the exception of naked yields for Italy for which pˆ = 3.
The time series of yIT show indeed two different peaks, debt-crisis in Italy itself at
first and the side effect of Spanish crisis later, which are hard to be properly fitted
without allowing for a higher number of lags (figure 2.13).
Tables in A.2 collects p-values from conducting Augmented Dickey Fuller tests, for
all relevant processes and countries. The results show that the null of unit-root is
not refused by any test on any of the processes, hence each component of the VAR
under study is an I(1) process in a strict sense. In particular, the basis bIT and bES
are integrated processes.
Next section explores the statistical features of benchmark European rates, and
reveals the properties of credit risk hedging strategies for Germany.
As explained in chapter 2, the estimation procedure provides for any vector model
to be firstly estimated with the number of lags estimated as in (1.5.1), resumed in
table A.4. Subsequently, residuals are computed and whiteness is verified.
The residuals presented in table A.7 are collected after a first complete estimation
of the model: whether any of the statistics λLM(h) or λW (h) defined in section 1.5.4
rejects the null of no autocorrelation for any of the h ≤ h¯ := 4, the number of lags
is augmented by 1 and the procedure repeated. A second iteration of the procedure
is sufficient to fully whithen residuals in all cases requiring so at a first stage.
The number of lags reported in table 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 is the final one, which is
selected to estimate all statistics and parameters presented either in this section
and in tables A.5 and A.6. The VARs which required lag augmentation to whiten
residuals are evidenced in each table. The unit of measure for yields is basis points.
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Figure 2.11: (a): Naked yield (black), CDS-bearing yield (grey-dotted) for Germany, and
Euribor (green-triangled) rate ; (b) Credit risk premium (red-squared), CDS-bond basis
(pink-squared) for Germany and yDE − L (purple-squared) spread. (Source: Bloomberg,
Markit and author’s computations.)
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Figure 2.12: (a) Scatter plot of Euribor rate and naked yield for Germany. (b) Scatter plot
of Euribor rate and naked yield for Germany. (Source: Bloomberg, Markit and author’s
computations.)
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p r
(yDE, L) 2 0
(y¯DE, L) 2 0
(yDE, y¯DE) 2 0
Table 2.2: Estimated cointegrating order and number of lags (rˆ, pˆ) used in parameters
estimations; pˆ is selected according to the procedure described in section 1.5.1. No
corrections are needed to assess residuals whiteness.
2.3.1 Risk-free yields
Figure 2.11 shows the time-series evolution of both naked and CDS-bearing yields
for Germany and Euribor rate, as well as the processes implied by differencing such
yields; figure 2.12 shows the scatter plot, with Euribor rate on the horizontal axis
and naked (left) and CDS-bearing (right) German yields on the vertical axis. It is
evident the downward trending of all rates ending up in late 2012, after the turmoil
caused by the Spanish banking sector crisis.
All the three rates moves together on a relatively similar pattern; by exhamining the
credit risk premium piDE, we find an almost constant process with average E(piDE) =
36 bp, and standard error σ(piDE) = 2 bp. The average difference E(yDE−L) = −30
bp, but with σ(piDE) = 15 bp. We can however state that it is likely for this difference
to be negative on average, which shows how financing at Euribor to buy German
obligations is not convenient. This is due to the market preventing easy access to
German debt, which demand was constantly increasing51.
Table 2.2 shows the selected number of lags for these VARs as well as the estimated
cointegration rank. It could be expectable to find cointegrating relations appearing
among the VAR components (see [48] and [35]), but this is not the case. Recall that
the general interpretation of cointegrating relations is that of long-run equilibria.
The time series are weekly quotes within a forty-two months window, thus long-run
equilibria may be not perceivable with this frequency in this relatively short stub.
Table A.6 shows the short-run analysis for (yDE, y¯DE), (yDE, L) and (y¯DE, L); with
only two lags and no cointegrating relations in a H∗1 framework (see section 1.5.2),
a generic bivariate VECM in the equation system form becomes:∆z1t = C1(1, 1) ·∆z1t−1 + C1(1, 2) ·∆z2t−1 + U1t∆z2t = C1(2, 1) ·∆z1t−1 + C1(2, 2) ·∆z2t−1 + U2t (2.3.1)
where Ut is a gaussian white noise process with covariance matrix Σ.
51The flight to credit quality may lead to the existence of a significant convenience yield, see [75].
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p r
(piIT , sIT ) 2∗ 1
(piES, sES) 2 1
(y¯IT , L) 2 0
(y¯ES, L) 2 0
Table 2.3: Estimated cointegrating order and number of lags (rˆ, pˆ) used in parameters
estimations; p is selected according to the procedure described in section 1.5.1. Values
with (∗) provide an additional lag to whithen the residuals.
Observe that in case the correlation coefficient ρ(U1, U2) = ρ is equal to 1, then
the components U1 and U2 are linearly dependent, thus the source of randomness
in the two equation is the same.
Computing differences among different yields correspond to combine a long position
and a short position in the two respective portfolios. In case the two portfolios are
linearly dependent, the combination of the two positions has the same variability of
one of them, enforcing the good performance of hedging strategy.
The case (yDE, y¯DE) is the easiest to deal with: the correlation ρ is estimated to be 1
while Cˆ1 is not significant. The two processes can be modeled as two random walks
sharing the same innovation process.
The position of Germany as a preferred investment in the European sovereign
market makes the analyzes of (yDE, L) and (y¯DE, L) very simple too. In light of
the relationship between yDE and y¯DE, the discussion can be limited to (yDE, L)
only, as (y¯DE, L) will share with it similar statistical properties.
The correlation coefficient is larger than 0.9, and significant short-run bidirectional
feedback effects C1(1, 2) ≈ 0.33 and C1(2, 1) ≈ 0.45 are registered.
In particular, since C1(2, 1) > C1(1, 2), variations of German yields ∆yDE have
greater impact on Euribor variations than the other way around.
It is also interesting to observe that the correlation between innovations is larger in
this model with respect to (y¯DE, L). This implies that naked German yields explain
more of Euribor variability when credit risk is not hedged.
The basis bDE = y¯DE −L = yDE −L− piDE (figure 2.11b) is always negative, −60 bp
on average. This result is coherent with [48] and [35], where the difference between
CDS and ASW (which is equivalent to −b) is positive on average.
The pattern of Euribor moves away from that of German rates between 2010 and
2012; both these facts are again due to yields decrease related to the flight-to-quality
phenomenon.
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ˆˆ
B1
ˆˆ
D‖
ˆˆ
A
(piIT , sIT ) 1.000 -0.687 -0.007 -0.123 0.064
(0.045) (0.001) (0.021) (0.031)
(piES, sES) 1.000 -0.625 -0.008 -0.167 0.029
(0.060) (0.002) (0.078) (0.011)
Table 2.4: Cointegrating vectors (pi, s): EGLS estimation of the normalized cointegrating
basis [1 B1], the constant within the cointegrating relations D‖ and the error-correction
speeds A; correspondent standard errors in brackets.
2.3.2 CDS-bearing credit risk premia and yields spreads
We turn now to compare the country specific risk premium piIT and piES with spread
vis-à-vis German obligations of the respective naked yields sIT and sES.
Table 2.3 reports the number of lags selected, namely p = 2, for the two vector
processes (piIT , sIT ) and (piES, sES): lag augmentation was necessary for the former
because a single lag induces residuals autocorrelation when h = 3, 4.
A similar analysis is conducted in [48], using weekly data but covering a larger time
window (2006-2010) and allowing for models time breaks in September 2008, before
the crisis affected Europe. In the first period, no cointegrating relation involving
CDS and bond spreads is present: conversely, the ocurring the crisis in Europe
tightened the linkages between the two markets, and long-run equilibria arise.
The latent variable is credit risk, so it is interesting to investigate which of the
two components contribute most in its price discovery process. The existence of
cointegration between CDS and bond spreads implies that at least one market has
to contribute to price discovery and the other has to adjust [48].
This in turn is determined by the error-correction speeds vectorA: if both components
are significant, then both markets contribute to mutual prices discovery.
Alternatively, if spreads are likely to move first, then A1 will be significant and
negative, while a positive significant A2 implies that pi contribute more to the price
formation of s than the other way around.
Figure 2.13(a) shows the time series evolution: in both cases, the two components
share a common pattern. Cointegrating relations appear even in this short time
window, and the cointegration basis are reported in table 2.4.
In particular, piIT = 0.69sIT +70bp and piES = 0.62sES +80bp ; hence, the credit-risk
premium which is paid when hedging with CDS contracts is composed by a fixed
sunk cost plus approximatively 60% of the spread vis-à-vis Germany.
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This decomposition is interesting because it shows how purchasing protection
from the credit market is always costly, even when spreads are zero.
Results deviate from those in [48] for what concerns the error-correction speeds.
The difference in the parameters sizes is probably due to the fact that cointegrating
relations are estimated using daily data, differently from this work, where weekly
frequency is maintained.
A difference which is instead worth to mention is that our analysis implies that
spreads anticipates the price formation of CDS risk premia, while the converse
happens on daily data from 2008 to 2010. The rush to buy German obligations,
started in 2010, makes of the spreads the leading indicator of financial distress of
risk measures. Short-run analysis (table A.6) reveals significant pure autoregressive
components, and significant impact of ∆st−1 on ∆pit are registered, again confirming
the central role of Germany in European debt market.
Correlation in each country specific VAR process is approximatively 0.8, thus also
the local (short-run) innovations of the processes are higly dependent.
It is notable that in both the cases of Italy and Spain the spread tends to overprice
the implied credit-risk premium in times of crisis; the average excess is 20 bp in
Italy and 40 bp in Spain, computed between half 2011 and half 2013. The excess
demand for German obligations contributed to lowering yDE, and the spread reflect
this fact by demanding a higher premium with respect to country specific ones.
Notice that the average difference E(pi − s) on the whole sample period results in
approximatively 1 bp for both countries, thus the spread is also underpricing credit
risk in normal times.
2.3.3 Hedging imperfections: the CDS-bond basis
Figure 2.14(a) shows the evolution of CDS-bearing yields compared to the Euribor
rate; the analysis in section 2.3.1 suggests that similar result would come out if any
of the two German yields would be substituted to L.
The number of selected lags for both processes is p = 2 (see table 2.3), and no
cointegrating relations arise. The effectiveness of the hedging strategy is evident: it
projects the time series of naked yields on the pattern followed by the Euribor rate.
The average difference E(b) = E(y¯ − L) is negative, approximatively −50 bp for
Italy and −27 bp for Spain on the whole sample period.
This means that financing at Euribor a CDS-hedging strategy would have resulted
in average losses on the time stub considered: this result is coherent with [35], [36]
as well as [48].
Short-run analysis (table A.6) reveal a significant pure autoregressive effects on the
Euribor and a high correlation among the CDS-bearing portfolios y¯IT and y¯ES and
the Euribor rates innovations, namely ρ = 0.93 and ρ = 0.88, respectively.
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Figure 2.13: 10y yield spread vis-à-vis Germany (black), credit risk premium pi
(red-dotted) and cointegrating relations pi = B1s+D
‖
1 for Italy, figure 2.13(a), and Spain
2.13(b) (Source: Bloomberg, Markit and author’s computations).
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Figure 2.14: Scatter plot of credit risk premium pi and spread vis-à-vis Germany for Italy
(a) and Spain (b). (Source: Bloomberg, Markit and author’s computations.)
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p r
(yIT , yES) 3∗ 0
(y¯IT , y¯ES) 2 0
(bIT , bES) 2∗ 0
Table 2.5: Estimated cointegrating order and number of lags (rˆ, pˆ) used in parameters
estimations; p is selected according to the procedure described in section 1.5.1. Values
with (∗) provide an additional lag to whithen the residuals.
Concerning the matrix C1, only diagonal elements are significant in both cases.
It is also interesting to compare Italian and Spanish yields before comparing between
each other the synthetic credit-risk free positions and the basis b for both countries.
The estimated number of lags for all processes (yIT , yES), (y¯IT , y¯ES) and (bIT , bES)
are reported in table 2.5; no cointegrating relations arise.
The VAR process (yIT , yES) requires an additional lag with respect to the others
in order to whithen residuals: a longer memory is required to properly fit two
processes with different peaks, corresponding to side-effects of the crisis hitting the
two countries at different times.
The average spread E(yIT − yES) among the two countries is −38 bp, hence Spain
embed a higher risk premium in its yields in the period considered.
Short run analysis reveal ρ = 0.91: the high number of lags in the VECM form
leaves a matrix of residuals which is close to singular.
The unique significant feedback effect among the two processes is C1(1, 2) ≈ 0.31,
thus Spanish lagged yields differences impacts Italian yields differences. This is a
direct consequence of Italy experiencing Spanish crisis and not vice-versa.
It is clear from the scatter plot that the variability with respect to the Euribor
(horizontal axis) of both CDS-bearing yields y¯t diminishes, figure 2.16(a), with
respect to the correspondent scatter plot which compares L to naked yields y 2.16(b).
Correlation of innovations however decreases when comparing the two CDS-bearing
yield spreads through the VAR process (y¯IT , y¯ES), namely ρ = 0.66.
This is due to the combined position of two obligations and two CDS contracts
within the vector process evolution, which amplify the sources of randomness as
dealing with the aggregate process.
No other relevant short-run feedback effect is measured, hence the two processes y¯
evolve as a vector random walk with relatively high correlated disturbances.
This is a signal of hedging performing well on each country specific market, resulting
in two portfolios unaffecting each other through their respective short-run memories.
The analysis of the process (bIT , bES) and their difference bIT − bES, figure 2.15(b),
reveals interesting features of the basis which may help to explain its origin.
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Figure 2.15: CDS-bearing yield for Italy (blue-dotted) and Spain (red-crossed)
compared to the Euribor (green-triangled) rate, figure 2.15(a); CDS-bond basis for Italy
(light-blue-dotted), Spain (orange-crossed) and CDS-bearing spread y¯IT − y¯ES = bIT − bES,
2.15(b). (Source: Bloomberg, Markit and author’s computations.)
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Figure 2.16: Scatter plot of naked yield for Italy (blue) and Spain (red) versus Euribor,
figure 2.16(a); scatter plot of CDS-bearing yield for taly (blue) and Spain (red) versus
Euribor, 2.16(b). (Source: Bloomberg, Markit and author’s computations.)
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The situation is similar to that of the VAR process (y¯IT , y¯ES): no short-run
feedback effects are registered and the correlation among innovations is even lower
(ρ = 0.45). An additional lag is also required with respect to a first estimation to
whithen residuals when h = 3 (table A.7).
Again, we have a vector random walk: the components of the vector of innovations
show a non-zero correlation, but the estimated covriance matrix is far from being
singular. As aforementioned, the difference bIT − bES is negative on average, but it
systematically point in the direction of the country suffering the highest financial
distress among the two at that moment.
Particularly, if the basis spread is interpreted as the payoff of buying a CDS-hedged
Italian obligation and sell short a similarly hedged Spanish one, we have bIT − bES >
E(bIT − bES), with highest positive peak of −6 bp in late 2011, when Italy was
suffering its most difficult moment, and bIT − bES < 0 in mid 2012, with lowest peak
of −50 bp, during the Spanish banking crisis.
The basis difference reacts even to the brief turmoil which followed political elections
in Italy dated March 2013, increasing from the average negative value to a positive
one, with highest peak of 28 bp.
As the two portfolios in principle are fully hedged against credit risk, the basis
should be zero in both cases: this obviously implies that also the difference between
the respective basis must be zero, up to statistical discrepancies.
The portfolios provide instead for a useful tool to monitor non-credit related risks in
this aggregated market as excess risk appears exactly when macrofinancial stability
of target country teeters.
2.3.4 Econometric analysis: further comments
The first outcome of econometric analysis is that market perceives credit risk to
be absent in Germany. German naked bond yield yDE is the primary source of
fluctuation in the Euro money market, able to significantly impact the Euribor rate
too, with which it shares a similar pattern.
Credit risk as measured with CDS-hedging does not sensibly variate with respect to
its average value of 36 bp; it is different from zero only because any contract has a
non zero price on the market, but the hedging strategy is not needed.
Hedging is considered to be relevant when correlation among residuals is high, so
that the two portfolios yields share a unique source of randomness.
As dealing with German yields, CDS are not needed: the correlation is already high
in (yDE, L) and the average negative difference yDE shows the market discouraging
investors willing to finance at Euribor long positions on German yields.
This same rush to quality is the cause of the spread vis-à-vis Germany overpricing
CDS-implied credit risk pi in moments of major distress.
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The hedging strategy allowing for the construction of the two credit-risk free
yields y¯ is effective in projecting all rates on a common credit-risk free pattern, the
same already shared by yDE and L.
The basis, defined here as the difference between the hedged portfolio and Euribor,
is however an integrated process, and shows a systematic discrepancy arising when
major distress is experienced by the country under exam.
It could be argued that this basis depends on the specific benchmark L chosen to
measure the credit risk free rate in Europe, and is merely a theoretical arbitrage. The
Euribor rate is not directly accessible to every dealer as well as the CDS-one, and
restrictions may not coincide, so that the combined position is difficult to achieve
in practice.
However, even if the analysis is limited to the CDS-bond market, the difference
bIT − bES, reveals movements from the (negative) average basis in the direction of
the country suffering major distress at that moment.
We thus interpret the basis as an additional risk premium: even when obligations
are hedged using CDS contracts, the combined positions still embed a higher risk
premia when combined macroeconomic and financial distress affect target country.
Next chapter explores in detail the consequences of macroeconomic distress for a
larger set of Euro-area countries, to measure the impact that public economy has
on financial markets and viceversa.
Sovereign yields are combined with public accounting variables to analyze the portion
of variability in country credit risk (as measured by the implied default probabilities)
which are explained by unhealthy public accounting management.
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3 Macro-financial risk measures
The effects of global financial crisis in Europe were not restricted to financial markets
alone: releasing the global network of financial transactions from public economy by
assuming no feedback effects among the two would be partial and unrealistic.
Advanced economies in the Euro-area suffered both recession and deterioration in
public finance: the lowering of primary surplus led in turn to a rise in debt level,
even higher if measured as a fraction of nominal output.
The analysis is limited here to eight state members: Belgium (BE), Germany
(DE), Spain (ES), France (FR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Netherlands (NL) and
Portugal (PT). Greece (GR) has been excluded as the significance52 of a rigorous
econometric analysis of this case might be questionable, but it will however be used
as a benchmark from the bottom up.
3.1 The crisis across EMU: stylized facts
The crisis unfolded in the EMU approximatively in 2008: the first alarming signals
came with the uncovering, between 2008 and 2009, of high structural deficit in Greek
public accounting. The deficit/gdp ratio rapidly boosted below any level expected
by the market, reaching in 2010 downward peaks of nearly −10% on a yearly basis,
while debt/gdp ratio had reached 130%.
In April 2010 Greece was no more able to borrow from the market: Greek government
was granted a first bailout loan53, on May 2, 2010. Roughly, one fourth came from
the IMF while the rest was injected by member states and the ECB.
In mid-2011 it was evident that efforts in this direction were insufficient; a second
rescue package [111] was finally endorsed on February 21, 2012, regulating one of
the largest sovereign debt restructuring in history [2].
On March 9, 2012, the EMEA determination committee [69] recognized a credit
event occurred in Greece, so that also CDS triggered (see chapter 3): Greece will
thus be considered to have defaulted in 2012 : Q1, so the last relevant observations
time for this country will be 2011 : Q4.
The Greek case is therefore an example of high deficit and recession, followed by a
reaction of market interest rates, which ultimately led to a default on public debt;
no other default occurred among other Euro-area countries, although some of them
suffered heavy downgrades due to both specific and idiosyncratic events. Glaring
examples are the cases of Ireland and Portugal.
52The chain of structural reforms in Greece which followed the bailout programs might be
misleading when interpreting the mutual effects of macroeconomic and financial variables.
53See [30] for details.
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The former was hit when the government reacted to the bursting of the housing
bubble, rescuing distressed banks’ bondholders by rising public debt. The latter
simply paid the cost of years-long poor government expenditure management.
Spain and Italy are the biggest harshly distressed economies among the EMU: Spain
suffered from a sudden increase in public debt from 2010 to 2013 (about 30%
on aggregate) to finance banking institutions in wretched conditions, while Italy
beholded a strong recession on top of a multi-year debt/gdp ratio above 100%.
France and Belgium experienced just a single downgrade, but differ in their respective
economies sizes: furthermore, Belgium is representative for a highly-rated country
with a debt/gdp floating around 100%.
Finally, Germany and Netherlands are included as examples of countries that kept
unchanged their rating across the crisis. The latter experienced several54 financial
institutions default while the former was considered, and still is, a risk-free haven
for Euro-area investments.
The unfold of financial crisis showed ". . . the serious limitations of existing economic
and financial models. . . " [108]: ECB and state members thus looked for efficient
methods devoted to track financial distress, so that suitable countermeasures can
be set up with as larger anticipation as possible.
Conventional stability measures provide EMUmembers to monitor financial stability
by controlling several macroeconomic indicators: Maastricht treaty [46] and the
revisions which followed [47], provide a cap for debt/gdp ratio (60%) and a floor
(-3%) for primary surplus/gdp.
Financial markets measure creditworthiness using a wide range of market implied
indicators, including risk premia over a benchmark (spread vis-à-vis Germany),
derivatives (CDS models) and implicit rating (scoring-based).55
The idea is to solve this duality by constructing a score which gathers signals
from both sources. The minimal amount of information needed incorporates yields
(spreads vis-à-vis Germany), capturing market credit risk, and public accounting
variables, conveying government’s policies. The score must be specific for each
country but retrieved with a common methodology across the whole EMU.
Section 3.2 briefly describes the theoretical underlyings together with the dataset
and defines variables dynamics, while section 3.3 presents the results out of a direct
econometric approach. Section 3.4 aims to present the framework in which to
construct the scoring method; section 3.5 collects econometrics results out of direct
statistical comparison of credit risk scores with custom credit-risk measures.
54More precisely, DSB bank defaulted in 2009 while other troubled financial institutions were
bailed out with the help of foreign investors and Dutch government, for example ABN-AMRO.
55In this sense, it is worth to mention the pioneering [7] and recent [8] work of Altman on scoring
models, sharing their conceptual background with the approach pursued in this work.
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Figure 3.1: Gdp-growth rate gt (green-crossed, left-axis), primary surplus/gdp nt
(blue-dotted, left-axis) and debt/gdp ratio xt (red-straight, right-axis) for Belgium (a),
Spain (b), Ireland (c) and Greece (d); black-dotted line is zero level for left axis. (Source:
ECB and author computations)
3.2 Supply of public debt and demand for risk premia
The arguments which will be used in order to retrieve a country specific scoring
system requires some underlying assumptions, which in a first moment subordinate
statistical modeling to economic intuition.
The idea is to consider each country’s specific sovereign debt market as a single-good56
market in a demand/supply framework, being the quantity supplied the amount of
debt issued and its price the yield-to-maturity57 y of the aggregate debt burden.
The choice of y will be discussed in next section: it will be sufficient at this stage
to consider it as a rate of return on public debt which includes credit-risk premia as
settled by financial markets in the obligations prices formation processes.
56No distinctions relative to maturity of debt will be considered throughout the discussion.
57Formally, yields are inverse prices, as increasing yields corresponds to decreasing prices when
relevant obligations are traded at the same face-value.
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Greek default is interpreted here as the result of the lack of demand for its
debt: bailout loans served the purpose of matching, through an artificially-inflated
demand, the additional supply of debt that Greece was forced to issue.
As soon as liquidity completely dried up, and regulators considered not worthy to
fill demand-gaps anymore, default became unavoidable.
Let x be the debt/gdp ratio: fix target country, and define an exhogenous model:
yt = ω(xt) (3.2.1)
with the underlying assumption that the one-period demand function ω is able to
fully determine yt given xt, see figure 3.2(a).
It is preferrable to use debt/gdp rather than (the logarithm of) debt level for at
least two reasons: the first is that it easily allows for cross-country comparison.
The second deals instead with modeling assumptions: the willingness of lenders to
borrow, cloaked within ω, must award a good use of public debt.
Among countries sharing the same y, the risk premium is inversely proportional
with respect to growth of their respective economy, hence debt/gdp is the relevant
variable. A linear model58 can always be obtained by first order expansion:
yt = ωxt (3.2.2)
where the constant coefficient ω > 0 is the risk aversion coefficient with respect to
target country’s obligations, considered as an aggregate single-good.
For any process Z, the natural filtration for Z is the σ-algebra generated by process
Z up to time t, and will be indicated as FZt = σ(Zs : 0 ≤ s ≤ t).
Assume that each country’s sovereign yield is composed by the credit risk premium
charged to the borrower pi over a risk free rate:
yt = Lt + pit (3.2.3)
being Lt a common EMU-benchmark rate and pit a country-specific credit risk
premium; if the benchmark rate is not conditionally expected to variate over [t−1, t]
for any t, the (conditional) expected variation at t− 1:
E(∆yt|Fxt−1) = E(∆pit|Fxt−1) (3.2.4)
is equal to the expected variation of credit risk premia in that same period.
In times of crisis, financial distress combined with recession economy makes easy to
predict a rise in debt/gdp over the next period.
58A more realistic model would provide for a constant y = y0 +ωxt, so that when risk-aversion is
zero the yield is equal to the risk-free yield. The constant is not explicited here as it is not relevant
when describing this modeling framework.
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Figure 3.2: (a): One-period linear demand function yt = ω(xt). (b): Different types of
risk attitude in a one-period curve.
Consider then a government for which xt is Fxt predictable, that is, the one-period
supply function is predictable and totally inelastic in the time window [t− 1, t].
The credit-risk premium pit is expected to increase proportionally to ω when debt/gdp
level increase: combine (3.2.2) and 3.2.4 to obtain:
E(∆pit|Fxt−1) = E(ω∆xt|Fxt−1) = ω∆xt (3.2.5)
which shows how ω captures the reactions of lenders to new debt issuing in terms
of credit-risk premia variations.
Forecast procedures in such framework will obviously suffer from the restrictive
assumption that the only determinant of credit risk is x.
Equation (3.2.5) can yet be useful to capture any slow-frequency amplifying effect
on pi (or y) attributable to x only.
Indeed, (3.2.5) could be combined with a faster (e.g. daily sampled) model for
market-implied credit risk in order to improve the underlying dgp model.59
Since the purpose here is to create a macro/financial-based credit score, also market
data must be considered at quarterly frequency in (3.2.5), in order to permit the
standard VAR approach.
59In this sense, a possible direction could be to fit mixed data-sampling (MIDAS) models (see [44]
and the interesting application in [51]).
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Figure 3.2 (b) shows three different shapes: a perfectly elastic demand (a), a
perfectly inelastic demand (b) and a ’negative’ (downward sloping) demand (c).
The first case (ω = 0) shows the market perceiving the borrower as creditworthy:
whatever the quantity of new debt is demanded, the interest rate does not change.
The second case (ω = +∞) instead represents default. The perfectly elastic demand
results in the unmatching of the curves which makes impossible for the government
to rise debt/gdp level, whatever the interest rate he offered.
The case of negative demand (ω < 0) is also included: it is clear that ω is expected
to be positive, but a negative value is aimed to include flight-to-quality phenomena,
such as that which interested Germany starting in 2010. That is, despite the
unwillingness of government to issue more debt, demand constantly increased, while
interest rates decreased, even down to negative values for some maturities.
It is worth to observe that, formally, there’s no way to switch with continuity from
models with positive to models with negative ω. This will not be considered a major
shortcoming as default is de facto a limiting case.
Furthermore, negative demand function is a rather uncommon and case-specific
situation, so we allow this exception to mathematical harmonization.
A straightforward method to imply a credit-risk score is to deem ω to be the relevant
measure of creditworthiness. Consider (3.2.2) within a statistical framework: it
could be sufficient to measure ω using the aforementioned econometric techniques,
and chart them according to this output to construct a dynamic credit score.
It is clear that the observation yt and xt are simultaneous, thus any statistical
approach to equation (3.2.2) is partial, as feedback effects of y over x shall be of
interest too. The VAR approach which will be adopted will permit to measure both
signals at the same time.
Before discussing the econometric properties of this direct approach (section 3.3),
we explore the dataset supplied by the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse (SDW),
together with the underlyings dynamics of the macroeconomic variables of interest.
3.2.1 The dataset: debt dynamics in practice
The SDW supplies publicly available quarterly statistics for any memeber state
within the EMU. The official documentation provides an exact equation for debt
level in each of the countries. Namely,
Dt = Dt−1 + It −Nt +Mt (3.2.6)
and the relevant processes are defined as:
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• Dt : total government consolidated debt.
• Nt : government primary surplus
• It : interest payable (accrued between t− 1 and t)
• Mt : deficit-debt adjustment (DDA)
see [110] (Table 1A, p. 11 and Table 2A, p. 39) or [16] (p. 11).
Several modification have been approved on government accounting methods, finally
endorsed60 in a Council Regulation: a new methodology, the ESA2010 replaced
former ESA95 in defining rules for debt computation and accounting under the
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP).61.
ESA2010 provides debt to be evaluated at face value, while ESA95 defines debt level
as that which "..reflects the sum of funds originally advanced, plus any subsequent
advances, less any repayments, plus any accrued interest ([16], p. 383); ESA95 time
series are thus to be used in order to match (3.2.6).
The DDA reconciles change in debt Dt−Dt−1 with (gross) surplus Nt− It by taking
into account adjustments due to statistical discordances (between members central
banks and the ECB) and to peculiar accounting-based discrepancies. Details are
provided in [110] (pp. 34-37).
The interest payable is defined as the difference between primary surplus and the
surplus itself: following [49], we can define an implicit interest rate y˜t:
It = y˜t ·Dt−1 (3.2.7)
which will be also addressed to as internal or accounting rate. The dynamics of
public accounting are then retrieved weighting all variables with nominal output
level Gt. Notice that gdp ratios of primary deficit (as well as DDA) are commonly
weighted by the gdp level over a quarter G∗t , while debt/gdp at time t is defined as
the ratio between current level of debt and the aggregated gdp-level over latest year,
namely Gt =
∑3
k=0G
∗
t−k. The choice was to follow the second convention: define
gt =
Gt −Gt−1
Gt−1
(3.2.8)
the quarterly growth rate of yearly aggregated nominal output, divide (3.2.6) by Gt
and combine (3.2.7) and (3.2.8) with (3.2.6) to obtain:
60Commission Regulation (EU) No 220/2014. ESA stands for European System of Accounts.
61This latter takes place in case a government is in persistent deficit excess with respect to the
provided floor and "provides for the necessary steps to be taken-.. (which)..could ultimately lead to
imposing sanctions on the country concerned." (ECB, www.ecb.eu)
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Dt
Gt
= (1 + y˜t)
Dt−1
Gt
− Nt
Gt
+
Mt
Gt
. (3.2.9)
Equation (3.2.9) can in turn be rewritten at first order by exploiting Taylor expansion
1
1±x ≈ 1∓ x and removing cross-products among variables. This yields:
∆xt = (y˜t − gt)xt−1 − nt +mt. (3.2.10)
where we defined:62
nt :=
Nt
Gt
, mt :=
Mt
Gt
, xt :=
Dt
Gt
and equation (3.2.10) remains an identity63.
The quantity (y˜t − gt)xt−1 measures the snowball effect ([49], p. 11), that is,
the self-reinforcing of debt accumulation due to the difference between the cost of
borrowing and the growth rate the country is able to achieve.64 Further comments
are necessary for what concerns the implied interest rate y˜t.
Eurostat rules state that It is accrued according to the debtor approach, that is,
the yield on each debt instrument which is issued is ".. the cost of borrowing as
observed at the time the instrument is created. As a consequence, interest must be
accrued using the market rate (yield-to-maturity) or the contractual rate available at
inception of the instrument.."([16], pp. 86).
Moreover, the methodologies to imply single-instruments yield-to-maturity is custom
([16], pp. 353-354) and is the same which is used in the construction of the yield
curve (appendix B). Each debt instrument can thus be considered as a financial
operation whose yield is implied by assuming that the market is arbitrage-free
(equation (C.1.2)).
Debt instruments serve also the purpose of implying a sovereign yield curve, as
showed in chapter 2; in this case, considering the total set of issued instruments as
an aggregated single financial operation, the yield at time t of such portfolio will be
y(t, T ∗), being T ∗ the duration of the compound portfolio.
The SDW do not offer observations65 on government debt duration; figure 3.3 shows
the average (residual) debt maturity across countries, and the average of this latter
over the periods 2001-2013 and 1995-2013, respectively.
An average duration of 4.3 years concerning this eight-countries panel is obtained
using datasets of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), although observations are often sparse, and lasts in the year 2010.
62nt and mt are roughly 1/4 of correspondent quarterly surplus/gdp (DDA/gdp) defined in [14].
63Discrepancies arise due to Taylor approximation: market data induce a maximum error of 7
bp with respect to the true ∆xt, thus (3.2.10) will still be considered an identity.
64Notice that (3.2.10) does not change even if real interest rate and output are considered.
65An interesting review on debt size and composition across the EMU can be found in [77].
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Figure 3.3: Time-evolution of average public debt maturity across Europe (red-squared);
average from 1995 to 2013 is T = 5.78 years (blue-crossed) while average from 2001 is
T = 6.48 (black-dotted). (Source: ECB and authors computations)
The choice is to compare y˜t with current market yield y(t, T ) and set T = 5,
for at least two reasons. First of all, five years is the closest custom maturity to
both the average debt maturity and its duration. Secondly, eventual movements in
the slope and/or curvature of the term structure y(t, T ) (including inversions) are
better captured with a mid-term rate than with a longer termed one, due to the
flattening of the curve as T goes to infinite [39].
Figure 3.4 shows the time-evolution of y˜t and yt for the countries under exam:
market yield yt reacts to the burst out of the crisis in reaching peaks of near 15%
on a yearly basis (concerning Portugal and Ireland); time-evolution of y˜t, on the
contrary, is rather smooth, very similar across countries and almost not reacting to
any of the crisis side-effects.
Before 2008, y˜t stays above market yields, a fact that could be attributed to the
differences in debt maturity with respect to the choice T = 5. Observe that, in the
case of Germany, market rate always stays lower than the internal rate, because a
general lowering of interest rates.
Particularly, the internal rate y˜t does not embed credit risk premia but rather follows
an arranged (hence highly predictable) pattern that remains similar throughout the
whole countries panel.
Next section will present a direct econometric approach aimed to answer the questions
presented thus far. First of all, the vector model (y, y˜) is fitted so as to unearth
eventual common features of the two rates which could help out to settle the internal
rate of return within financial markets rates.
Secondly, a VAR model for both the couples (y, x) and (y˜, x) is set up, with the
purpose of estimating ω out of equation (3.2.2), as well as the feeedback effects of
rates on debt. It will be also useful to introduce another variable of interest, that
is, debt variation (debt speed) ∆x.
78
01 03 05 07 09 11 13
5%
10%
15%
BE
01 03 05 07 09 11 13
5%
10%
15%
DE
01 03 05 07 09 11 13
5%
10%
15%
ES
01 03 05 07 09 11 13
5%
10%
15%
FR
01 03 05 07 09 11 13
5%
10%
15%
IE
01 03 05 07 09 11 13
5%
10%
15%
IT
01 03 05 07 09 11 13
5%
10%
15%
NL
01 03 05 07 09 11 13
5%
10%
15%
PT
Figure 3.4: 5-years sovereign yield yt (blue-dotted) and implied rate y˜t (green-squared)
comparison, all data on a yearly basis (Source: ECB, Bloomberg and authors computations)
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y 2 3 1 1 2 4 2 3
y˜ 2 3 3 2 4 2 2 2
x 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 2
s 2 − 4 2 2 4 1 3
Table 3.1: Unidimensional number of lags pˆj, estimated through the step-procedure
described in section 1.1, pˆj ≤ 4 by construction.
The reasoning behind comes from direct inspections of macroeconomic variables
time evolution (figure 3.1). The examples of Portugal and Ireland, the latter showing
a pre-crises consolidated debt 30%, suggest that a major source of increase in risk
aversion (and credit risk premium) might be the speed at which this high level of
debt is reached, rather than the level itself.
A VARmodel of the form (y,∆x) is thus inferred using the set of relevant observation.
The idea is that debt variation could affect directly y in shifting upwards the slope
of demand curve, as explained in section 3.3.
Moreover, associating to each country the speed ∆x at which it gets into debt could
be also seen as another possible way of scoring countries: that is, the faster it runs
up into debt, the higher its credit risk premium (or yield, see (3.2.4)) variation.
It will thus be worth to discuss VAR models in the form (s,∆x), where spread
vis-à-vis Germany s is selected as benchmark (see chapter 2).
3.3 A direct econometric approach
Quarterly observations supplied by the SDW cover, at the moment, the time window
2000:Q1-2013:Q4; as mentioned, a four-quarter moving average is applied to available
data to take out eventual season effects, which results in a sample period covering
2001:Q1-2013:Q4, for a total sample size of T = 52.
Market yields are instead taken from Bloomberg database: the dataset is composed
of daily observations. In order to uniform the time scale to that of SDW macro-data,
a quarterly moving average of end-of-day quotes is performed, and end-of-quarter
observations are selected.
The choice of fitting two-dimensional vector models is appropriate, as the number
of parameters to be estimated would be large with respect to T in case higher
dimensional VAR were analyzed. Econometric results are presented model-by-model.
Before analyzing vector models, single components properties are disclosed in line
with the procedure in chapter 2.
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Table 3.1 collects the estimated number of lags for each process and country,
where maximum number of significant lags is set to p¯ = 4; test statistics (1.2.2) are
presented in table (A.8). Most frequently, the criterion selects 2 lags.
Market interest rate y displays a longer memory in the case of Germany, Portugal
(pˆ = 3) and Italy (pˆ = 4), while hypotheses testing does not refuse reduction to one
lag in the case of Spain and France. The internal rate y˜ requires pˆ = 4 lags only in
Ireland, because of the noisy behaviour of this time series between 2001 and 2004,
due to alignement movements of the Irish economy to the new currency.
Debt/gdp evolution is similar across countries, showing a slightly upward linear
trend all over the sample period, with a sudden shift in trend slope around 2009.
A linear trend is not provided in the dgp model, as the prior Hˆ = H∗1 provides no
constant outside the cointegrating relation. Observe that even if trend was modeled,
it should allow for a break in order to be significantly estimated: since no break is
provided, x requires a high number of lags to be estimated.
Spread s almost lacks of memory in the case of healthy countries such as Netherlands
while is very path dependent in distressed countries such as Spain, Italy (4) and
Portugal (3) probably due to the unexpected spread-widening in-crisis.66
Tables (A.10) collect p-values from conducting unit root tests T1, T2 and T3: all
ADF tests fail to reject the unit-root null, with the exceptions of y˜ in Belgium,
France and Italy (T3 rejects H0), and y in Italy (T1 rejects H0).
Following definition 1.3.3, unit-root tests on processes in differences are performed
so as to bound integration order from below: it turns out that each of the processes
in each countries, shows stationarity in first differences, except for debt/gdp x.
The hypothesis x ∈ I(0) is rejected by all tests in all countries: moreover, in Spain,
Ireland and Portugal, the same happens for ∆x, hence the VAR processes (y, x) and
(y˜, x) for this countries are I(2) processes (definition 1.3.3) and will not be analyzed.
ADF tests does not give unilateral results instead on the integration order of ∆x
(except that it is smaller than 1) in other countries, hence vector models of the form
(y, x) and (y˜, x) will be fitted with the prior x ∈ I(1), and commented case by case.
Following the procedure resumed in 1.6, next step is to estimate the number of lags
for the resulting vector processes: table A.12 in the appendix shows values of the
statistics defined in (1.5.3) for testing one-lag reduction within a p lag framework
for p = p¯ . . . 2; eligible tests are those including values of p¯ from a maximum pˆ+∞
down to pˆ−∞. The number of lags out of the estimation procedure described in 1.5.1
is resumed in table A.14; Johansen test is then performed, parameters are retrieved
and the estimated residuals autocorrelation statistics are collected in table A.26.
66In order to avoid a large number of lags when modeling y for severely distressed countries,
conditional heteroscedasticty effects should be considered even at quarterly frequencies.
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(y, y˜) (0, 2) (1, 2) (0, 3) (0, 2) (0, 2) (0, 3) (1, 2) (0, 3)
(y, x) (0, 2) (1, 2) − (0, 3)∗ − (0, 3) (0, 2) −
(y˜, x) (1, 2) (0, 3)∗ − (0, 3)∗ − (1, 2) (1, 2) −
(y,∆x) (0, 2) (0, 2) (0, 2) (0, 2) (0, 2) (0, 2) (0, 2) (0, 3)
(s,∆x) (0, 2)? − (0, 2) (0, 2) (0, 2) (0, 2) (0, 2) (0, 3)
Table 3.2: Estimated cointegrating order and number of lags (rˆ, pˆ) used in parameters
estimations; p is selected according to the procedure described in section 1.5.1; models
with (∗) provide an additional lag to whithen residuals.
Such residuals are those collected after a first complete estimation of the model;
whether any of the statistics λLM(h) or λW (h) defined in section 1.5.4 rejects the
null of no autocorrelation for any of the h ≤ h¯ := 4, the number of lags is augmented
by 1 and the procedure repeated. A second iteration of the procedure is sufficient
to fully whithen residuals in all cases which demanded so.
Table 3.2 collects the final results: the estimated number of lags floats between 2
and 3, and a longer memory is necessary again for Spain, Italy and Portugal as
result of the long memory in y; Portugal needs also 3 lags to fit (y,∆x) and (s,∆x).
The interesting part for gleaning feedback effects among variable begins with the
analysis of cointegration and parameters estimation, which will be discussed model
by model: being the vectors bivariate, a maximum cointegrating rank of 1 is expected,
although an eye must always be kept on unit-root tests.67
3.3.1 Market yield and internal rate
The first VAR model to fit compares the interest rates (y, y˜): a first look to figure
3.4 prevents from expecting strong linkages among the two rates.
Cointegrating relations arise hower in Germany and Netherlands (table 3.3): long-run
equilibria relationship are yDE = 1.5y˜DE−3.6% and yNL = 0.9y˜NL, having considered
significant D‖ only in Germany. It is not surprising to find market rates and internal
rates on debt to share a common equilibrium for these countries.
The interpretation is a (perceived) healthy economy results in a market rate which
is tied to debt-service (hence to public accounting) on the long-run.
We introduce here a measure of dominance among the two components of a bivariate
cointegrated VAR. Namely, it is possible to infer which of them is likely to require
the largest adjustment to reach the asymptotic steady state of the system.
67Stationarity of one between the two components yield however a I(1) model with a natural
cointegrating relation, see definition 1.3.3 and the discussion that follows.
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ˆˆ
B1
ˆˆ
D‖
ˆˆ
A
DE 1.000 -1.547 0.036 -0.206 0.024
(0.131) (0.006) (0.029) (0.007)
NL 1.000 -0.884 0.008 -0.240 0.074
(0.102) (0.005) (0.036) (0.014)
Table 3.3: Cointegrating vectors (y, y˜): EGLS estimation of the normalized cointegrating
basis [1 B1], the constant within the cointegrating relations D‖ and the error-correction
speeds A; correspondent standard errors in brackets.
The component which requires less adjustment thus dominate the other, in
the sense that the latter is moving towards the former, which is closer to the
long-run equilibria. The dominating component is then interpreted as the principal
determinant of the long run equilibrium [48].
The Gonzalo-Granger (GG) measure, introduced in [52], is based on error correction
speeds: whether both A1 and A2 are significant68, the ratio A2/(A2−A1) is close to
1 when Y 1 dominates, while the converse happens when such ratio is closer to 0.
The accounting rate y˜ determines a long-run equilibrum with market yields in
countries with healthy balance accounting.
Furthermore, the error correction speeds reveal that, in both cases, the accounting
rate is the principal component determining the steady state of the vector model.
No feedback effects are registered across other countries, except for Italy and Spain:
roughly 5% of internal yield variation ∆y˜t is explained by the lagged variation ∆yt−1,
thus market yields are active part in the formation of debt service.
Pure autoregressive effects are significant for ∆y˜ in any country: this variable is
strictly macroeconomic, thus requires a longer memory, while the observations of its
market counterpart are conditionally independent at quarterly frequencies.
3.3.2 Yields and public debt
The analysis of VAR models (y, x) and (y˜, x) requires the foreward assumption that
the null of unit root in ∆x for any of the countries is refused. Formally, in order
to homogenize models across countries, the alternative in T1 is accepted, that is,
∆xt = c0∆xt−1 + c1∆2xt−1 + . . . with c0 < 1.
Again the univariate choice of the model is coherent with the prior H∗1 in vector
modeling, providing for no constants in differences (no time trend in levels).
Vector models (y, x) supplies poor information: short-run effects are not significant
and cointegrating rank rˆ is different from zero in Germany only.
68If only one of the two speeds is significant, then we are back to the discussion of section 2.3.2.
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ˆˆ
B1
ˆˆ
D‖
ˆˆ
A
DE 1.000 0.303 -0.241 -0.041 -0.142
(0.101) (0.070) (0.014) (0.060)
Table 3.4: Cointegrating vectors (y, x): EGLS estimation of the normalized cointegrating
basis [1 B1], the constant within the cointegrating relations D‖ and the error-correction
speeds A; correspondent standard errors in brackets.
The long-run equilibrium is yDE = −0.3xDE + 0.2: the sizes of cointegrating
paraemters are questionable, but the fact that Bˆ1 > 0 is retained significant as
exposing the aforementioned flight to quality phenomena in the long-run.
The error-correction speeds (table 3.4) reveal the dominance of rates on debt level,
as it is expectable since the rate determines debt service.
Among short-run effects, only C22 is significant, yet not in all countries: long
memory of x is recognizable in Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, France and Italy.
Particularly, 5% confidence bandwiths induced by the estimator Cˆ22 include the unit
root (table A.17), thus confirming the assumption (y, x) ∈ I(1) to be strained.
Statistical relevance of feedback effects between the two variables is thus globally
unsatisfactory to drag conclusions.
Similar problems arise in the analysis of (y˜, x). Cointegration arise in Belgium, Italy
and Netherlands and the significant error-correction speed is A1 < 0, suggesting debt
determines the internal rate.
These poor statistical results are attributable to inaccurate estimates of integration
orders of the vector processes. On the one hand, y˜ might be a trend stationary
process (T3 refuses the null in Belgium and Italy), while on the other x could be an
I(2) process. This partially invalidates also the significance of short-run feedbacks
(0 < Cˆ12 < 1) of ∆xt−1 on ∆y˜t in these same countries.
The assumption (y˜, x) ∈ I(1) is less strained in France and Germany: pure AR
coefficients are relatively far from 1 (FR) or not significant (DE), respectively.
Germany shows Cˆ12 < 0 < Cˆ21, with |Cˆ12| = |Cˆ21| ≈ 0.5: the effect of debt/gdp
variation on internal rate variation is negative (flight to quality) while positive
variation of y˜ produces positive variation of x, as expectable.
Summing up, the mixed results out of Dickey-Fuller statistics suggest the assumption
x ∈ I(1) to be inaccurate, so that cointegrating vectors might be faulty as retrieved
out of incorrect dgp modeling underlyings.69
Attempts to directly measure ω in a VAR framework are thus nullified by the
difference in the integration order of rates and debt/gdp.
69Recall that if the true VAR process is I(2), trace statistics are different (see [74], pp. 132-138)
from the I(1). In this case, the use of cointegration tests for I(1) processes may not be informative.
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ˆˆ
B1
ˆˆ
D‖
ˆˆ
A
BE 1.000 1.108 -1.077 -0.031 0.069
(0.019) (0.018) (0.002) (0.460)
IT 1.000 2.721 -3.280 -0.091 0.227
(0.015) (0.016) (0.006) (0.290)
NL 1.000 -0.177 0.097 -0.086 0.111
(0.012) (0.007) (0.004) (0.405)
Table 3.5: Cointegrating vectors (y˜, x): EGLS estimation of the normalized cointegrating
basis [1 B1], the constant within the cointegrating relations D‖ and the error-correction
speeds A; correspondent standard errors in brackets.
3.3.3 Debt speed, yields and yields spreads
The vector processes (y,∆x) and (y˜,∆x), involve debt-speed (see figure 3.5). ADF
tests accept the null of unit root for y and s for any country, except for yIT (test
T2 refuses the null): the prior assumption yIT ∈ I(1) is explictly added, so that all
models are homogeneously estimated in a I(1) framework.
Firstly, notice that no cointegrating vectors arise for any of the countries in any
of the two VARs: for what concerns (y,∆x), short-term dynamics move separately
since significant coefficients belong to the diagonal of C1 only.
The only relevant feedback effect is CES12 ≈ −0.35: the minus sign is counterintuitive,
but the p-value of the t-statistic is very close to the 5% threshold, thus significance
may be questionable.
The analysis of (s,∆x) short-run dynamics reveals poor coefficient significance too:
concerning the only exception is the impact of spread on debt-speed in Spain CES12 ≈
0.28, but again p-value is close to 5%..
3.3.4 A direct econometric approach: concluding remarks
The conclusions that can be drawn following a direct econometric approach are
generally unsatisfactory. The comparison among interest rates (y, y˜) reveal structural
connections among financial market and government accounting in the long run only
in Germany and Netherlands.
If the VAR (yDE, y˜DE) VAR is fitted with prior Hˆ = H2 (no constant in the
cointegrating relation), the estimated cointegrating rank is r = 1 with BDE1 ≈ 1.1,
aligning to [BNL1 D‖] ≈ [0.9 01×2].
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Figure 3.5: 5-y yields (blue-dotted) and 5-y yield spreads vis-à-vis Germany (red-dotted)
versus debt speed (green-squared) (Source: ECB, Bloomberg and authors computations)
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The VAR (y, y˜) instead scarcely displays feedback effects in distressed countries:
the conclusion is that market risk premia are not beared by the internal-rate y˜.
Statistics concerning any model where debt/gdp level x is present may be inaccurate
as the true process x might belong to I(2).
The only result which is worth to mention concerns the signals of the flight-to-quality
towards Germany, but it is clear that ω out of (3.2.2) cannot be directly inferred.
Finally, when switching to debt speed ∆x, results are even poorest in terms of
feedback effects, which were of most interest. Considering both (y,∆x) and (s,∆x),
components of each of the two vectors are estimated to evolve as non-interacting
AR processes, with slightly correlated residuals (ρ ≤ ρPT = 60% in any country).
The linear model for debt/gdp and yields presented in section 3.2 does not find
validation within the statistical framework.
Next section updates theoretical underlyings described in section 3.2, and presents
an economically founded approach to debt-crisis, allowing to build up economically
founded scores that can be compared with standard credit-risk indicators
3.4 Sovereign risk: a Minskian approach
Previous econometric analysis revealed that a demand/supply approach based on
(3.2.2) produces relevant statistical results for healthy economies only.
Distressed countries displaying sensible increase in credit risk premia, as reflected
by market yields, requires a different framework.
The reasons behind is that risk appetites of lenders towards EMU-countries debt
market have not remained constant in the last decade.
Equation (3.2.1) should encompass a time-varying demand function, modeled by a
time-varying operator ω = ωt.
Assuming that the operator’s functional form does not change over time and that
it can be identified through a dynamic parameter ωt in a product form, implies:
yt = ωt(xt) := f(xt, ωt) = ωtxt (3.4.1)
A one-period upward shift in risk aversion (∆ωt > 0) is able to steepen the line
up, towards the the ultimate boundary, which is default. Taking the logarithms in
(3.4.1), and defining:
logωt := log yt − log xt (3.4.2)
it is possible to check if intuitions are confirmed. Figure 3.6 shows the evolution of
the relative variation ∆ logωt ≈ ∆ωt/ωt−1 defined out of (3.4.1).
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Figure 3.6: Quarterly relative variation ∆ logωt ≈ ∆ωt/ωt comparison among France,
Italy and the Netherlands (top) and among Germany and Greece (bottom) within the
time stub 2001Q1:2013Q3 (Source: ECB, Bloomberg and authors computations)
A common cross-country pattern is recognizable up to 2008 approximatively: the
burst of the crisis brought along the set of aforementioned side effects which allow
to explicitly distinguish one country from the other.
Greece, for example, maintained a positive relative variation from 2010 on, with an
upward peak reached soon before the second rescue package (February 2012). The
downturn variation started in 2012, when credit restructuring removed pressures
from Greek yields.
Conversely, during that same time-window, Germany shows the lowest peak together
with France and Netherlands. Italy instead was suffering its worse distress period,
thus the relative variation of ω is again positive therein.
These facts confirm the trivial intuition that risk appetites with respect to the EMU
had a dynamic evolution along the past decade and invalidate any attempt to study
a statistical model for (y, x) without time-variating risk aversion coefficients.
A dynamic risk aversion coefficient is able to model reactions of markets to the
increasing financial distress.
Figure 3.7 (a) shows the one-period demand function when a shift in risk appetites
∆ωt > 0 occurs: a similar approach can be found in [55].
A static demand curve model (blue-dashed) would predict future yield to be yEt up
to a certain confidence level (black circle): the aforementioned positive shift may
push the realized interest rate yt > yEt outside that confidence region.
This surprise effect yt−yEt > 0 measured by the difference between the realized and
the expected rate results in an additional risk premium which is not Fxt−1-measurable.
Figure 3.7(b) shows the effects of a sequence of positive debt variation under the
assumption that each of them causes a positive shift in risk aversion.
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Figure 3.7: One period (a) and multi-period (b) shifts in demand curve caused by a
positive variation of ωt in response to a positive debt variation ∆xt.
The cascade of upward slope shifts ultimatey leads country to default. Formally,
define Fxt and Fωt the natural filtrations for processes x and ω; equation (3.4.1)
implies Fyt ⊆ σ(Fxt ∪ Fωt ) = Ft and:
∆yt = ωt−1∆xt + xt∆ωt (3.4.3)
The exhogenous model for rates is now constituted by two components, namely
debt/gdp level and risk aversion of market investors. Taking conditional expectations:
E(∆yt|Ft−1) = E(xt∆ωt|Ft−1) + ωt−1E(∆xt|Ft−1) (3.4.4)
the assumption that xt is Fxt (hence Ft) predictable implies:
E(∆yt|Ft−1) = ωt−1∆xt + xtE(∆ωt|Ft−1) (3.4.5)
The conditional expectation E(∆ωt|Ft−1) forecasts the slope at t of the demand
curve in (3.4.1), and is needed for prediction even if future debt/gdp level is known.
Previous equation does not add anything new: investors risk appetites ω, in a
theoretical exhogenous model for market yields, embeds all the variability in y that
is not explained by x, which is rather large, as proved in section 3.3.
Risk aversion ω is clearly unobservable: it contains general expectations on future
creditworthiness, local (one-period) reactions to excessive ∆x > 0 (lenders might
demand additional risk premia to fulfill borrower’s request) as well as contagion
effects due to a general rise in risk aversion for EMU obligations market (see [36]).
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Equation (3.4.5) sheds however light on the rather poor explanatory power of
VAR modeling in (y, x) and (y,∆x).
Time-varying ω nullifies estimation with constant coefficients. Furthermore, (3.4.5)
explicitely model the impact on yields of debt speed as well as that of risk appetites
variations, weighted by debt/gdp level.
As y and x (and their variations) are instead observable, it might be worth to exploit
them in order to infer ω. This latter can be viewed as the informative variable on
borrower’s credit risk, and can in turn be compared to custom credit risk measures.
A standard VAR approach to (3.4.5) is however impossible because of dynamic
coefficients. The following sections present the construction of a score based on y and
x which is able to capture investors’ expectations on countries future creditworthiness.
Subsection 3.4.1 discusses the underlying modeling assumption, tracing back to the
seminal ideas of Minsky [86] in the framework of the basic model as presented in
section 3.2. Section 3.5 presents econometric results out of comparison with standard
credit risk measures, concluding the chapter.
3.4.1 The Ponzi-score
The reliance on economic theory serves the purpose of moving away from pure
econometric modeling, which would require more advanced instruments than those
supplied by the VAR framework.
The direction undertaken in this work is thus to construct a measure of credit risk
based on economic theories on credit market in a demand/supply framework.
Namely, a growing interest of academics ([42] and references within) concerning the
dynamics driving public debt was registered during this latest crisis following the
pioneering ideas of H. Minsky [86] and his Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH).
It is also worth to mention the speech of Janet Yellen, current president of the Federal
Reserve (Fed), where Minsky’s framework is contextualized to current crisis. The
facility of markets to grant credit in the form of assets and derivatives purchasing
was under question: "..borrowers, lenders, and regulators (that) are lulled into
complacency as asset prices rise. It was not so long ago..that many of us were trying
to figure out why investors were demanding so little compensation for risk" [116].
When lenders perceive global financial conditions to be healthy, borrowers are able
to match demand for their debt under general compliance of regulators, which
benefit from a liquid market. As confidence collapses, lenders dry up demand: the
countereffect is to charge yields with higher risk premia so as to relaunch purchases.
If at the same time real economy is in recession, borrowers may not be able to repay
loans, due to low output and high deficit. Regulators, on their side, find themselves
trapped between financial untrustworthiness and economic distress, disposing of
monitoring instruments unable to predict sudden confidence shifts.
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Particular interest will be devoted to Minsky’s classification of loan agreements,
where three kinds of borrowers are distinguishable: the hedger, the speculator and
the Ponzi -borrower. The hedger repays at each payment date all accrued interest
plus a fraction of principal, so that the outstanding debt diminishes in time. The
speculator repays only the interests, keeping debt always at the same level, while
the Ponzi borrower is not able to repay neither (a fraction of) the interests.
A Ponzi borrower, in a given period of time, is the one who has increased its debt
level in that period: not only must he completely refinance the outstanding debt,
but also issue new one not to default on interest payments.
He has to be able to find new lenders and/or persuade current ones to purchase
more obligations, increasing in turn his credit exposure. This deadly debt spiral [42]
will soon lead to default, that will occur when auctions will ultimately be diserted.
These ideas can be easily adapted to the demand-supply framework: broadening
the concept of "loan" by replacing debt level with debt/gdp, a government will be
considered a Ponzi borrower within the time period [t− 1, t] if ∆xt > 0.
The aim is to build up a scoring method which is able to recognize and monitor
government Ponzi schemes, and evaluate their impact on countries crediworthiness
perceptions (investors risk aversions).
The positive part of debt speed ∆x+t = max{∆xt, 0} will be called the actual
Ponziness of government, as it quarterly measures the size of government Ponzi
scheme. Increasing debt supply may boost the requested risk premium and affect
y, as shown by the example in figure 3.7(b), with time-observation of ωt describing
the path of market confidence.
A rather intuitive experiment is to ignore the size of Ponzi schemes and imply a
score by counting the number of times the government is acting as a Ponzi borrower
along the time window considered.
A set of thresholds determining rating migrations could then be easily implied by
mapping target score to that of rating agencies, in the original spirit of Altman [7].
This approach suffers from the fact that similar signals were coming out of opposite
situations, so that different countries would be labelled with the same scoring.
Along with the expansive phase which followed the collapse of Lehman between
Q2:2009 and Q3:2010, ending up with the full onset of the Euro-Sovereign crisis,
any of the countries under examination exhibits ∆xt > 0, and it thus becomes
difficult to clearly distinguish them (a similar score would for example be attributed
to Germany and Ireland).
It could be the case that quantifying the size of actual Ponziness is relevant for
creditworthiness perception. Notice that the snowball effect in (3.2.10) is measured
with respect to y˜, while it is clear that market yields are the main drivers of public
debt demand and determine market liquidity.
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Market yields perform better in reflecting critical conditions of the correspondent
countries with respect to y˜ (figure 3.4) because they embed credit risk premia
(section 3.3). Determining if a government is acting as a Ponzi borrower does not
take into account external interventions such as bailout programmes, that allow the
country to borrow at the monitored interest rate through extraordinary measures.
Rewriting equation (3.2.10) as:
∆xt = (yt − gt)xt−1 − nt +mt − (yt − y˜t)xt−1 (3.4.6)
we define the process:
φt := (yt − gt)xt−1 − nt +mt (3.4.7)
by substituting the accounting rate with market rate equal to debt duration.
In other words, debt variation at time t is evaluated at market interest rate, thus
measuring the speed of borrowing of target country considering global financial
market as the lender: the higher φ, the lower the creditworthiness. In what follows,
country A will be called a Ponzi borrower at time t whenever φAt > 0.
A closer look to (3.4.7) validates the introduction of φ: first of all, it contains
Maastricht parameters x and n, and it includes both the growth rate of the economy
and market yields within y − g.
Primary surplus directly affects the score, while market snowball effect yt−gt, being
weighted by xt−1, has direct (or amplified) effect in countries showing 100% of
debt/gdp ratio (or greater). Combination of (3.4.6) and (3.4.7) yields:
φt = ∆xt + (yt − y˜t)xt−1 (3.4.8)
that is, φt is given by debt/gdp variation plus an additional penalty determined by
the spread yt − y˜t, weighted by previous debt/gdp level.
The misalignement between y and y˜ could be used as a rough measure of credit risk,
as it culminates during financial distress, and decreases after bailout programmes
became effective. Another possible interpretation of (yt − y˜t)xt−1 is the correction
to debt variation indiced by market rates and attributable to external interventions.
Figure 3.8 shows the evolution of φ for our panel of countries: it is notable that
from late 2008 on, all countries became Ponzi-borrowers due to the combined effect
of recession, and rise in both credit risk and public deficits.
After 2009, the spread φGR − φDE widens dramatically, and each country-specific φ
lies between the two of them. An interesting exception is again that of Ireland, which
underperforms Greece up to 2011, when the rescue of Irish banks was completed and
the country returned to normal level of yields and deficit.
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Figure 3.8: φA (blue-straight) compared to the correspondent indicator for Germany
φDE (black-squared) and Greece φGR (red-squared).(Source: ECB, Bloomberg and authors
computations)
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The idea is to construct a score based on market Ponziness, defined as:
φ+t := max{φt, 0} (3.4.9)
quantifying government’s Ponzi scheme: we will refer to φ+t as the Ponzi score.
The scoring system built up in this way is strictly country-specific but it does
not encompass flight-to-quality cases, Since augmenting debt-level is always seen
as negative (the higher the score the lower the creditworthiness).
It is thus worth to leave Germany out of this approach: relying on market’s perception
and on the general stable conditions of German’s public economy, we define the
spreaded market Ponziness as:
φ∗t = φt − φDEt
= (∆xt −∆xDEt ) + stxt−1 + (yDEt − y˜DEt )(xt−1 − xDEt−1) + (y˜DEt − y˜t)xt−1
(3.4.10)
If we further assume that the accounting rate is common for the whole monetary
union, and also that the difference between such rate and German yield is neglectable,
then (3.4.10) is approximated by:
φ∗t ≈ (∆xt −∆xDEt ) + stxt−1 (3.4.11)
Thus φ∗ is given by a nonlinear process in the spread as weighted by current debt
level, plus the difference between target country and Germany’s actual Ponziness.
The spreaded Ponzi-score can again be defined by taking the positive part in (3.4.11):
φ+∗t := max{φt − φDEt , 0} (3.4.12)
can be defined. In this way, the minimum score (maximum creditworthiness) is
assigned to Germany by construction, which is de facto considered risk-free, coherently
with the results presented in chapter 2.
This scoring system grants70 to each country a certain degree of Ponziness, as long
as it remains lower than that of Germany. This corresponds to assume that the
combination of macroeconomic indicators and interest rates in Germany is such
that the country is perceived as a risk-free issuer by the market.
Building up a scoring system is useful in order to extend a rating system (for example
that supplied by rating agencies) which does not cover all entities.
Such techniques provide the new score to be constructed for all borrowers, so that
a one-to-one mapping between the two curves can be interpolated using the entities
providing both scores (see [7]).
70In the sense that an increase of φ∗ does not impact market-implied creditworthiness.
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Here we maintain the same approach in defining a uniform scoring methodology
but with a different scope, as the panel of countries is commonly covered by all
external ratings. The aim here is instead to construct a dynamic scoring which is
able to capture eventual rating migrations with quarterly frequency.
The implied scoring system is mapped to custom credit-risk measures through VAR
analysis to infer feedback effects between the score and the standard measure.
Among the most popular credit-risk measures in the EMU, we selected the (5-year)
spread vis-à-vis the german bund s and the (5-year) CDS-implied default probability.
The term structure of CDS-implied default probabilities is retrieved out of CDS
quotes through the ISDA CDS-Standard model (appendix C).
Particularly, ISDA methodology relies on the assumption that, for any trade date
and standard maturity (t, T¯j), the (conditional) probability of default under the
risk-neutral measure occurring within the time window [t, T¯j] at time t is:
Q(t, T¯j) = 1− exp(−λT¯j · T¯j) (3.4.13)
where default intensity is assumed to be flat for any fixed maturity.
Observe that implying λ by assuming a flat maturity is inconsistent from a theoretical
point of view in that a different λ is implied for each different maturity.
This shortcoming invalidates pricing models when contract with different maturities
are traded on the market at the same time (see [20]).
However, if the scope is to seek for relevant statistical relationships in terms of credit
risk, and aggregated debt is considered to mature at five years, a more complicated71
structure for the default intensity process is not essential.
The advantage is that we are able to imply a one-to-one mapping between default
probability and default intensity out of (3.4.13). Setting Qt = Q(t, 5), the evolution
of 5-year CDS-implied default probabilities yields72:
λt = − log(1−Qt)/5 (3.4.14)
where T is set to 5 years coherently with the assumed maturity (duration) of public
debt.73 It is left to understand how to quantify the extent to which this scoring
method reflects market sentiment, that is, what are the characteristic we expect a
sovereign scoring system to have so as to be considered a valid alternative.
Econometric analysis is again used as the mean to draw conclusions: as large
consensus is received by both s and λ as distress indicators, a VAR model (λ, s)
is analyzed, in order to benchmark the statistical features shared by these different
credit risk metrics.
71Current practice is to assume a piecewise constant λ across standard maturities.
72Observe that first-order expansion of (3.4.14) implies λ ≈ Q/5 for small λ.
73Notice that rules for computing default intensity provides λt to be always positive whatever
the level of CDS-spread is observed, see [84].
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BE DE ES FR IE IT NL PT
φ 4 4 2 2 4 4 1 4
φ∗ 4 − 2 4 4 4 4 4
λ 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2
φ+ 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 4
φ+∗ 4 − 2 4 1 2 4 4
Table 3.6: Unidimensional number of lags pˆj, estimated through the step-procedure
described in section 1.1, pˆj ≤ 4 by construction.
The following step is to seek those same properties when comparing q to the
implied scores: namely, as both φ+ and φ+∗ are positive for any t, it is convenient to
analyze the VAR models (λ, φ+) and (λ, φ+∗ ).
Notice that, by defining a Ponzi default probability as an exponential term structure
with default intensity equal to the score, we are de facto comparing two different
default probability measures. It is worth to underline that default probabilities out
of 3.4.13 are instead computed under the risk-neutral measure.
Before exploring the set of credit risk indicators, it is worth to analyze both (y, φ)
and (s, φ∗): it could be argued that any of the scores does not add information with
respect to yield or spread, respectively.
This would be the case whether these latter VAR models brought forth strong
statistical dependence among their components. The inclusion of macroeconomic
variables as explanatory factors must be justified by proving their structural relevance
within each of the scoring systems.
3.5 Econometrics of the scoring systems
Table 3.6 collects the estimated number of lags for each univariate process and each
country: again, the maximum number of significant lags is set to p¯ = 4. The values
of test statistics (1.2.2) are presented in table (A.9).
Observe that one lag is selected for all countries but Ireland and Portugal (pˆ = 2):
this rather short memory in 5-year default probabilities evolution is probably due
to slow sample frequencies, inducing smooth time series.
On the other hand, a higher number of lags is required in order to fit φ and φ∗: this
fact is not surprising considering the amount of different information they embed,
and their intimate nonlinear nature.
When considering the positive parts of φ+ and φ+∗ , respectively, the number of
required lags decreases, as a large amount of observations before 2009 equals zero.
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BE DE ES FR IE IT NL PT
(y, φ) (0, 2) (0, 3) (0, 2) (0, 2) (0, 2) (0, 4) (0, 2) (0, 3)∗
(s, φ∗) (0, 4) − (0, 3)∗ (0, 4) (0, 2) (0, 4) (0, 4) (0, 3)∗
(λ, s) (0, 2) − (1, 4)∗ (0, 2) (1, 2) (0, 2) (0, 2) (1, 3)∗
(λ, φ+) (0, 3) (0, 2) (1, 2) (0, 2) (0, 2) (0, 2) (0, 3)∗ (1, 3)∗
(λ, φ+∗ ) (1, 4) − (1, 2) (0, 4) (0, 2) (1, 4) (0, 4) (1, 3)∗
Table 3.7: Estimated cointegrating order and number of lags (rˆ, pˆ) used in parameters
estimations; p is selected according to the procedure described in section 1.5.1; models
with (∗) provide an additional lag to whithen residuals.
Tables A.11 collect p-values from conducting ADF tests on this second set of
variables: results are mixed so it is worth to face them one by one.
First of all, test T1 rejects the null of unit root for process φ in Spain, Italy and the
Netherlands. If combined with market yield, the process (y, φ) ∈ I(1) as y ∈ I(1),
but again care must be taken when performing cointegration tests.
The only questionable case is that of Italy, for which process y could be stationary
too (test T2 refuses the null), so that a possible alternative model for (yIT , φIT )
could be an I(0) process. The choice was to consider (yIT , φIT ) ∈ I(1) to compare
all countries using the same integration order.74
Concerning φ∗, the null of unit-root is rejected by model T3 in Italy, in favor of the
trend stationary model. It is not restrictive here not to consider this test because
estimating with the prior Hˆ = H∗1 does not provide for linar trend in the VAR.
ADF tests for process q (or, equivalently, for process λ) do not reject the nulls of
unit-root for any of the countries in the panel.
The assumption of unit root in φ+ is rejected by both T1 and T2 in all countries
except for Germany and Ireland. Furthermore, Italy shows rejection of unit root
assumption for any test, hence φ+,IT ∈ I(0) although (λIT , φ+,IT ) ∈ I(1) (definition
1.3.3): cointegration rank is set to zero in this case.
The same applies to φ+,BE∗ (rejections of T3) and φ+,NL∗ (all tests rejects unit-root):
again the integration order of λ again allows to set (λ, φ+∗ ) ∈ I(1), but eventual
cointegrating relations would be fallacious. In all these case, the cointegration order
is again priorly set to r = 0.
Determining the lags of VARmodels follows the same principles disclosed for previous
observation sets: briefly, lags are chosen according to tables 3.7.
A first estimation of cointegrating basis and short-run parameters is performed, and
in-sample residuals Uˆ are tested for autocorrelations.
74Statistical results out of a stationary VAR estimation of (yIT , φIT ) are however unsatisfactory.
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ˆˆ
B1
ˆˆ
D‖
ˆˆ
A
ES 1.000 -1.605 0.000 -0.442 -1.356
(0.005) (0.001) (0.031) (0.661)
IE 1.000 -1.282 0.003 -0.405 -0.383
(0.008) (0.001) (0.034) (0.311)
PT 1.000 -2.282 0.005 -0.236 -3.776
(0.006) (0.001) (0.034) (0.150)
Table 3.8: Cointegrating vectors (λ, s): EGLS estimation of the normalized cointegrating
basis [1 B1], the constant within the cointegrating relations D‖ and the error-correction
speeds A; correspondent standard errors in brackets.
Results out of these tests are collected in A.27 and lags are augmented by 1 in
all those VARs exhibiting rejection of no-autocorrelation assumptions. The final
number of lags is resumed in table 3.7, and each model is fitted using such pˆ’s.
3.5.1 Ponzi-scores: a new information set
The first step is thus to make sure that the scoring which were introduced provide
different information with respect to yields and spread respectively. The idea is to fit
VAR models (y, φ) and (s, φ∗) looking for eventual feedback effects. No cointegrating
relations are present in any of the two models in all countries. Short-run feedback
effects (tables A.21 and A.22) are not observed, with the exception of France and
Netherlands where the estimated models are ∆sFRt ≈ 0.11∆φFR∗,t−1 + ut and ∆sNLt ≈
0.04∆φNL∗,t−1 + ut. The correlation among residuals is notable only in Portugal, both
in (yPT , φ+), ρ = 0.7 and (sPT , φ+,PT∗ ), ρ = 0.6.
C11 in (s, φ∗) is informative in all countries (but Netherlands), differently from C22,
which is never significant. The conclusion is that the implied scores embed different
information sets with respect to market yields and spreads.
Feedback effects are not registered and the significance of diagonal elements out of
models fitting point out separate dynamics for each of the two components.
3.5.2 Common features of credit-risk measures
Next step concerns VAR models of the form (λ, s), across countries: figure 3.9 shows
the evolution of the two time series. The purpose of such comparisons is to enlighten
the econometric features arising among two widely diffused credit-risk measure, so
as to fix a set of criteria able to determine the relevance of a new scoring system.
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Figure 3.9: Default intensity (blue-dotted) and 5-years spread vis-à-vis Germany
(red-dotted); eventual cointegrating relations λ = ˆˆB1s+
ˆˆ
D‖ are also shown (grey-squared).
(Source: ECB, Bloomberg and authors computations)
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Cointegrating relations arise in Spain, Ireland and Portugal, the most distressed
countries within our panel: the long-run equilibria relationships yield λES ≈ 1.6sES,
λIE ≈ 1.3sIE + 0.3% and λPT ≈ 2.3sPT + 0.8%.
The GG measure implies that default intensity dominates the spread in Italy and
Portugal, as the latter adjusts more slowly to the steady state. The sole significant
error-correction speed in Ireland is Aˆ1, hence the situation is reversed, with default
intensity reaching more slowly the steady state.
Short-run analysis (table A.23) reveals limited feedback effects, except for France
and Ireland, where ∆λt−1 impacts ∆st with C12 = 0.05.
This result, particularly in Ireland, confirms the idea that yields spreads contain a
richer information set with respect to credit derivatives prices. The shortcoming is
the relatively large estimated short-run feedback effect CPT21 ≈ 4.1: a 1% variation of
CDS-implied default probabilities would imply a rise in spread of 400 basis points.
3.5.3 The Ponzi-score(s) and credit risk
Consider now the vector processes (λ, φ+) : figure 3.10 shows the evolution of these
two processes between 2001 and 2013. The estimated cointegration rank is different
from zero only in Spain and Portugal, and table 3.9 collects the cointegrating basis
out of these two countries.
In particular, the long-run equilibria relationships are λES ≈ 1.2φ+,ES + 3.5% and
λPT ≈ 2.5φ+,PT − 1.3%: using the first order approximation Q ≈ 5λ, we deduce that
a rise in the score ∆φ+ = 1%, for example, corresponds to a rise of 6% (ES) and
11.2% (PT) in the respective CDS-implied default probabilities, similarly to (λ, s).
This result is a signal pointing in the right direction: a higlhy distressed country
shows a structural equilibrium between the Ponzi-score and market-implied Q.
It is also interesting to notice that, in Portugal, the Ponzi score dominates default
intensity, while in Spain results are less explicit.
In the short-run (table A.24) feedback effects Cˆ12 are registered in all countries but
they all differ in size and sign. The opposite effect CˆIT21 ≈ 0.01 is registered in Italy
only. These unaligned short-run effects may again be due the prior assumption
φ+ ∈ I(1): coefficients estimation in the case of Belgium, Spain, Italy and the
Netherlands may be biased (φ+ ∈ I(1) is refused by T1 and T2).
Figure 3.11 shows in turn the time evolution of (λ, φ+∗ ) in the time window considered;
by comparing these pictures with those collected in 3.10, an important property of
both score processes is recognizable across countries.
The score becomes indeed significantly different from zero with approximatively two
quarters of delay with respect to CDS-implied default probabilities.
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ˆˆ
B1
ˆˆ
D‖
ˆˆ
A
ES 1.000 -1.235 -0.035 -0.147 0.084
(0.303) (0.050) (0.027) (0.015)
PT 1.000 -2.501 0.013 -0.440 0.073
(0.055) (0.010) (0.046) (0.030)
Table 3.9: Cointegrating vectors (λ, φ+): EGLS estimation of the normalized cointegrating
basis [1 B1], the constant within the cointegrating relations D‖ and the error-correction
speeds A; correspondent standard errors in brackets.
The lack of liquidity in sovereign CDS market, where CDS contracts before 2003
are not actively traded, sets implied default probability to zero75.
The government becomes a Ponzi-borrower almost as soon as CDS-quotes became
informative, hence, as soon as the risk of sovereing default in the EMU became a
possible scenario in the view of financial markets.
This responds to eventual criticisms arguing that statistical results are biased because
the time series of scores are zero in the first portion of the sample. Before the
outspread of the crisis, credit risk in EMU countries was actually null (or perceived
so), that is the reason why CDS contracts were not actively traded at those times.
In this sense, the fact that φ+∗ is equal to zero up to some (variating) observation time
close to 2008 is considered as a good property of φ+∗ . The score activates as soon as
CDS-default probabilities do, and each observation (0, 0) is considered significant.
The scoring system as determined by φ+∗ is able to better capture variation in
countries creditworthiness with respect to its country-specific counterparts φ+.
The first result is that cointegrating relations arise in all countries but France,
Netherlands76 and Ireland, (table 3.10). Cointegrating relations would arise also
in Ireland if dataset is limited to 2011:Q4, with a significant BˆIE1 ≈ 0.98.
Results are mixed for what concerns the cointegrating constants D‖, which are
significant in Belgium and Portugal only. Cointegrating speeds are not informative
on the principal determinant except for Belgium, where φ+∗ anticipates λ. Short-run
dynamics are poorly informative too (table A.25): beyond each variable’s specific
autoregressive effects, short-term feedbacks are significant in Belgium and Italy
(Cˆ12 < 0) and the Netherlands (Cˆ12 > 0). The negative sign in both Italy and
Belgium could be interpreted as a tendency to reduce Ponziness as soon as default
probabilites rise, so as to increase market confidence.
75Databases such as Datastream show no quotes, while specific financial provider such as
Bloomberg provide them but the number of trades is not sufficient to consider prices as informative.
76The three ADF tests on φ+,NL∗ refuses the null of unit-root, hence we set rˆ = 0.
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Figure 3.10: Default intensity (blue-dotted) and Ponzi score (red-dotted); eventual
cointegrating relations λ = ˆˆB1φ+ +
ˆˆ
D‖ are also shown (grey-squared). (Source: ECB,
Bloomberg and authors computations)
102
ˆˆ
B1
ˆˆ
D‖
ˆˆ
A
BE 1.000 -1.056 -0.002 -0.833 0.155
(0.098) (0.001) (0.042) (0.044)
ES 1.000 -1.165 -0.001 -0.223 0.206
(0.116) (0.003) (0.046) (0.029)
IT 1.000 -1.949 0.000 -0.142 0.286
(0.067) (0.000) (0.058) (0.027)
PT 1.000 -1.854 0.008 -0.655 0.410
(0.039) (0.001) (0.059) (0.073)
Table 3.10: Cointegrating vectors (λ, φ+∗ ): EGLS estimation of the normalized
cointegrating basis [1 B1], the constant within the cointegrating relations D‖ and the
error-correction speeds A; correspondent standard errors in brackets.
It is notable that the steady state shows roughly double sensitivity in Portugal
and Italy with respect to Belgium and Spain. This implies, for example, a decrease
of 1% in nt (see equation (3.4.6)) yields a 5% increase of default probabilities in these
latter countries and of 10% in Portugal and Italy. The latter suffers also from an
amplified snowball effect because of the high level of debt/gdp, similarly to Belgium.
Such phenomenon is latter pronounced in Spain, where xES < 100% uniformly in t,
and Portugal, where xPTt ≥ 100% only for t ≥ 2011 : Q4.
3.5.4 Econometrics of the scoring systems: concluding remarks
Between the two competing scores which had been defined, φ+∗ is the more informative,
and deserves further considerations. φ+∗ is rolled every quarter, endowed with brand
new macreoconomic and financial. Its value can be used as a default intensity, thus
corresponds approximately to 5Bˆ1-times physical default probabilities.
As aforementioned, it is typical to consider process λ (or Q) as containing the
largest information set in terms of expectations on future creditworthiness of any
issuer, including forecast on public accounting and market rates.
Countries displaying long-run equilibria withQ reveal structural relationships among
current financial accounting and perceived creditworthiness. This relationship affects
the most financially distressed countries only.
Public accounting and expectations on creditworthiness share a common equilibrium
which is manifested on the long run. Cointegrating speeds shows the reaction of
agents that, looking at current φ+∗ , change their expectations (as reflected by CDS
prices) in order to move back to the asymptotic steady state.
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Figure 3.11: Default intensity (blue-dotted) and spreaded Ponzi score (red-dotted);
eventual cointegrating relations λ = ˆˆB1φ+∗ +
ˆˆ
D‖ are also shown (grey-squared). (Source:
ECB, Bloomberg and authors computations)
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Conclusions
In the present work, the reliability of financial distress indicators across EMU
countries originally inspired by Maastricht parameters is tested, and a new scoring
method, supported by economic theory, is constructed by combining them.
The basis for comparison is credit derivatives market: information may be retrieved
either from CDS prices or from model-based CDS-implied default probabilities.
Maastricht Treaty supplies monitoring systems based on macroeconomic and financial
variables, but it is clear that the latter played a central role in directing economic
policies across the Eurozone in the latest years.
The healthy situation of German’s macro-financial conditions raised yields spreads
vis-à-vis Germany to the role of custom indicator of distress for member states.
Particularly, yields spreads are commonly interpreted as risk premia over a risk-free
benchmark. It is possible to test whether credit risk is the only determinant of yields
spreads once an alternative measure of credit risk premia is available.
Standardization of credit derivatives market furnishes a perfect framework to assess
credit risk premia through simple hedging strategies.
The enhancements of standard contracts rules, including central clearing, decisional
committees and auction-based post-default settlement, are designed with the scope
of cleaning CDS prices from risk factors different from credit risk.
Furthermore, the introduction of a bond-like structure for CDS contracts allows to
integrate credit derivatives and obligations market (the CDS-bond market) through
the fundamental introduction of a spot price for hedging credit risk.
A CDS-bearing portfolio is defined as a combined long position on a sovereign
obligation and a standard CDS, expiring the first standard maturity which exceeds
the residual bond life. Assuming the existence of a term structure of zero-coupon
hedging portfolios, a country-specific CDS-bearing yield curve can be implied for any
member state, using the same modeling assumptions underlying the construction of
naked yield curves. The difference between naked and CDS-bearing yield curves:
pi(t, T ) = y(t, T )− y¯(t, T )
determines for any trade date t the term structure of credit risk premia.
The use of custom yield curves modeling techniques allows to monitor comovements
of CDS and obligations prices for any maturity using the parameter θ¯∗ out of
Nelson-Siegel interpolation. Changes in level, slope, curvature and scale of country
specific CDS-bearing yield curves can forecast cross-country arbitrage opportunities.
This framework allows to compare long-term credit risk premia pit = pi(t, 10) to
spreads vis-à-vis Germany without additional modeling assumptions.
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Furthermore, it allows to imply credit-risk premia piDE also for Germany: its
time evolution confirms the market perception of a credit-risk free entity.
Credit risk premium is different from zero because CDS contracts must have a
nonzero price, but the relative variance of piDE is so small that it can almost be
considered as constant on the selected time window.
A constant CDS premium certifies the illiquidity of German CDS market due to the
unwillingness of investors to trade German credit risk: this confirms that, from a
pure market perspective, credit risk is de facto not present.
The bivariate model (yDE, y¯DE) shows perfect correlation ρ = 1 among the innovations
components: hedging does not reduce naked yields variance because the two portfolios
are already sharing the same source of randomness.
A high correlation (ρ ≥ 0.9) is estimated among residuals out of (yDE, L) and,
consequently, between those out of (y¯DE, L). The basis bDE = y¯DE − L is always
negative: the market discourages the purchase of German bonds financed at Euribor
rate, so as to deflate the flight towards German debt market’s quality.
The absence of cointegrating relations in any of the three models is probably due
the relatively high frequency of the dataset compared to the relatively short time
examined. In the short run, German lagged yields differences have a positive impact
on future Euribor rate differences, stressing the leading position of German bonds
among European credit-risk free investments.
The computation of piIT and piES permits the comparison with yields spreads vis-à-vis
Germany sIT = yIT − yDE and sES = yES − yDE, respectively.
Spreads overprice CDS-implied credit risk premia during the time of harshest distress
of each respective countries, that is, the differences (sIT−piIT ) = (yIT−yDE−piIT ) and
(yES−yDE−piES) are positive between 2011 and 2012 and in mid-2012, respectively.
Possible reasons for this misalignment additional country specific risk premia cloaked
within yields levels, which are not directly attributable to credit risk.
A second explanation could be the excess demand for German debt: even if yields
spreads in normal times measured exactly credit risk premia, the rush to buy German
bonds resulting in an excess lowering of yDE might have systematically risen the
difference (y − yDE − pi) to positive values in these years.
Moreover, since pi underprices credit risk in normal times, purchasing a German bond
before 2011 was more profitable than buying a peripheral Euro-country obligation
and hedge credit risk by purchasing CDS protection: this could be in turn an a
priori justification to the flight-to-quality phenomenon.
Cointegrating relations arise both in (sIT , piIT ) and (sES, piES), despite frequency and
time stub: the long run equilibrium provide credit risk premium to be roughly 60%
of the spread plus a fixed cost of 70 basis points in both countries.
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This sunk cost implies that hedging obligations positions through the credit
derivatives market is always costly, even if s is zero. This fact is attributed to the
purchase of a derivative contract which cannot have a zero price.
CDS-hedging projects sovereign yields onto a credit-risk-free pattern: the set of
country-specific hedged portfolios together with the Euribor rate should in principle
be representative of three credit risk free yields available on the market, thus we
expect models in the form (y¯IT , L), (y¯ES, L) and (y¯IT , y¯ES) to share similar properties.
No cointegrating relations arise: the short-run analysis reveals a high correlation
with Euribor rate (ρ ≈ 0.90) for both y¯IT and y¯ES, but a lower one among themselves
(ρ ≈ 0.66). This is probably due to the higher variability in the combination of the
two hedged portfolios, since vector models residuals includes information stemming
from two derivatives contracts and two obligations.
Although the pattern of y¯IT , y¯ES and L is similar when looking at charts, the basis
b = y¯ − L is non stationary in both cases. Furthermore, b rises from average value
when economic and financial conditions of target countries are severly distressed,
thus suggesting a systematic nature. Both these facts exclude that the basis can be
assimilated to a statistical discrepancy in the white noise family.
It is worth to underline that this conclusion is not related to the choice of the
benchmark rate: by computing the difference y¯IT − y¯ES = bIT − bES, the process
which is obtained is negative on average, yet it exceeded systematically the mean
from above (below) when Italy (Spain) was facing its harshest distress moments.
This argument applies also for relatively minor events, such as the turmoil which
followed political election in Italy in March 2013.
The basis is thus interpreted as an additional risk premium, which is present even
if credit risk is fully hedged. In principle, if credit risk was the only determinant of
yields spreads, any systematic discrepancy between Italian and Spanish CDS-bearing
portfolios yields is an arbitrage opportunity.
Sunk risk premia within such portfolios might be attributable to counterparty risk
in the CDS contract, which is present notwithstanding the standardization process.
Alternatively, naked yields themselves might embed liquidity risk premia which are
obviously not hedged using credit derivatives. Unexpected rise in yields level might
be due to a drain of liquidity in distressed countries obligations market as a direct
consequence of diffused panic effects on financial markets.
Liquidity of obligations markets is expected to be an important factor in determining
sovereign yields levels. On the one hand, the rush to buy German obligations77
resulted in a general decrease of the correspondent yields level.
77The flight to quality phenomenon induced a decreasing pattern of yields as a response to
increasing supply of debt: between 2010 and 2012, the quarterly relative average debt variation is
dx/x ≈ 1.5% (DE), 0.8%(IT) 4.5%(ES), while ∆y/y = −6.5% (DE), 8.25% (IT) and 6.35%(ES).
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On the other, Greece experienced a total lack of demand for its obligations
which ultimately caused default. In a standard demand/supply framework, countries
sovereign obligations markets can be considered as single-good markets where yields
are prices and demand is an increasing function of debt.
It is not retained a significant limitation to assume that the quantity being supplied
is debt/gdp. Investors will be encouraged to purchase obligations in case the money
which is lended is used profitably, hence the differences between yields and the
growth rate of target economy are the relevant variables to be considered.
The panel of countries under analysis is widened to eight state members: Belgium,
Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal.
The statistical analysis of a linear demand function requires an appropriate choice
of yields in such context. Beyond market yield y, an alternative candidate is the
accounting rate y˜, as implied through the interest quotes out of government balance
accounting. The computation of y and y˜, with quarterly frequency, suggests the
accounting rate not to be sensitive to market risk premia, and is thus retained of
minor importance.
The two rates y and y˜ may be exchanged without affecting results only in highly
rated countries, such as Germany and Netherlands. In both cases cointegrating
relations reveal a long run equilibrium among the two rates, with cointegration
coefficient of 1.5 (DE) and 0.9 (NL). Highly distressed countries such as Spain and
Italy registered instead a significant impact of ∆yt−1 on ∆y˜t: that is, the financial
market impacts future accounting variables.
Any attempt of directly estimating the (linear) demand function in a VAR model
involving any of the two yields and debt/gdp level x is nullified by the integration
order of x ∈ I(2). This problem cannot be sidestepped in the case of Spain, Portugal
and Ireland, as the three unit root tests do not refuse the null of unit root in ∆x,
therefore the assumptions (y, x) ∈ I(1) or (y¯, x) ∈ I(1) are unrealistic.
Referring to other countries, no feedback effects and cointegrating relations are
retrieved for processes of the form (y, x). The unique significant coefficient is the
pure autoregressive component in debt differences, but confidence bandwiths for the
estimators include unit roots: the short-run analysis may be then questionable too.
An exception is again Germany: y˜DE can be modeled as a I(1) process according to
each of the three models, and, although parameter sizes are questionable, there’s a
negative impact of ∆xt−1 on ∆yt, attributable to excess demand effects.
Considering the model (y˜, x) cointegrating relations arise in Belgium, Italy and
Netherlands, where also feedback effects of lagged speed on internal rate differences
is registered. Such relations are of little interest as distorted from the fact that the
assumption y˜ ∈ I(1) is not unanimously accepted by the three tests.
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The cases of Ireland and Portugal suggest that debt speed might be the correct
variable affecting yields premia; this is also in line with this demand/supply approach
as a government in recession which is issuing a large amount of debt in a short time
period must encourage new investors by offering a higher yield to maturity.
The comparison of debt speed ∆x does not produce meaningful long-run effects (no
cointegrating relations) when combined either to naked yields y or to yields spreads
s, with the partial exception of Spain, both in (y,∆x) and (s,∆x) where p-values
for the impact of ∆2xESt−1 on ∆yESt are registered. The empirical evidence inspired
by Portugal and Ireland do not find confirmation except for positive correlation of
innovations components in Portugal, reaching 60%.
Positive debt speed inspired also the use of Minsky’s classification of borrowers:
broadening such definitions to debt/gdp borrowers a government is a Ponzi borrower
when ∆x > 0. The perpetuation of Ponzi schemes in public debt might shift
investors risk aversion, up to default.
The idea is to build up a scoring methodology which is able to recognize and monitor
eventual governments Ponzi schemes, and infer whether pursuing such schemes
affects target country’s creditworthiness as expressed by credit risk premia.
The simplest idea is to base the scoring methodology using actual Ponziness ∆x+
in order to measure the perpetuation of such schemes in times.
The unconditional expectation of the variables 1∆xt>0(t) on the time stub considered
might be used to calibrate a set of thresholds and imply a rating measure by
comparison with standard ratings.
The situation of government in crisis prevents from this approach, as almost any
EMU countries has augmented his debt level during the crisis, but with different
outcomes in terms of perceived creditworthiness.
The level of actual Ponziness ∆x+t =
[
(y˜t − gt)xt−1 − nt + mt
]+ does not offer
satisfactory results when a direct VAR approach is pursued to compare it either
to yt and st. The reason is that the former is based on information coming from
accounting variables only, while yields (yields spreads) are market variables, and the
two information sets hardly interact at this time frequency.
The idea is to substitute market rates to accounting rates and define the process:
φt = (yt − gt)xt−1 − nt +mt = ∆xt + (yt − y˜t)xt−1
which is composed by actual Ponziness plus variation between market and internal
rates, weighted by previous debt/gdp level.
The score φ combines Maastricht parameters through a nonlinear function: a possible
limitation is that φ is not sensitive to inflation, as the nominal and real snowball
effects are the same as resulting from the difference of yields and growth rates.
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The impact of the snowball effect yt − gt is mitigated or amplified depending
on xt−1 being below or above 100%, while primary surplus has always a one-to-one
impact on φ. A second score can be constructed by differencing on Germany:
φ∗t = φt − φDEt
= (∆xt −∆xDEt ) + stxt−1 + (yDEt − y˜DEt )(xt−1 − xDEt−1) + (y˜DEt − y˜t)xt−1
≈ (∆xt −∆xDEt ) + stxt−1
where last approximation comes from assuming that the accounting rate in Europe
is constant across countries, and that (yDEt − y˜DEt ) is small.
The first question was whether this processes embeds a different information set
with repsect to their consitutives: particularly, it is necessary to verify whether
yields (yields spreads) are not the main drivers of φ and φ∗, respectively.
The analysis of (y, φ) reveals no cointegrating relations and no short-run significant
coefficients in the first case; correlation of stochastic innovations is high in Portugal
only (70%). Models of the form (s, φ∗) present similar results, with a relatively high
correlation among innovations estimated for Ireland (50%) and Portugal (60%), but
remains lower than 30% in absolute value across the other countries.
Significant short-run feedback effects are retrievable in Spain and Netherlands, where
score differences ∆φ∗t−1 impacts future spread variation ∆st.
Econometric results thus confirm that both processes are not fully determined by
the respective underlying financial variables, that is, accounting variables play a
significant role. Taking the positive part of such scores defines market Ponziness φ+
and spreaded market Ponziness φ+∗ of target sovereign borrower.
The advantage of such scores is that they both awake (become different from
zero) together with CDS-implied default probabilities, and increase comonotonically
with them. In order to decide how to determine the significance of such scores
as macrofinancial distress measures, the features of a VAR analysis of (λ, s) are
retrieved, being λ the default intensity as implied by the CDS market.
Cointegrating relations arise in major distressed countries: approximating Q ≈ 5λ
allows an easy description of this results in terms of default probabilities.
The long-run equilibrium relationships between yields spreads and default intensity
implies QES = 8sES, QIE = 6.5sIE + 0.3% and QPT = 11.5sPT + 0.8%.
The presence of these equilibria are justifiable by observing that financial distress
measures are based on expectations on future creditworthiness.
Hence, a VAR model exhibiting cointegrating relations indicates that expectations
on future creditworthiness are linked in a long-run equilibrium.
When analyzing the models (λ, φ+) and (λ, φ+∗ ) cointegrating relations are thus
considered of major importance.
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Observe that, since both scores are non negative, a straightforward way to
compare them to custom credit risk measure is to imply a physical default probability
by using them as default intensities in a standard exponential framework.
Similarly to the case of λ and Q, the 5-years physical default probabilities are
approximated multiplying the respective score by five.
Concerning φ+, results are similar to those retrieved for yields spreads, namely
QES = 6φ+,ES + 3, 5% and QPT = 12.5sPT − 1.3%.
A long-run equilibrium between accounting-based score φ and Q is interpreted as
current macorfinancial condition is affecting expectations on future creditworthiness
in the long-run.
An interesting feature is that φ+ is a country specific score, and does not need to
be benchmarked on further countries. The disadvantage is the short-run analysis.
Disturbances correlation is lower 40%(ES) and 60%(PT) and a rather counterintuitive
short-run impact of ∆φ+t−1 on ∆Qt is registered in Belgium, Spain and Italy: a
possible explanation could be that the assumption φ+ ∈ I(1) is a bit strained.
The VAR model (λ, φ+∗ ) yields cointegrating relations in a larger number of countries:
beyond Spain and Portugal, Belgium, Italy and also Ireland (if we limit the analysis
to 2011:Q4) revealed the presence of long term equilibria. Cointegrating relations are
expressed in terms of Q as: QBE = 5.2φ+,BE∗ −0.2% , QES = 5.8φ+,ES∗ , QIT = 9.5φ+,IT∗
and QPT = 9.0φ+,PT∗ − 0.8%, respectively (QIE = 4.5φ+,IE∗ with limited dataset).
The presence of long-term equilibria is interpreted as a measure of interconnectedness
among distress measures, thus the spreaded score φ+∗ performs better than φ.
Cointegrating relations among the two risk measures do not arise only in Netherlands
and France. Mutual short-run feedback effects are of scarce significance across
countries, except for residuals correlation (ρ ≥ 0.4 across all countries).
The presence of cointegrating relations across any distressed country reveal that
long-run determinants of CDS-based default probabilities are captured by such score,
with accounting variables bringing forth their peculiar contribution.
A mixed-frequency approach to the construction of such scores might help to improve
the performances of the scoring methods in explaining default probabilities implied
by financial markets. Daily evolution of yields premia could be statistically combined
with quarterly shocks attributed to the accounting variables of interest in order to
retrieve a more sensitive risk indicator which evolves at market frequency.
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A Statistical tables
A.1 Statistical tables: Chapter 2
IT
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
y 3.696 8.156 0.916
y¯ 0.114 0.288 4.640
pi 0.773 0.554 1.656
b 0.142 0.225 3.048
s 8.171 2.048 4.462
ES
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
y 0.360 0.278 8.209
y¯ 0.621 0.115 0.287
pi 0.026 1.306 0.158
b 2.626 0.282 2.259
s 0.107 0.143 5.231
DE
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
y 3.161 0.022 6.589
y¯ 2.737 0.002 6.769
pi 1.519 1.175 0.001
b 3.589 1.439 39.10
EUR
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
L 1.358 0.001 12.01
Table A.1: Single variables lag selection: Values of the F(1, T − p − 1)-statistic
(1.2.2): degrees of freedom in testing (p − 1)|p correspond to the effective sample size
under the alternative. The correspondent α = 5% critical values are F(1, 172) = 3.897,
F(1, 173) = 3.896 and F(1, 174) = 3.895, respectively. Statistics are computed for each
test, although the estimated numbers of lags pj is selected as the first p for which (p− 1)|p
is rejected.
IT
H0 T1 T2 T3
y 0.718 0.707 0.911
y¯ 0.620 0.677 0.602
pi 0.714 0.543 0.785
b 0.094 0.319 0.342
s 0.683 0.527 0.809
ES
H0 T1 T2 T3
y 0.731 0.529 0.774
y¯ 0.640 0.749 0.694
pi 0.750 0.371 0.545
b 0.055 0.389 0.609
s 0.755 0.324 0.752
DE
H0 T1 T2 T3
y 0.575 0.516 0.697
y¯ 0.539 0.465 0.687
pi 0.736 0.073 0.173
b 0.705 0.143 0.446
EUR
H0 T1 T2 T3
L 0.617 0.646 0.849
Table A.2: Unit-root tests : p-values from Augmented Dickey Fuller hypotheses
tests T1, T2 and T3 (section 1.1) for unit roots; bold numbers represent value under the
significance level α = 0.05. Critical values variate with estimated p as described in section
1.1. (ADF tests with p ≥ 6 would be however affected by small sample bias.)
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H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
(yDE, L) 0.021 1.922 22.51
(y¯DE, L) 0.110 3.231 26.87
(yDE, y¯DE) 9.344 7.505 2.370
(piIT , sIT ) 4.579 4.727 1.668
(piES, sES) 1.806 4.216 37.98
(y¯IT , L) 4.441 2.176 18.54
(y¯ES, L) 4.966 42.38 12.93
(yIT , yES) 8.527 25.42 25.02
(y¯IT , y¯ES) 1.547 1.440 4.578
(bIT , bES) 2.613 2.411 6.267
Table A.3: Vector lag selection: values of the test statistic (1.5.3): the critical value
at 5% level is χ2(n2) = χ2(4) = 9.488 for any test of the form p − 1|p; bold numbers
report eligible tests, according to the limitations pˆ : pˆ−∞ ≤ pˆ ≤ pˆ+∞. pˆ is the first p such
that p− 1|p is rejected; if no bold number is in a row then pˆ = pˆ−∞ = pˆ+∞.
(yDE, L) 2
(y¯DE, L) 2
(yDE, y¯DE) 2
(piIT , sIT ) 1
(piES, sES) 2
(y¯IT , L) 2
(y¯ES, L) 2
(yIT , yES) 3
(y¯IT , y¯ES) 2
(bIT , bES) 1
Table A.4: VAR lag selection resume: estimated number of lags out of the procedure
described in 1.5.1, before eventual corrections due to residual analysis.
(yDE, L) 0.364
(y¯DE, L) 0.415
(yDE, y¯DE) 0.300
(piIT , sIT ) 0.057
(piES, sES) 0.055
(y¯IT , L) 0.510
(y¯ES, L) 0.773
(yIT , yES) 0.934
(y¯IT , y¯ES) 0.328
(bIT , bES) 0.261
Table A.5: Cointegration test statistic: p-values for the cointegrating test statistics
for integrated VAR(p) models, with p as in table 2.2, 2.3 and 2.5, respectively.
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ˆˆ
C1(1, 1)
ˆˆ
C1(1, 2)
ˆˆ
C1(2, 1)
ˆˆ
C1(2, 2) σˆ1 σˆ2 ρˆ
(yDE, L) -0.008 0.336 0.455 -0.115 0.001 0.001 0.924
(0.095) (0.115) (0.072) (0.087)
(y¯DE, L) -0.010 0.345 0.456 -0.107 0.001 0.001 0.900
(0.094) (0.113) (0.073) (0.087)
(yDE, y¯DE) -0.042 0.219 -0.028 0.205 0.001 0.001 1.000
(0.892) (0.902) (0.882) (0.892)
(piIT , sIT )∗ -0.092 0.249 -0.011 0.156 0.002 0.002 0.782
(0.022) (0.036) (0.033) (0.035)
(piES, sES)∗ -0.157 0.319 -0.029 0.205 0.002 0.001 0.791
(0.017) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030)
(y¯IT , L) 0.046 0.224 -0.044 0.283 0.001 0.001 0.936
(0.094) (0.144) (0.060) (0.092)
(y¯ES, L) 0.013 0.013 -0.053 0.285 0.001 0.001 0.878
(0.091) (0.135) (0.059) (0.088)
(yIT , yES) -0.096 0.316 -0.147 0.350 0.002 0.001 0.914
(0.103) (0.136) (0.076) (0.101)
(y¯IT , y¯ES) 0.081 0.086 0.114 -0.058 0.001 0.001 0.666
(0.098) (0.101) (0.095) (0.098)
(bIT , bES) 0.048 0.084 0.152 0.019 0.001 0.001 0.450
(0.085) (0.083) (0.086) (0.084)
Table A.6: Short-run dynamics: estimated values of Cˆ1, relative standard errors
(in brackets) and estimated correlation matrix of residuals; bold numbers indicates the
significant coefficients; processes marked with (*) have estimated cointegrating rank rˆ = 1.
h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4
r p λLM λW λLM λW λLM λW λLM λW
(yDE, L) 0 2 1 - 1 0.210 1 0.057 1 0.091
(y¯DE, L) 0 2 1 - 1 0.157 1 0.064 1 0.090
(yDE, y¯DE) 0 2 1 - 1 0.743 1 0.419 1 0.255
(piIT , sIT ) 1 1 1 0.984 1 0.168 1 0.014 1 0.048
(piES, sES) 1 2 1 - 1 - 1 0.058 0.251 0.249
(y¯IT , L) 0 2 1 - 1 0.216 1 0.347 1 0.386
(y¯ES, L) 0 2 1 - 1 0.700 1 0.507 1 0.325
(yIT , yES) 0 2 1 - 1 0.023 1 0.000 1 0.002
(y¯IT , y¯ES) 0 2 1 - 1 0.605 1 0.340 1 0.465
(bIT , bES) 0 1 1 - 1 0.285 1 0.039 1 0.629
Table A.7: Analysis of residuals: p-values out of test statistics (1.5.16) and (1.5.21),
with h = 1 . . . 4; bold numbers shows values under 5%. Residuals are estimated out of
models with number of lags reported in tables A.4.
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A.2 Statistical tables: Chapter 3
BE
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
y 1.566 0.387 6.065
y˜ 0.048 0.084 93.52
x 0.646 1.785 127.6
s 0.753 0.061 6.787
DE
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
y 1.611 5.035 5.219
y˜ 0.052 2.168 25.241
x 0.820 6.404 102.6
s − − −
ES
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
y 3.418 0.153 3.069
y˜ 0.747 13.70 62.21
x 0.985 16.16 181.4
s 9.028 0.706 3.757
FR
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
y 0.750 1.268 2.959
y˜ 0.646 0.615 85.84
x 1.389 11.38 232.4
s 2.884 3.129 6.283
IE
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
y 0.172 0.186 20.05
y˜ 11.18 0.166 0.810
x 0.866 0.468 152.8
s 0.720 0.093 18.03
IT
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
y 10.58 0.171 1.928
y˜ 0.157 1.251 110.6
x 2.399 4.681 91.39
s 8.972 0.500 2.353
NL
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
y 0.833 2.249 4.580
y˜ 0.042 2.611 38.67
x 0.175 2.852 69.87
s 0.130 0.075 3.377
PT
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
y 0.866 6.956 38.49
y˜ 0.095 2.449 185.7
x 0.867 0.048 73.58
s 0.013 18.70 42.94
Table A.8: Single variables lag selection (I): Values of the F(1, T − p− 1)-statistic
(1.2.2); degrees of freedom in the test (p − 1)|p correspond to the effective sample size
under the alternative. The correspondent α = 5% critical values are F(1, 47) = 4.047,
F(1, 48) = 4.042 and F(1, 49) = 4.038, respectively. Statistics are computed for each test,
although the estimated numbers of lags pj is selected as the first p for which (p − 1)|p is
rejected.
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BE
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
φ 6.727 1.563 2.439
φ∗ 10.88 0.030 0.023
λ 1.738 0.183 0.530
φ+ 1.176 5.583 7.913
φ+∗ 18.50 1.610 0.257
DE
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
φ 10.07 3.086 1.050
φ∗ − − −
λ 3.637 0.132 0.312
φ+ 2.723 0.067 4.752
ES
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
φ 0.355 2.162 18.98
φ∗ 0.214 0.419 5.796
λ 1.697 0.061 0.678
φ+ 0.487 1.529 19.03
φ+∗ 0.144 1.079 8.496
FR
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
φ 2.455 0.699 17.90
φ∗ 4.865 0.169 0.039
λ 1.416 0.123 0.904
φ+ 0.235 1.248 33.56
φ+∗ 5.555 0.309 0.738
IE
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
φ 4.187 1.679 0.047
φ∗ 4.389 0.000 2.700
λ 1.950 3.002 7.797
φ+ 3.047 1.891 0.048
φ+∗ 1.483 0.014 3.276
IT
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
φ 5.111 3.479 6.034
φ∗ 4.542 1.849 2.225
λ 3.734 1.113 0.019
φ+ 1.784 3.977 7.141
φ+∗ 0.565 2.902 5.114
NL
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
φ 3.202 0.662 3.772
φ∗ 7.959 3.165 2.923
λ 0.254 0.059 5.187
φ+ 2.925 1.099 4.335
φ+∗ 8.603 3.553 3.371
PT
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
φ 10.17 0.078 1.262
φ∗ 12.60 2.619 0.623
λ 0.933 1.369 12.02
φ+ 9.518 0.040 1.113
φ+∗ 13.20 2.783 0.856
Table A.9: Single variables lag selection (II)
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BE
H0 T1 T2 T3
y 0.523 0.624 0.534
y˜ 0.618 0.120 0.034
x 0.712 0.432 0.671
∆x 0.017 0.378 0.355
s 0.118 0.489 0.405
DE
H0 T1 T2 T3
y 0.530 0.771 0.775
y˜ 0.617 0.179 0.663
x 0.762 0.532 0.395
∆x 0.022 0.198 0.473
s − − −
ES
H0 T1 T2 T3
y 0.584 0.135 0.453
y˜ 0.649 0.197 0.089
x 0.770 0.829 0.669
∆x 0.051 0.620 0.489
s 0.171 0.736 0.620
FR
H0 T1 T2 T3
y 0.520 0.676 0.595
y˜ 0.598 0.495 0.047
x 0.801 0.346 0.790
∆x 0.019 0.032 0.052
s 0.053 0.243 0.052
IE
H0 T1 T2 T3
y 0.405 0.147 0.380
y˜ 0.671 0.092 0.464
x 0.911 0.443 0.745
∆x 0.248 0.664 0.866
s 0.131 0.585 0.578
IT
H0 T1 T2 T3
y 0.578 0.011 0.051
y˜ 0.626 0.122 0.009
x 0.760 0.575 0.563
∆x 0.005 0.199 0.018
s 0.466 0.814 0.591
NL
H0 T1 T2 T3
y 0.537 0.652 0.884
y˜ 0.581 0.561 0.189
x 0.779 0.920 0.653
∆x 0.003 0.069 0.114
s 0.139 0.402 0.148
PT
H0 T1 T2 T3
y 0.221 0.167 0.177
y˜ 0.623 0.321 0.129
x 0.915 0.697 0.841
∆x 0.421 0.638 0.737
s 0.082 0.502 0.379
Table A.10: Unit-root tests (I): p-values from Augmented Dickey Fuller hypotheses
tests T1, T2 and T3 (section 1.1) for unit roots, see table A.2.
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BE
H0 T1 T2 T3
φ 0.164 0.788 0.828
φ∗ 0.378 0.900 0.755
φ+ 0.001 0.001 0.065
φ+∗ 0.098 0.098 0.009
λ 0.198 0.637 0.618
DE
H0 T1 T2 T3
φ 0.130 0.719 0.148
φ∗ − − −
φ+ 0.113 0.113 0.492
φ+∗ − − −
λ 0.188 0.551 0.321
ES
H0 T1 T2 T3
φ 0.011 0.460 0.296
φ∗ 0.472 0.904 0.152
φ+ 0.016 0.016 0.195
φ+∗ 0.431 0.431 0.472
λ 0.592 0.847 0.688
FR
H0 T1 T2 T3
φ 0.026 0.112 0.252
φ∗ 0.615 0.739 0.799
φ+ 0.016 0.016 0.085
φ+∗ 0.513 0.513 0.674
λ 0.278 0.667 0.458
IE
H0 T1 T2 T3
φ 0.412 0.635 0.913
φ∗ 0.354 0.693 0.833
φ+ 0.362 0.362 0.954
φ+∗ 0.415 0.415 0.835
λ 0.122 0.542 0.427
IT
H0 T1 T2 T3
φ 0.012 0.199 0.040
φ∗ 0.283 0.790 0.017
φ+ 0.033 0.033 0.033
φ+∗ 0.263 0.263 0.036
λ 0.503 0.777 0.429
NL
H0 T1 T2 T3
φ 0.005 0.095 0.158
φ∗ 0.419 0.678 0.652
φ+ 0.002 0.002 0.078
φ+∗ 0.028 0.028 0.020
λ 0.148 0.494 0.074
PT
H0 T1 T2 T3
φ 0.494 0.786 0.885
φ∗ 0.452 0.774 0.595
φ+ 0.403 0.403 0.809
φ+∗ 0.279 0.279 0.602
λ 0.132 0.588 0.356
Table A.11: Unit-root tests (II)
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BE
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
(y, y˜) 11.66 8.193 0.161
(y, x) 1.208 1.171 11.06
(y˜, x) 0.281 0.026 1.109
(y,∆x) 1.158 1.405 5.833
(s,∆x) 12.08 8.824 3.910
DE
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
(y, y˜) 1.247 0.971 5.317
(y, x) 4.433 0.231 8.957
(y˜, x) 0.099 12.55 35.10
(y,∆x) 2.374 4.633 17.55
(s,∆x) − − −
ES
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
(y, y˜) 5.851 8.409 14.88
(y, x) − − −
(y˜, x) − − −
(y,∆x) 5.228 2.554 0.974
(s,∆x) 4.772 7.739 2.944
FR
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
(y, y˜) 3.978 5.491 20.39
(y, x) 0.846 3.343 41.74
(y˜, x) 0.003 0.097 1.163
(y,∆x) 0.865 1.865 4.908
(s,∆x) 12.84 11.68 6.932
IE
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
(y, y˜) 1.526 0.266 2.783
(y, x) − − −
(y˜, x) − − −
(y,∆x) 7.688 0.197 5.558
(s,∆x) 8.395 0.704 4.852
IT
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
(y, y˜) 3.719 22.64 41.24
(y, x) 4.805 1.671 22.47
(y˜, x) 0.880 0.023 4.989
(y,∆x) 3.854 4.359 0.598
(s,∆x) 6.987 6.769 1.895
NL
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
(y, y˜) 1.119 4.719 3.662
(y, x) 0.876 0.031 19.10
(y˜, x) 0.260 0.286 2.229
(y,∆x) 4.376 6.808 9.265
(s,∆x) 8.705 27.60 9.994
PT
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
(y, y˜) 31.25 22.90 51.58
(y, x) − − −
(y˜, x) − − −
(y,∆x) 6.206 9.493 9.950
(s,∆x) 6.886 29.35 5.151
Table A.12: Vector lag selection (I): Values of the test statistic (1.5.3): the critical
value at 5% level is χ2(n2) = χ2(4) = 9.488, see table A.3.
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BE
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
(y, φ) 1.532 1.889 4.129
(s, φ∗) 12.17 9.502 20.86
(λ, s) 1.026 5.210 2.570
(λ, φ+) 1.622 5.547 11.81
(λ, φ+∗ ) 20.65 11.17 9.369
DE
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
(y, φ) 5.092 8.153 11.63
(s, φ∗) − − −
(λ, s) − − −
(λ, φ+) 6.923 4.629 18.66
(λ, φ+∗ ) − − −
ES
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
(y, φ) 5.253 2.982 9.780
(s, φ∗) 4.631 9.589 8.277
(λ, s) 1.104 9.800 13.97
(λ, φ+) 7.469 19.19 34.56
(λ, φ+∗ ) 8.140 32.59 9.677
FR
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
(y, φ) 0.851 1.661 4.910
(s, φ∗) 21.03 0.992 27.90
(λ, s) 1.704 8.292 0.262
(λ, φ+) 19.72 9.855 8.051
(λ, φ+∗ ) 17.94 4.610 8.760
IE
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
(y, φ) 8.909 0.461 8.422
(s, φ∗) 8.630 1.797 9.651
(λ, s) 0.276 0.432 7.522
(λ, φ+) 0.944 0.162 17.21
(λ, φ+∗ ) 2.185 1.306 22.63
IT
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
(y, φ) 5.254 9.417 1.125
(s, φ∗) 19.40 12.33 8.303
(λ, s) 0.703 6.820 15.53
(λ, φ+) 3.515 2.406 12.46
(λ, φ+∗ ) 21.07 27.43 2.592
NL
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
(y, φ) 5.460 6.031 4.935
(s, φ∗) 15.75 20.03 19.51
(λ, s) 0.381 0.779 9.849
(λ, φ+) 10.28 20.345 9.503
(λ, φ+∗ ) 13.59 5.239 20.62
PT
H0 3|4 2|3 1|2
(y, φ) 6.128 4.976 5.072
(s, φ∗) 4.757 5.422 31.26
(λ, s) 0.038 1.538 5.841
(λ, φ+) 7.179 6.048 4.131
(λ, φ+∗ ) 5.043 0.902 1.229
Table A.13: Vector lag selection (II)
121
BE DE ES FR IE IT NL PT
(y, y˜) 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 3
(y, x) 2 2 − 2 − 3 2 −
(y˜, x) 2 2 − 2 − 2 2 −
(y,∆x) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
(s,∆x) 2 − 2 2 2 2 2 3
BE DE ES FR IE IT NL PT
(y, φ) 2 3 2 2 2 4 2 2
(s, φ∗) 4 − 2 4 2 4 4 2
(λ, s) 2 − 3 2 2 2 2 2
(λ, φ+) 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
(λ, φ+∗ ) 4 − 2 4 2 4 4 2
Table A.14: VAR lag selection resume: estimated number of lags out of the
procedure described in 1.5.1, before eventual corrections due to residual analysis.
BE DE ES FR IE IT NL PT
(y, y˜) 0.106 0.034 0.218 0.358 0.287 0.358 0.076 0.332
(y, x) 0.308 0.072 − 0.119 − 0.470 0.523 −
(y˜, x) 0.001 0.834 − 0.226 − 0.007 0.001 −
(y,∆x) 0.330 0.557 0.426 0.340 0.340 0.267 0.280 0.192
(s,∆x) 0.474 − 0.447 0.382 0.279 0.603 0.158 0.229
BE DE ES FR IE IT NL PT
(y, φ) 0.401 0.444 0.423 0.341 0.326 0.145 0.299 0.192
(s, φ∗) 0.755 − 0.803 0.426 0.494 0.601 0.683 0.109
(λ, s) 0.210 − 0.083 0.279 0.054 0.931 0.561 0.001
(λ, φ+) 0.571 0.535 0.064 0.266 0.170 0.576 0.173 0.016
(λ, φ+∗ ) 0.037 − 0.011 0.644 0.253 0.049 0.223 0.009
Table A.15: Cointegration test statistic: p-values for the cointegrating test statistics
for integrated VAR(p) models, with p as in tables 3.2 and 3.7, respectively.
122
ˆˆ
C1(1, 1)
ˆˆ
C1(1, 2)
ˆˆ
C1(2, 1)
ˆˆ
C1(2, 2) σˆ1 σˆ2 ρˆ
BE 0.246 0.355 0.021 0.741 0.004 0.000 0.016
(0.136) (0.891) (0.013) (0.088)
DE∗ 0.318 1.268 0.011 0.779 0.003 0.000 0.299
(0.004) (0.052) (0.246) (0.033)
ES 0.161 1.179 0.049 0.431 0.004 0.001 0.237
(0.140) (1.118) (0.016) (0.132)
FR 0.180 -0.381 0.055 0.701 0.003 0.001 0.393
(0.140) (0.466) (0.028) (0.093)
IE 0.458 0.656 -0.046 -0.334 0.007 0.003 0.202
(0.121) (0.357) (0.044) (0.131)
IT 0.157 -1.417 0.051 0.776 0.004 0.001 0.338
(0.144) (1.111) (0.020) (0.151)
NL∗ 0.413 0.496 0.052 0.699 0.003 0.001 0.086
(0.009) (0.053) (0.124) (0.032)
PT 0.610 -0.354 0.012 0.783 0.010 0.001 0.400
(0.125) (1.399) (0.007) (0.082)
Table A.16: Short-run dynamics: (y, y˜): estimated values of Cˆ1, relative standard
errors (in brackets) and estimated correlation matrix of residuals, see table A.6.
ˆˆ
C1(1, 1)
ˆˆ
C1(1, 2)
ˆˆ
C1(2, 1)
ˆˆ
C1(2, 2) σˆ1 σˆ2 ρˆ
BE 0.210 -0.051 -0.266 0.867 0.004 0.004 -0.197
(0.140) (0.051) (0.174) (0.063)
DE 0.279 -0.048 0.042 0.841 0.003 0.004 0.078
(0.018) (0.048) (0.021) (0.026)
ES − − − − − − −
− − − −
FR 0.136 -0.273 -0.130 1.336 0.003 0.003 -0.168
(0.132) (0.143) (0.110) (0.117)
IE − − − − − − −
− − − −
IT 0.058 -0.158 0.026 1.158 0.004 0.004 -0.251
(0.144) (0.144) (0.137) (0.137)
NL 0.208 -0.009 -0.294 0.782 0.003 0.007 -0.339
(0.142) (0.040) (0.299) (0.085)
PT − − − − − − −
− − − −
Table A.17: Short-run dynamics: (y, x):
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ˆˆ
C1(1, 1)
ˆˆ
C1(1, 2)
ˆˆ
C1(2, 1)
ˆˆ
C1(2, 2) σˆ1 σˆ2 ρˆ
BE∗ 0.350 0.841 0.024 0.871 0.000 0.004 0.109
(0.003) (0.052) (0.239) (0.023)
DE 1.561 -0.476 0.506 -0.033 0.000 0.004 0.298
(1.021) (0.129) (0.136) (0.017)
ES − − − − − − −
− − − −
FR 0.236 -0.479 0.049 0.748 0.001 0.003 -0.331
(0.146) (0.744) (0.154) (0.030)
IE − − − − − − −
− − − −
IT∗ 0.170 0.566 0.058 0.831 0.000 0.004 -0.357
(0.004) (0.053) (0.221) (0.029)
NL∗ 0.413 0.496 0.052 0.699 0.000 0.007 0.116
(0.099) (0.053) (0.124) (0.031)
PT − − − − − − −
− − − −
Table A.18: Short-run dynamics: (y˜, x)
ˆˆ
C1(1, 1)
ˆˆ
C1(1, 2)
ˆˆ
C1(2, 1)
ˆˆ
C1(2, 2) σˆ1 σˆ2 ρˆ
BE 0.240 -0.048 -0.114 0.153 0.004 0.005 -0.148
(0.138) (0.111) (0.176) (0.141)
DE 0.217 0.114 -0.033 0.077 0.003 0.005 0.090
(0.135) (0.105) (0.181) (0.140)
ES 0.088 -0.354 0.120 0.645 0.004 0.004 0.091
(0.138) (0.166) (0.121) (0.146)
FR 0.134 -0.176 -0.071 0.465 0.003 0.003 -0.041
(0.137) (0.145) (0.118) (0.124)
IE 0.459 0.067 -0.118 -0.039 0.007 0.009 0.163
(0.125) (0.116) (0.150) (0.140)
IT 0.063 -0.144 0.065 0.233 0.004 0.004 -0.205
(0.143) (0.143) (0.140) (0.140)
NL 0.223 0.009 0.034 0.143 0.010 0.006 0.466
(0.142) (0.066) (0.311) (0.145)
PT 0.781 -0.146 -0.140 0.110 0.009 0.006 0.582
(0.156) (0.242) (0.101) (0.157)
Table A.19: Short-run dynamics: (y,∆x)
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ˆˆ
C1(1, 1)
ˆˆ
C1(1, 2)
ˆˆ
C1(2, 1)
ˆˆ
C1(2, 2) σˆ1 σˆ2 ρˆ
BE 0.291 -0.116 0.151 0.149 0.003 0.005 0.264
(0.138) (0.081) (0.244) (0.143)
DE − − − − − − −
− − − −
ES 0.196 -0.240 0.284 0.661 0.004 0.003 0.114
(0.138) (0.160) (0.120) (0.138)
FR 0.214 0.003 0.263 0.465 0.001 0.003 0.055
(0.137) (0.057) (0.296) (0.123)
IE 0.460 0.045 -0.078 -0.039 0.007 0.009 0.200
(0.125) (0.103) (0.171) (0.141)
IT 0.121 -0.254 0.195 0.238 0.004 0.004 -0.048
(0.136) (0.137) (0.133) (0.134)
NL 0.021 0.042 1.235 0.090 0.001 0.007 0.322
(0.140) (0.017) (1.186) (0.145)
PT 0.850 -0.134 -0.123 0.106 0.009 0.006 0.611
(0.154) (0.233) (0.105) (0.159)
Table A.20: Short-run dynamics: (s,∆x)
ˆˆ
C1(1, 1)
ˆˆ
C1(1, 2)
ˆˆ
C1(2, 1)
ˆˆ
C1(2, 2) σˆ1 σˆ2 ρˆ
BE 0.251 -0.050 -0.094 0.135 0.004 0.005 0.043
(0.135) (0.112) (0.170) (0.140)
DE 0.319 -0.185 -0.273 -0.004 0.003 0.005 0.012
(0.125) (0.098) (0.223) (0.140)
ES 0.139 -0.359 0.040 0.599 0.004 0.004 0.258
(0.135) (0.187) (0.123) (0.151)
FR 0.163 -0.170 -0.135 0.455 0.003 0.003 0.159
(0.136) (0.144) (0.118) (0.124)
IE 0.446 0.056 0.023 -0.050 0.007 0.009 0.314
(0.129) (0.118) (0.160) (0.146)
IT 0.119 -0.094 0.040 0.214 0.004 0.004 0.086
(0.131) (0.134) (0.131) (0.134)
NL 0.221 0.009 0.042 0.139 0.003 0.007 -0.238
(0.140) (0.067) (0.299) (0.143)
PT 0.844 -0.195 0.050 0.051 0.010 0.008 0.695
(0.190) (0.244) (0.152) (0.195)
Table A.21: Short-run dynamics: (y, φ)
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ˆˆ
C1(1, 1)
ˆˆ
C1(1, 2)
ˆˆ
C1(2, 1)
ˆˆ
C1(2, 2) σˆ1 σˆ2 ρˆ
BE 0.401 0.094 0.058 -0.160 0.002 0.006 0.290
(0.132) (0.055) (0.352) (0.146)
DE − − − − − − −
− − − −
ES 0.266 0.061 0.022 0.091 0.003 0.039 0.002
(0.133) (0.087) (0.211) (0.138)
FR 0.354 0.108 -0.432 -0.227 0.001 0.005 -0.253
(0.107) (0.026) (0.588) (0.141)
IE 0.390 0.108 0.165 0.116 0.006 0.010 0.492
(0.144) (0.103) (0.223) (0.160)
IT 0.351 0.045 -0.074 -0.071 0.004 0.006 0.109
(0.119) (0.082) (0.198) (0.136)
NL 0.195 0.036 -0.031 0.083 0.001 0.008 0.214
(0.135) (0.012) (1.575) (0.138)
PT 0.981 -0.183 0.212 -0.083 0.010 0.009 0.621
(0.128) (0.128) (0.173) (0.173)
Table A.22: Short-run dynamics: (s, φ∗)
ˆˆ
C1(1, 1)
ˆˆ
C1(1, 2)
ˆˆ
C1(2, 1)
ˆˆ
C1(2, 2) σˆ1 σˆ2 ρˆ
BE -0.073 0.039 -0.013 0.014 0.002 0.027 0.864
(0.227) (0.023) (2.389) (0.240)
DE − − − − − − −
− − − −
ES∗ 0.356 0.028 0.218 -0.012 0.004 0.011 0.725
(0.149) (0.044) (0.245) 0.090
FR -0.191 0.038 -1.004 0.076 0.001 0.038 0.497
(0.188) (0.013) (2.944) (0.210)
IE∗ 0.121 0.073 -0.552 0.423 0.006 0.015 0.446
(0.185) (0.030) (1.258) (0.205)
IT 0.120 0.000 7.601 -0.404 0.004 0.041 0.194
(0.237) (0.013) (4.021) (0.229)
NL -0.032 0.005 0.305 -0.110 0.001 0.041 0.687
(0.180) (0.004) (8.785) (0.183)
PT∗ 0.881 -0.019 4.104 -0.180 0.006 0.026 0.476
(0.178) (0.043) (0.637) (0.153)
Table A.23: Short-run dynamics: (λ, s)
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ˆˆ
C1(1, 1)
ˆˆ
C1(1, 2)
ˆˆ
C1(2, 1)
ˆˆ
C1(2, 2) σˆ1 σˆ2 ρˆ
BE 0.058 -0.629 0.053 0.193 0.006 0.003 0.386
(0.152) (0.303) (0.074) (0.148)
DE -0.092 0.047 -0.099 0.070 0.003 0.002 -0.095
(0.140) (0.177) (0.110) (0.139)
ES∗ -0.120 -0.187 0.058 0.003 0.010 0.003 0.141
(0.032) (0.010) (0.016) (0.171)
FR 0.012 -0.159 0.003 0.567 0.004 0.002 0.090
(0.139) (0.202) (0.080) (0.115)
IE 0.317 -0.044 0.174 -0.122 0.012 0.008 0.142
(0.136) (0.199) (0.095) (0.139)
IT -0.223 -1.136 0.121 0.300 0.010 0.003 -0.038
(0.132) (0.427) (0.039) (0.128)
NL -0.068 0.152 0.293 0.060 0.003 0.006 0.270
(0.128) (0.065) (0.265) (0.134)
PT∗ -0.440 0.370 0.003 -0.120 0.014 0.008 0.590
(0.046) (0.027) (0.073) (0.057)
Table A.24: Short-run dynamics: (λ, φ+)
ˆˆ
C1(1, 1)
ˆˆ
C1(1, 2)
ˆˆ
C1(2, 1)
ˆˆ
C1(2, 2) σˆ1 σˆ2 ρˆ
BE∗ 0.280 -0.237 0.046 -0.137 0.006 0.005 0.490
(0.034) (0.057) (0.059) (0.048)
DE − − − − − − −
− − − −
ES∗ -0.223 -0.020 0.205 -0.185 0.010 0.005 0.415
(0.046) (0.023) (0.290) (0.100)
FR 0.155 -0.054 -0.288 -0.222 0.010 0.003 -0.012
(0.113) (0.104) (0.154) (0.141)
IE 0.310 0.003 0.233 0.071 0.004 0.002 0.112
(0.144) (0.181) (0.113) (0.143)
IT∗ 0.090 -0.472 -0.161 0.251 0.010 0.005 0.339
(0.033) (0.049) (0.095) (0.054)
NL 0.074 0.166 -0.474 0.232 0.010 0.003 -0.138
(0.130) (0.046) (0.400) (0.141)
PT∗ 0.323 -0.077 -0.027 0.341 0.014 0.009 0.772
(0.038) (0.064) (0.077) (0.049)
Table A.25: Short-run dynamics: (λ, φ+∗ )
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h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4
r p λLM λW λLM λW λLM λW λLM λW
BE (y, y˜) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.914 1.000 0.836 1.000 0.781
(y, x) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.819 1.000 0.837 1.000 0.606
(y˜, x) 1 2 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 0.059
(y,∆x) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.857 1.000 0.757 1.000 0.282
(s,∆x) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.501 1.000 0.405 1.000 0.153
DE (y, y˜) 1 2 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 0.397
(y, x) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.113 0.933 0.094 0.988 0.003
(y˜, x) 0 2 1.000 − 0.999 0.615 0.662 0.512 0.991 0.048
(y,∆x) 0 2 1.000 − 0.991 0.999 0.367 0.949 0.874 0.773
(s,∆x) − − − − − − − − − −
ES (y, y˜) 1 3 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 0.475
(y, x) − − − − − − − − − −
(y˜, x) − − − − − − − − − −
(y,∆x) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.922 1.000 0.917 1.000 0.306
(s,∆x) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 0.882 1.000 0.660
FR (y, y˜) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.999 1.000 0.922 1.000 0.361
(y, x) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.008 1.000 0.018 1.000 0.035
(y˜, x) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.002 1.000 0.002 1.000 0.000
(y,∆x) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.885 1.000 0.893 1.000 0.564
(s,∆x) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 0.470 1.000 0.246
IE (y, y˜) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.660
(y, x) − − − − − − − − − −
(y˜, x) − − − − − − − − − −
(y,∆x) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.999 1.000 0.967 1.000 0.742
(s,∆x) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.996 1.000 0.912 1.000 0.433
IT (y, y˜) 0 3 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 0.871 1.000 0.286
(y, x) 0 3 1.000 − 1.000 0.835 1.000 0.550 1.000 0.430
(y˜, x) 1 2 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 0.155
(y,∆x) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 0.929 1.000 0.663
(s,∆x) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 0.833 1.000 0.823
NL (y, y˜) 1 2 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 0.938
(y, x) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.876 1.000 0.928 1.000 0.311
(y˜, x) 1 2 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 0.059
(y,∆x) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.982 1.000 0.998 1.000 0.454
(s,∆x) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.948
PT (y, y˜) 0 3 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 0.732 1.000 0.477
(y, x) − − − − − − − − − −
(y˜, x) − − − − − − − − − −
(y,∆x) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 0.105
(s,∆x) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 −
Table A.26: Analysis of residuals (I): p-values out of test statistics (1.5.16) and
(1.5.21), with h = 1 . . . 4; bold numbers shows values under 5%. Residuals are estimated
out of models with number of lags reported in tables A.14.
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h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4
r p λLM λW λLM λW λLM λW λLM λW
BE (y, φ) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.855 1.000 0.752 1.000 0.269
(s, φ∗) 0 4 1.000 0.993 1.000 0.465 1.000 0.052 1.000 0.008
(λ, s) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 − 0.997 − 1.000 0.785
(λ, φ+) 0 3 1.000 − 1.000 0.996 1.000 0.984 1.000 0.840
(λ, φ+∗ ) 0 4 1.000 − 0.998 0.442 0.258 0.091 0.894 0.011
DE (y, φ) 0 3 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 0.938 1.000 0.397
(s, φ∗) − − − − − − − − − −
(λ, s) − − − − − − − − − −
(λ, φ+) 0 2 1.000 − 0.991 0.999 0.367 0.949 0.874 0.773
(λ, φ+∗ ) − − − − − − − − − −
ES (y, φ) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.925 1.000 0.913 1.000 0.335
(s, φ∗) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.113 0.933 0.094 0.988 0.003
(λ, s) 1 3 1.000 − 0.999 − 0.662 0.512 0.991 0.048
(λ, φ+) 1 2 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 − 0.995 0.854
(λ, φ+∗ ) 1 2 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 − 0.960 0.177
FR (y, φ) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.881 1.000 0.904 1.000 0.593
(s, φ∗) 0 4 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 0.004
(λ, s) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.953 1.000 0.185 1.000 0.100
(λ, φ+) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.994 1.000 0.990 1.000 0.709
(λ, φ+∗ ) 0 4 0.999 − 0.000 − − − − 0.001
IE (y, φ) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.998 1.000 0.941 1.000 0.745
(s, φ∗) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.565
(λ, s) 1 2 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 0.985
(λ, φ+) 0 2 1.000 − 0.732 0.866 − 0.854 − 0.317
(λ, φ+∗ ) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.949 0.922 0.942 0.162 0.167
IT (y, φ) 0 4 1.000 − 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.894 1.000 0.629
(s, φ∗) 0 4 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 0.006
(λ, s) 0 2 1.000 − 0.996 0.254 1.000 0.365 1.000 0.118
(λ, φ+) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 1.000 0.968 0.964 0.000 0.825
(λ, φ+∗ ) 1 4 1.000 − 1.000 − 0.007 − 0.004 0.019
NL (y, φ) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.982 1.000 0.998 1.000 0.448
(s, φ∗) 0 4 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 0.363
(λ, s) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.878 0.971 0.965 1.000 0.978
(λ, φ+) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.072 0.045 0.102 − 0.005
(λ, φ+∗ ) 0 4 1.000 − 0.993 − 0.000 − 0.000 0.000
PT (y, φ) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.992 1.000 0.866 1.000 0.022
(s, φ∗) 0 2 1.000 − 0.997 0.021 0.997 0.01 1.000 0.000
(λ, s) 1 2 0.365 − 0.498 − 0.000 − 0.000 0.000
(λ, φ+) 0 2 1.000 − 1.000 0.969 0.981 0.702 − 0.000
(λ, φ+∗ ) 1 2 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 − 1.000 0.000
Table A.27: Analysis of residuals (II)
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B Econometric Toolbox
B.1 Basic definitions
Definition B.1.1. A n-dimensional process Ut is called a white noise if Ut, Us
are independent, identically distributed n-dimensional random variables for which
E(Ut) = 0, E(UtU
′
t ) = ΣU non-singular, and fourth moments are uniformly bounded
in t; the process is called a gaussian white noise if Ut ∼ N (0,ΣU), any t.
Static parametric analysis provide the data generating process to be modeled so
that for any t:
Yt = f(Θ, Yt−1 . . . Y0) + Ut
where f corresponds to the choice of the model, which in turn depends on a
time-constant parameter matrix Θ, and U the random innovations.
The parameter set Θ is retrieved using the available data set which is considered to
be generated by the dgp; given observations {Y0 . . . YT}an estimator :
Θˆ = Θˆ(Y0 . . . YT ) = ΘˆT
is a function of the observations which approximates the true parameters Θ depending
both on the model chosen and on the fitting technique which is used; the estimator
is itself a random variable which depends on the trajectory Y1 . . . Yt as well as on
the set of initial conditions Y0.
Here, linear models are considered, hence the techniques will be custom ordinary
least squares (OLS), estimated generalized least squares (EGLS) and maximum
likelihood (ML). We do not present the ideas underlying each of them, and skip
basic tools in random sequences different type of convergence, for which we refer
to [56] and [57]; it is worth to present an additional definition:
Definition B.1.2. We say that an estimator ΘˆT = Θˆ is consistent if
ΘˆT
p−→ Θ
that is, as the sample size T increases, the estimator ΘT constructed with a T -sized
observations set converges in probability to the true parameter Θ.
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B.2 Unrestricted Least Squares Estimation
The estimators presented in this section concern processes with cointegration rank
r > 0; in case of I(1) processes with r = 0, the model in difference is an ordinary
regression model involving stationary variable and estimators are standard (see [57]).
Consider a n-dimensional vector process Y ∈ I(1) in its VEC(p − 1) form (1.4.3),
with unrestricted deterministic term: Dt = D0 + tD1 ∈ Rn.
This corresponds to model H in table 1.2 or, equivalently, to choose dex = [1 t]′ and
dco = [ ] in table 1.1, so that:
∆Yt = [C0 C
+]

Yt−1
∆Yt−1
...
∆Yt−p+1
dext
+ Ut , (B.2.1)
C+ = [C1 . . . Cp−1 D0 D1] ∈ Rn×J , J = n(p − 1) + 2 and Ut is white noise; given a
set of observations:
Y = {Y−p+1 . . . Y0} ∪ {Y1 . . . YT} (B.2.2)
where the first subset contains p initial conditions78 we can stack the data as:
∆Y = [C0 C
+]
[
Y+
∆Z+
]
+ U (B.2.3)
see equation (1.4.8). The explicit form of the estimator comes straightforward out
of the vectorization of equation (B.2.3); given any matrix Θ ∈ Rm×n, we define:
vec(Θ) =
Θ
′
1
...
Θ′m
 ∈ Rmn×1
the column vector obtained by stacking the transposes of the rows of Θ.
An exhaustive summary of the basic properties of this operator can be found, for
example, in [78] (p. 663); these properties allow to rewrite (B.2.3):
vec(∆Y) =
([
Y+
′
∆Z+
′
]
⊗ In
)[
vec(C0)
vec(C+)
]
+ vec(U) (B.2.4)
which is now a standard LS model in RnT×1 with parameters vector [vec(C0)′ vec(C+)′]′
in Rn(n+J)×1 to be estimated.
78This implies that the effective sample size is T , which simplifies notations.
131
The estimators are then retrieved with little algebra: formal derivation can be
found, for example, in [78] (section 7.2, pp. 286-305): here only the main results
servicing consistent estimation are reported.
Proposition B.2.1. Let Y ∈ I(1) be a n-dimensional V AR(p) process in the form
(B.2.1) that is assumed to generate the observations set Y as defined in (B.2.2).
Let Y+, ∆Y, ∆Z+ be as defined in (B.2.3); then:
[Cˆ0 Cˆ
+] =
[
∆YY+
′
∆Y∆Z+
′
] [ Y+Y+′ Y+∆Z+′
∆Z+Y+
′
∆Z+∆Z+
′
]−1
(B.2.5)
is the LS estimator79 of [C0 C+]; furthermore:
ΣˆU := (T − np)−1 · Uˆ Uˆ ′ (B.2.6)
is a consistent estimator of the white noise covariance matrix, being
Uˆ := ∆Y − Cˆ0Y+ − Cˆ+∆Z+
the matrix of estimated residuals.
Observation B.2.1. If the parameters of process Y = X+D∗ are estimated keeping
X in level form (1.4.1), then consistent estimators of parameters matrices Γi can
be retrieved from [Cˆ0 Cˆ+] = [Cˆ0 Cˆ1 . . . Cˆp−1 Dˆ0 Dˆ1] by reversing the algebraic
procedure used to infer equation (1.4.2), namely:
Γˆp =− Cˆp−1
Γˆi = Cˆi − Cˆi−1 , 2 ≤ i ≤ p− 1
Γˆ1 = In + Cˆ1 − Cˆ0
(B.2.7)
([78], Remark 4, p. 289)
Observation B.2.2. The LS estimator Γˆ = [Γˆ1 . . . Γˆp] has a gaussian asymptotic
distribution with a singular covariance matrix whenever the cointegration rank r > 0
([78], Corollary 7.1.1, pp. 289-90).
79Given any parameter matrix Θ ∈ Rm×n, by writing that Θˆ is an estimator for Θ we implicitly
suggest that vec(Θˆ) ∈ Rmn×1 is an estimator of vec(Θ) ∈ Rmn×1.
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B.3 Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation
Let Hˆ ∈ H be an identified model among those in table 1.2, and assume the
cointegration rank to be 0 < r < n; equation (B.2.3) can be rewritten as:
∆Y = [A ·B+′ C+]
[
Y+
∆Z+
]
+ U , (B.3.1)
for any t, with B+ = [B D‖0 D
‖
1]; the equation is specifically designed for each Hˆ
according to the form of dext and dcot presented in table 1.1. Next proposition collects
the results in [74] (chapter 6) while notations are those of [78] (p. 294).
Proposition B.3.1. Let Y ∈ I(1) be a n-dimensional identified VAR(p) model Hˆ,
with cointegration rank r : 0 < r < n, so that, see (1.4.6) and (B.3.1), the dgp is:
∆Yt = AB
+′ · Y +t−1 + C+ ·∆Z+t−1 + Ut (B.3.2)
where A,B ∈ Rn×r with rank r, B+ = [B D‖0 D‖1], Y +t = [Yt dcot ]′ and ∆Z+t =
[∆Yt . . .∆Yt−p+1 d
ex
t ]
′, and the correspondent dco, dex are determined according to 1.1
as in section 1.5.2. Stack vectors into matrices as in (1.4.8), and define:
M := IT −∆Z+′(∆Z+∆Z+′)−1∆Z+
M0 := ∆YM
M1 := Y
+M
Mij := MiM
′
j i, j ∈ {0, 1}
(B.3.3)
and let λ1 ≥ · · · ≥ λn be the eigenvalues ofM−1/211 M10M−100 M01M−1/211 , and {v1 . . .vn}
the corresponding eigenvectors; the ML estimators of B,A and C+ are defined as:
B˜+
′
= [B˜ D˜‖0 D˜
‖
1] := [v1 . . .vr]
′ ·M−1/211
A˜ := M01B˜
+(B˜+
′
M11B˜
+)−1
C˜+ := (∆Y − A˜B˜+′Y+)∆Z+′(∆Z+′∆Z+′)−1
(B.3.4)
respectively, while the estimator of the innovations’ covariance matrix ΣU is:
Σ˜U := (∆Y − A˜B˜+′Y+ − C˜+∆Z+)(∆Y − A˜B˜+′Y+ − C˜+∆Z+)′/T
and the maximum of the likelihood function is (omitting constant terms):
|M00|
r∏
i=1
(1− λi), λ1 ≥ · · · ≥ λr. (B.3.5)
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B.4 Normalized EGLS estimation
Assume that the VAR(p) model has cointegration rank 0 < r < n; the decomposition
of C0 into the product AB′ is not unique: given any nonsingular matrix Q and
defined A∗ = AQ′ and B∗ = BQ−1 we have C0 = AB′ = A∗B′∗.
However, if rk(B) = r, then B has exactly r independent rows, and this allows for
a convenient identification: it is easy to choose Q so that a unique cointegration
matrix is identified in the normalized form:
B =
[
Ir
Bn−r
]
(B.4.1)
with Bn−r ∈ R(n−r)×r, so that B+′n−r = [B′n−r D‖0 D‖1] ∈ R(K−r)×r and K = n+ dim(dco).
Following [78] (pp. 291-294), for any fixed C+0 , C+ is replaced in (B.2.3) by its LS
estimator:
Cˆ+ = (∆Z+∆Z+
′
)−1∆Z+
′
(∆Y − C+0 Y+)
so that (B.2.3) becomes:
M0 = C
+
0 M1 + U = A[Ir B
+′
n−r]M1 + U (B.4.2)
whereM0,M1 are defined in proposition B.3.1; assume that any parameter but B+n−r
is known, and partition (B.4.2) as:
M1 =
[
M (1)1
M (2)1
]
M (1)1 ∈ Rr×r, M (2)1 ∈ R(K−r)×r
so as to obtain the concentrated least squares problem:
M0 − AM (1)1 = AB+
′
n−rM
(2)
1 + U
The Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator is then ( [78], Chap. 7, p. 292):
Bˆ+
′
n−r = (A
′Σ−1U A)
−1A′Σ−1U (M0 − AM (1)1 )M (2)
′
1 (M
(2)
1 M
(2)′
1 )
−1
is defined as the unique minimizer of the generalized sum of squares U′(IT ⊗Σ−1U )U.
Notice that the same estimator would have been retrieved without concentrating out
C+ first, as this latter has been replaced by its optimal value given any value of C+0 .
The assumption that parameters other than B are known is however very restrictive:
an Estimated GLS is thus constructed so as to drop this assumption.
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Namely, given consistent estimators Aˆ and ΣˆU , we define the EGLS estimator
ˆˆ
B+
′
n−r = (Aˆ
′Σˆ−1U Aˆ)
−1Aˆ′Σˆ−1U (M0 − AˆM (1)1 )M (2)
′
1 (M
(2)
1 M
(2)′
1 )
−1 (B.4.3)
Next section explores asymptotic results for the parameters distribution that can be
used to set up standard confidence intervals on the estimates.
B.5 Asymptotic properties of the estimators
The following proposition ([78], Proposition 7.1, p. 287) collects the results on
asymptotic behaviour of LS estimators.
Proposition B.5.1. Given an identified VECM(p−1) model Hˆ ∈ H, the estimators
(B.2.5) and (B.2.6), as defined in Proposition B.2.1 and adapted according to equation
(B.3.1), are consistent estimators of the correspondent parameters; moreover:
√
T vec
(
[Cˆ+0 Cˆ
+]− [C+0 C+]
) d−→ N (0,Σco) (B.5.1)
and
Σˆco := T
[
Y+Y
′
+ Y+∆Z
′
+
∆Z′+Y
′
+ ∆Z+∆Z
′
+
]−1
⊗ ΣˆU (B.5.2)
is a consistent estimator of Σco.
Observation B.5.1. If Y ∈ I(1), which implies r < n, then the matrix Σco is
singular. Hence, standard Wald tests on multiple parameter restrictions may not
have the usual asymptotic χ2(·) distribution. ([78], Remark 1, p. 287)
Observation B.5.2. The ML estimators C˜+0 = A˜B˜+ and C˜+ as defined in (B.3.4)
converge to the same asymptotic distribution (B.5.1) as the LS estimator.
([78], Proposition 7.4, p. 296)
The estimator (B.5.1) globally converges at a rate
√
T , but distinguishing short
from long-term dynamics reveals several interesting asymptotic properties.
In this sense, a central result is given in Ahn and Reisnel [4] and reported in [78]
(Lemma 7.1, p. 271) in a slightly different form; we limit ourselves here to report
the results which are strictly necessary to our analysis; the first result concerns the
EGLS estimator ˆˆB+n−r and is provided in [78] (Proposition 7.2, p. 292).
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Proposition B.5.2. Let ˆˆB+n−r be the EGLS estimator of the normalized cointegration
matrix80, as defined in (B.4.3). We have:
vec
[
(
ˆˆ
B+
′
n−r −B+
′
n−r)
(
M
(2)
1 M
(2)′
1
)1/2] d−→ N(0, I(K−r) ⊗ (A′Σ−1U A)−1) (B.5.3)
Moreover, the estimator converges at a rate T and hence is superconsistent.
The distribution of ˆˆB+′n−r is non-standard (see [4]), hence the result reported in
proposition B.5.2 is very important for practical purposes, eventually allowing also
for multiple restrictions Wald tests, as it will be clear in what follows.
Proposition B.5.3. Assume that the normalized cointegration matrix B+n−r is known,
so that the model in the form (B.3.2) can be rewritten as:
∆Y = A ·Y++ + C+ ·∆Z+ + U (B.5.4)
where Y++ = [Ir B+
′
n−r] ·Y+ = B+ ·Y+; the least squares estimator
[Aˆ Cˆ+] =
[
∆YY′++ ∆Y∆Z
′
+
] [Y++Y′++ Y++∆Z′+
∆Z′+Y
′
++ ∆Z+∆Z
′
+
]−1
converges asymptotically to a non-singular gaussian distribution:
√
T vec
(
[Aˆ Cˆ+]− [A C+]) d−→ N (0,ΣA,C) (B.5.5)
where
ΣˆA,C = T
[
Y++Y
′
++ Y++∆Z
′
+
∆Z′+Y
′
++ ∆Z+∆Z
′
+
]−1
⊗ ΣˆU (B.5.6)
is a consistent estimator of ΣA,C.
Note that the estimators of the parameters are consistent, converging asymptotically
at a rate
√
T .
The fact that the EGLS estimator ˆˆB+ is superconsistent allows for two stage procedures:
in a first step long-run relationship among variables are determined and then the
short-run parameters are estimated by ordinary LS.
80We are abusing of terminology as B+n−r = [Bn−r D
‖
0 D
‖
0] while the normalized cointegration
matrix is actually Bn−r ; notice also that M (2)1 = M
(2)
1 (T ).
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Namely, consider the LS estimator of an identified model (B.5.1); if we further
identfy also the cointegration matrix in the normalized form (B.4.1), then we can
write
[Cˆ+0 Cˆ
+] = [Aˆ AˆBˆ+n−r Cˆ
+] (B.5.7)
so that the first r columns of Cˆ+0 are a consistent estimator of A.
This estimator coupled with the estimator of the white noise covariance matrix ΣˆU
can be used to construct the EGLS estimator (B.4.3); superconsistency implies that
the estimator we would obtain by substituting this latter to the true B+n−r yields the
same asymptotic distribution (B.5.5) we would obtain if the cointegration basis was
known. This fact is formalized in the following result ([78], Remark 3, pp. 293-94).
Corollary B.5.1. Let ˆˆB+ be the EGLS estimator (B.4.3) and consider:
[
ˆˆ
A
ˆˆ
C+] =
[
∆YYˆ′++ ∆Y∆Z
′
+
] [Yˆ++Yˆ′++ Yˆ++∆Z′+
∆Z′+Yˆ
′
++ ∆Z+∆Z
′
+
]−1
(B.5.8)
where Yˆ++ := [Ir
ˆˆ
B+
′
n−r] ·Y+. Then:
√
T vec
(
[
ˆˆ
A
ˆˆ
C+]− [A C+]) d−→ N (0,ΣA,C)
that is the estimator of the short-run parameters converges to the same distribution
which would be obtained knowing the true B+.
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C Financial Toolbox
C.1 Nelson-Siegel method
Given a zero-coupon bond (zcb) quoted P (t, T ), the yield-to-maturity :
y(t, T ) = − log(P (t, T ))
T − t ∀ T > t . (C.1.1)
is defined for any T as the log-return of the obligations over its lifetime. The yield
curve {y(t, T ) : T ≥ t} at time t is defined as the image of the function
T 7→ y(t, T )
mapping T ≥ t to the yield of a zero-coupon-bond (zcb) with maturity T .
Since the market does not offer a zcb for any maturity T , the yield curve can be
retrieved out of the most liquid fraction of the government bond market through a
nonlinear interpolation method due to Nelson and Siegel [89].
The method requires, as inputs, current bonds prices together with their fixed
coupons and payment dates, including reimbursment of face value at maturity.
It is worth to stress that no default probabilities are taken into account as computing
yields : common practice is to assume that the obligations market prices embeds any
risk premium attributable to eventual future credit events.
For a generic country A, we consider at time T the dirty81 prices {℘Aj (t)}JAj=1, each
with maturity TAj , coupon payment dates {TAkj} and fixed coupon {CAj }; consider
the country to be fixed and drop index A for the sake of notation simplicity.
Let P (t, T ) denote the unknown zcb price at time t with maturity T; if the market
is arbitrage free, then
℘j(t) =
Kj∑
k=1
Cj · P (t, Tkj) + ℘∗ · P (t, TKj ,j) (C.1.2)
for any obligation j ∈ {1 . . . J}, where ℘∗ is the bond face value82, which is assumed
to be same for each obligation. Observe that left member of (C.1.2) is due to the
bond issuer at inception while the right one is contingent on credit risk: future
coupons will not be paid, for example, in case of default. In order to imply the yield
curve, we interpolate the zero-coupon curve {P (t, T )} and then use equation (2.2.3).
81The prices including the accrued payment on the bond’s next coupon; the payment is zero
only on any bond’s coupon payment date.
82Again, for the sake of notation’s simplicity, we simply write Cj but consider it as the annual
coupon multiplied by the year fraction between two consecutive coupon dates.
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Nelson-Siegel interpolation is based on the projection of zero-coupon price on
a three-functions basis, which allows us to describe that curve in terms of a small
parameters set; interpolation knots is the set of all coupon payments dates T for
any of the obligations j, defined as:
T = {Tkj | k = 1 . . . Kj , j = 1 . . . J}
The choice of the functions to be used is due to statistical analysis [89], which
evidenced that most of the observed shapes in the zero-coupon curve were efficiently
reproduced by setting:
y(t, T ) =β0t + β1t
[
β3t
T − t exp
(
− T − t
β3t
)]
+β2t
[
β3t
T − t exp
(
− T − t
β3t
)
− exp
(
− T − t
β3t
)]
=β0t + β1t · g1
(
T − t
β3t
)
+ β2t · g2
(
T − t
β3t
)
= y(θt, T − t)
(C.1.3)
for all T ≥ t, where the parameter vector θt = (β0t, β1t, β2t, β3t) has to be dynamically
(for each t) implied from market quotes.
Equation (2.2.3) combined with (C.1.3) allows to write P (t, T ) as a function of θt
given any T ≥ 0. Hence, for each of the obligations j, the right member of (C.1.2)
can be written as pj(θt); the vector
℘(θt) =
(
℘1(θt) . . . ℘J(θt)
)′
collects all model-implied prices of the J relevant obligations at time t, variating
according to the parameter θt.
Define the vector ℘t = (℘1(t) . . . ℘J(t)) the vector collecting the spot dirty prices of
the J obligation at time t: in order to imply θt, the square distance between ℘(θt)
and ℘ is computed with a correction embedded in a weighting matrix W = W (θt).
Here, following the guidances in [1], a diagonal weighting matrix
W (θt) =
w1(θt) . . . 0... . . . ...
0 . . . wJ(θt)
 (C.1.4)
is chosen, where each element Wjj(θt) = wj(θt) is defined by:
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wj(θt) =
1
Dj(θt)
J∑
j=1
1
Dl(θt)
j = 1 . . . J (C.1.5)
and is in turn a function of the duration Dj of the j-th obligation
Dj :=
Kj∑
k=1
[
P (t, Tkj) ·
(
Kj∑
k=1
P (t, Tkj)
)−1
· (Tkj − t)
]
= Dj(θt) (C.1.6)
The best-fitting θt is defined as:
θ∗t = argmin (℘t − ℘(θt))′ ·W (θt) · (℘t − ℘(θt)) (C.1.7)
In this way, given a generic time grid {t0, t1 . . . tn}, it is possible to imply the
correspondent set of optimal parameters (θ∗t0 . . . θ
∗
tn
), that in turn allow through
(C.1.3) to retrieve the zero-coupon curve:[
{y(t0, T )}T≥t0 , . . . {y(tn, T )}T≥tn
]
(C.1.8)
for any ti ∈ {t0 . . . tn}.
C.1.1 The CDS-bearing yield curve
This section extends the previously explained techniques to the case of CDS-bearing
yield curve, that is, it permits to imply a term structure for synthethic hedging
positions obtained by combining each bond with a CDS covering its whole lifetime.
The method is essentialy the same as previous section, but it is worth to underline
two shortcomings of hedging strategies which are immediate consequences of market
standardization:
• Standard CDS contracts trade with notional ℘∗ equal to the face value of the
underlying obligation; the CDS-bearing bond purchaser is not covered for the
portion of dirty price exceeding this value.
This is rarely a problem for zero coupon bonds, but longer-dated bonds with
coupons exceeding those of more recently issued obligations of several basis
points could be severely overpriced with respect to ℘∗.
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• CDS are traded with standard maturities and standard scheduled payments;
for any trade date t, the choice of the CDS is limited to a set of ten maturities
covering a quarter plus thirty years at most83.
The choice was to hedge by selecting for each obligation the first available CDS
maturity after bond’s final payment date: if the residual life of the obligation
exceeds the longest CDS maturity available, the 30 year contract is selected.
Notice again that such simplifications are not driven by computational needs but
are instead direct consequence of market standardization: as soon as CDS contracts
lost their specifically-tailored nature, investors will face such issues, and is obliged
to enter into these imperfect hedges.
At time t, the relevant CDS-maturity for the j-th relevant obligations priced ℘j(t)
is thus selected as:
T¯Hj = min{T¯h|T¯h ≥ TKjj}, j = 1 . . . J
where {T¯h} are the set of CDS standard payment dates which do not depend on the
obligation; define:
T¯ = {T¯hj | h = 1 . . . Hj , j = 1 . . . J}
the set of standard CDS dates for the whole set of relevant obligations, and assume
that for any T ∈ T ∪T¯ in the complete timegrid there exist a zero-coupon CDS-bearing
bond priced P¯ (t, T ), and so a CDS-bearing yield y¯(t, T ) out of (2.2.3).
Notice that, in a non-standard CDS market, this assumption is as restrictive as
assuming the existence of a zcb for any T ∈ T . Assume that for each t there exists
a dynamic parameter vector θ¯t = (β¯0t, β¯1t, β¯2t, β¯3t) such that y¯(t, T ) = y¯(θ¯t, T − t)
as in (C.1.3), mutatis mutandis. Current spot price of any hedged portfolio is:
℘j(t) + ℘
∗ · Uj(t)− S¯ · AP01(t) = ℘j(t) + uj(t) j ∈ {1 . . . J}
where uj(t) is the clean upfront, obtaind by reducing Uj(t) from the riskless accrued
premium (see section 2.1.6). It is possible to use this new term structure {P¯ (t, T )}
as a credit risk free discount factor and combine it with the no-arbitrage principle
to obtain the discounted future cash flow of each hedged obligation.
83If for example we choose a 30-year CDS on March 20th 2010, protection will last on June 20th
2040, thirty years later than first coupon payment, corresponding approximately to 30.25 years.
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Namely, for any j ∈ {1 . . . J} and t, the equality:
℘j(t) + uj(t) = Cj
Kj∑
k=1
P¯ (t, Tkj) + ℘
∗ · P¯ (t, TKj)− S¯ ·
Hj∑
h=1
P¯ (t, T¯hj) (C.1.9)
where S¯ is CDS yearly standard spread.84 Notice that, similarly to bond market,
the left term of (C.1.9) is paid spot while the other is contingent on future credit
events.
Proceeding as in previous section, we define W¯ (θ¯t) as in (C.1.4), with diagonal
elements constructed as in (C.1.5) using (C.1.6) and P¯ (t, T ) replacing P (t, T ).
Setting:
℘¯t = (℘1(t) + u1(t), . . . ℘n(t) + un(t))
and ℘¯(θ¯t) = (℘¯1(θ¯t) . . . ℘¯J(θ¯t)) with
℘¯j(θ¯t) = Cj
Kj∑
k=1
P¯ (t, Tkj) + ℘
∗ · P¯ (t, TjKj)− S¯ ·
Hj∑
h=1
P¯ (t, T¯hj)
for any j = 1 . . . J , the relevant θ¯∗t is defined as in (C.1.7):
θ¯∗t = argmin (℘¯t − ℘¯(θ¯t))′ · W¯ (θ¯t) · (℘¯t − ℘¯(θ¯t)) (C.1.10)
for any t, which allows to retrieve a CDS-bearing zero-coupon curve {y¯(t, T )} on the
timegrid T ∪ T¯ .
C.2 CDS pricing and contracts migration
We present here in detail how CDS contracts are marked to the market, which allows
in turn to discuss the conversion mechanism that enables to switch from any CDS
quoted spread to the correspondent upfront payment of the standard contract given
the quoted spread St at time t.
First of all, a model is necessary for discounted future cash flows contingent on credit
events; particularly, the present value of CDS contracts are obviously subordinated
to determining default probabilities, which must be implied through market quotes.
Pricing formulae for CDS contracts are direct consequence of the model which is
chosen for default probabilities: in this section CDS pricing is explored in a general
framework following [22], without any specific choice of such probabilities. A detailed
analysis of the peculiar assumptions on such probabilities which underlie the ISDA
CDS Standard Model will be provided in section C.3.
84Again, we consider it as the yearly spread implicitely multiplied by the year fraction occurring
between two consecutive payment dates.
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t τ
LGDS ·AP01
Figure C.1: Single name CDS: Cash flow of protection seller
The cash flow at trade date t of a CDS is contingent on a credit event eventually
occurring at the random time τ before the maturity of the contract T¯H .
The survival probability at time t with respect to the risk-neutral measure Q is:
Q(τ ≥ u) (C.2.1)
representing the probability that τ occurs on or after time u ≥ t.
Figure C.1 shows the complete schedule of payments for the protection seller, which
takes into account the riskless accrued premium St · AP01(t) and the Loss given
default LGD = 1−R that will be paid when any of the relevant credit event occurs.
Here R is the Recovery Rate, which represents the post-credit event value of one unit
of the defaulted obligations: at default, the protection buyer receives the obligations
and repays face value, so that N(1−R) = N ·LGD is the amount to be reimbursed
to the buyer for any obligation with face value N .
Let Lt(T ) be the (possibly stochastic) risk-free discount factor at t for maturity T :
the discounted future cash flow of the seller is the stochastic process:
℘∗
[
St · AP01(t) + LGD · Lt(τ) · 1[t,T¯H ](τ)
]
(C.2.2)
where 1I(u) is the characteristic function, which is 1 if u ∈ I and zero otherwise.
Figure C.2 shows the buyer’s cash flow, which is composed by the dirty upfront
payment Ut, the discounted sum of future CDS coupon payments and the accrual
at default, which reimburses the seller for the time fraction that the contract would
have still been protected after default.
Let T = {T¯h}Hh=1 be the set of standard dates, and define T¯h(τ) as the first payment
date following τ , so that the discounted future cash flow of the buyer at time t is:
℘∗
[
Ut + St ·
H∑
h=1
Lt(T¯i) ·∆T¯i · 1τ≥T¯i + St · Lt(τ) · (τ − T¯h(τ)−1) · 1[t,T¯H ](τ)
]
(C.2.3)
Notice that spread-quoted contracts provide Ut = 0, while upfront-quoted contracts
provide St = S¯ and85 Ut 6= 0, where S¯ is standard spread.
85Obviously Ut = 0 if market quotation of the spread St is equal to the standard S¯ ex-ante.
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t T1 T2 Th(τ)−1 τ
(τ − T)St∆T1S ∆T2SUt
Figure C.2: Single name CDS: Cash Flow of protection Buyer
The no-arbitrage assumption implies that the expected discounted future cash
flows under the pricing measure Q are equal.
Define ℘∗ · Πt the difference between (C.2.2) and (C.2.3), which corresponds to the
marked-to-market value of the contract on the buyer’s side.
Two assumptions are common to most credit derivatives models, namely:
• The discount factor process is independent of τ under Q, so that for any u
and I, EQ(Lt(u)1I(τ)) = EQ(Lt(u)) · EQ(1I(τ)) = L¯t(u) ·Q(τ ∈ I).
• The recovery rate R is known, so that LGD is constant, thus non-stochastic.
Dropping one of these hypotheses (or both) is one of the addresses of current
research; taking expectations with respect to Q, we obtain the expected marked
to market value:
EQ(Πt) = Π¯t = 0. (C.2.4)
where the last equality comes from the aforementioned no-arbitrage assumption.
Define the protection leg ProtLeg(t) = ProtLeg(R, L¯t(·),Q) and the premium leg
PremLeg(t) = PremLeg(S, L¯t(·),Q) the unitary86 expectations under Q of (C.2.2)
and (C.2.3) for non-standard contracts, respectively, so that (C.2.4) can be rewritten
as:
ProtLeg(R, L¯t(·),Q)− PremLeg(St, L¯t(·),Q) +
(
St · AP01(t)− Ut
)
= 0 (C.2.5)
It is explicitly stressed that the equation depend on the selected term structure of
forward riskless rates {L¯t(T )} as well as on the model for the default probability Q
in the risk-neutral world. It is custom ([22]) to rewrite the two lags as:
ProtLeg(R, L¯t(·),Q) = −LGD · Prot01(L¯t(·),Q) (C.2.6)
and
PremLeg(St, L¯t(·),Q) = St ·
[
Prem01(L¯t(·),Q) + ACC01(L¯t(·),Q)
]
(C.2.7)
86Divided by the face value ℘∗.
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A little stochastic algebra allows to retrieve, under previous assumptions, explicit
formulae for (C.2.8) and (C.2.7). Particularly, it can be shown that:
Prot01(L¯t(·),Q) =
∫ T¯h
t
L¯t(u)dQ(τ ≥ u) (C.2.8)
and
Prem01(L¯t(·),Q) =
H∑
h=1
∆T¯hL¯t(T¯h)Q(τ ≥ T¯h) (C.2.9)
ACC01(L¯t(·),Q) =
∫ T1
t
L¯t(u)(u− T¯1)dQ(τ ≥ u)
+
H∑
h=2
∫ T¯h
T¯h−1
L¯t(u)(u− T¯h−1)dQ(τ ≥ u). (C.2.10)
C.2.1 Contract migrations: general framework and ISDA assumptions
Equation (C.2.4) allows to links the variables underlying the derivative into a nonlinear
implicit equation:
Π¯t = Π¯(t, T¯ , L¯t(·),Q, R, St, Ut) = 0 (C.2.11)
The explicit dependence on t is related to the accrued payments for both the
obligation and the derivative; the timegrid T¯ is constant across standard contracts,
although it distinguishes contracts with different maturities. A riskless term structure
L¯t(·) has to be chosen so that it is independent from the entity’s default; a model
for Q is also to be chosen, while R is in principle the outcome of the post-default
auction (see section 2.1.3) so it is also unknown at t.
One between the spread and upfront is instead observable in the market, and the
problem is how to migrate from one to the other: it is clear that some variables
must be settled, and we describe here the assumptions underlying ISDA Standard
Model [84]. First of all, a standard contract is considered, with a given maturity
T¯H ; moreover, as aforementioned, it is typical to consider as fixed the recovery rate
R, so that (C.2.11) can be simplified as:
Π¯t = Π¯(L¯t(·),Q, St, Ut) = 0 (C.2.12)
The relevant discount curve for European names L¯t(T ) is retrieved out of the Euribor
market: spot rates are available up to one year, so a par-curve must be implied using
swap rates and the absence of arbitrage; see section C.3.1 for details.
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The ISDA CDS Standard model assumes that, at trade date t, the survival
probabilities up to time u ≥ t follows an exponential distribution with constant
parameter λH :
Q(τ ≥ u) = exp [− λH(u− t)]. (C.2.13)
where λH is peculiar for maturity T¯H only. This model is also known as flat hazard
curve. The choice of modeling default intensities without either a term structure and
a volatility generates theoretical controversies for which we refer to [20]; a glaring
example is the unconsistency of the model across maturities. As soon as another
contract with, for example, later maturity, T¯H∗ > T¯H is traded on the market, then
λ(T¯H∗) 6= λ(T¯H), hence the model is inconsistent on the whole time interval [t, T¯H ].
This approach allows however to imply the whole term structure of the (risk-neutral)
default probabilities using a simple parameter; more precisely, equation (C.2.12)
becomes:
Π¯(λt, St, Ut) = 0. (C.2.14)
The conversion mechanism is based on the application of zero-search method for the
nonlinear function in (C.2.14).
• From quoted spread S∗t to upfront U∗t plus standard coupon S¯
– Set Ut = 0 and St = S∗t (as observed on the market) in (C.2.14); solve
Π¯(λt, S
∗
t , 0) = 0 and retrieve λ∗t .
– Set St = S¯ and λt = λ∗t in (C.2.14); solve Π¯(λ∗t , S¯, Ut) = 0 and
retrieve the correspondent upfront U∗t .
• From quoted upfront U∗t plus standard coupon S¯ to quoted spread S∗t
– Set St = S¯ and Ut = U∗t (as observed on the market) in (C.2.14); solve
Π¯(λt, S¯, U
∗
t ) = 0 and retrieve λ∗t .
– Set Ut = 0 and λt = λ∗t in (C.2.14); solve Π¯(λ∗t , St, 0) = 0 and
retrieve the correspondent spread S∗t .
Obviously, the flat curve assumption is totally unrealistic even within the standard
market itself; current practice is to use a piecewise constant default intensity λt(T )
with knots T¯ ∈ T¯ . At the moment, Markit has improved the CDS converter in a
way such that this option is available; model consistency is preserved, although a
stochastic component should be considered for the default intensity (see [31]).
Observe however that such framework has the advantage that it avoids the integrals
to be approximated as a closed form is available under such assumptions.
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C.3 ISDA-markit CDS Converter Specification
This section is rather technical and presents the exact procedure that the ISDA
standard model uses to solve equation (C.2.14): section C.3.1 describes the sructure
of Lt(·) out of the Euribor money market, while sections C.3.2 and C.3.3 deal with
the computation of the derivative’s payoff.
C.3.1 Interest Rate Curve
The construction of the risk-free term structure follow the guidelines in [85]: let
trade date equal to t, business adjusted87, and remove index t so as to lighten the
notations. Standard CDS model uses Euribor rates to imply the discount curve L¯(·).
The conventional Euribor rates to be used are the ones locked at (business) time
t − 1, daily updated on ISDA’s website, so that anyone is marking to the market
the CDS contract using the same discount curve.
It is also assumed that the spot date for these rates is t + 2 business adjusted: in
this way, the discount factor for time t will be 1 at time t+ 2, which in turn implies
that the discount factor will be slightly greater than one at time t.
Here, for the sake of simplicity, such distinctions will not be considered and we will
assume that all payments are made at trade date t.
We derive the discount curve up to 1 year directly from Euribor Deposit Rates; we
just have to consider the day count convention for these quotes, namely ACT/360.
Euribor rates are available for T = 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 12 months (deposit spot rate) as
well as T = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 20, 25 year (swap rates). Define {jk}19k=1 the
succession of these time distances, so that
tjk = t+ 2 + jk
all dates business adjusted following.
The daily count convention (dcc) will be crucial in this section: define d(t, u) the
distance between times t and u measured with ACT/360 dcc, and set:
∆jk = d(tjk−1 , tjk) (C.3.1)
This sequence of dates defines a non-homogeneous timegrid
T1 = {tjk}19k=0
that will be the domain of the discount curve L¯(T ) = exp(−L(T )(T − t)), where
L(T ) = L(t, T ) is the correspondent Euribor yield (as defined in chapter 3).
87Except for Japanese entities, no holidays are taken into account but Saturdays and Sundays
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Let `t(tjk) , with k ∈ 1 . . . 6 be the conventional deposit rate at t for maturity
tjk ; set:
L¯(tjk) =
1
1 + `(tjk) ·∆jk
.
A piecewise constant instantaneous forward rate is assumed, hence:
f(tjk) = fjk = −
1
∆jk
· log L¯(tjk−1)
L¯(tjk)
, k = 1 . . . 6 (C.3.2)
where fjk is the forward rate for time interval [tjk−1 , tjk).
In order to imply discount factors and forward rates for longer time periods, we use
the Euribor Swap Rates `(tjk), k = 7, . . . 19.
The Swap Rate is an annual coupon which is paid every 6 months with day count
convention 30/360; define ti = t+2+6i, with i = 0, 1 . . . months, and δi = d
′
(ti−1, ti)
the grid steps according to this convention.
For any maturity I ∈ {1, 2 . . . 25}, the par-swap relationship implies:
I∑
i=1
δi`(ti)L¯(ti) = 1 (C.3.3)
The discount curve is derived through an iterative process, assuming again a constant
instantaneous forward rate between swap dates, that is, a log-linear interpolation of
discount factors. For any u ∈ (ti, ti+1]
L¯(u) = exp
(
d(u, ti+1)
d(ti, ti+1)
fi +
d(ti, u)
d(ti, ti+1)
fi+1
)
(C.3.4)
Under these assumption, the yield curve can be progressively bootstrapped from
the market by adding one maturity at a time, use (C.3.4) to retrieve the following
discount factor/forward rate and iterate the process until the whole grid is covered.88
Iterating this process89 leads to a complete set of forward rates {fjk} evaluated on
the grid T1, so that the piecewise constant rate L(u) can be written as
L(u) = fj1 · 1[t0,tj1 ] +
19∑
k=1
fjk · 1(tjk−1 ,tjk ](u), u ≥ t
This leads to a closed form for the discount factor:
L¯(u) = exp
(
−
19∑
k=1
fjk · d(u ∧ tjk−1 , u ∧ tjk)
)
, u ≥ t (C.3.5)
with which we can compute the discount curve on any time grid.
88Notice that time fractions in parenthesis are computed as ACT/ACT days, which is
(ACT/360)/(ACT/360)=ACT/ACT, coherently with the first branch implied with spot rates.
89The formula has to be rearranged when time lags between swap dates are greater than 1 year.
However, piecewise constant forward rate always implies a single unknown in (C.3.3).
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C.3.2 The Protection Leg
In order to ease notation, since in this section time distances are computed using
ACT/365 daily count convention, we simply write the distance between time t and
time u ≥ t as u− t implicitly assuming that this distance is computed as an actual
day fraction of a non-leap year. Again, the index t stands for trade date and will be
dropped. Rewrite (C.2.8) as:
Prot01({fjk}, λ) =
∫ T¯H
t
L¯(u)λ exp(−λ(u− t0))du.
The form (C.3.5) chosen for the discount curve, induces a closed form for the integral;
if {fjk} is the set of implied forward rates relevant for selected maturity TH , the risky
discount factor Λjk = fjk + λ can be defined so as to set:
T ∗1 = {tjk}H
∗
k=0, H
∗ = H(TH) = argmin{jk : tjk ≥ TH} (C.3.6)
Using the set of correspondent {Λjk}, we compute:
Prot01({fjk}, λ) = λ
N∗∑
i=1
exp(−λ(tjk−1 − t0))L¯(tjk−1)
1− exp(−Λjk(tjk − tjk−1))
Λjk
.
C.3.3 The Premium Leg
In order to compute the Premium Leg, we set
T¯2 = {T¯i}Hi=0 (C.3.7)
where {T¯i} is the set of CDS payment dates, all business adjusted. Again, the
assumption of a flat hazard curve together with a piecewise constant forward curve
allows to explicitly solve the integral regardless of any approximation scheme.
In this case, we have:
Prem01({Ljk}, λ) =
h∑
i=1
(T¯i − T¯i−1)L¯(T¯i) exp(−λ(T¯i − t0))
ACC01({fjk}(·),Q)) =
∫ T¯1
t0
L¯(u)(u− t0) exp(−λ(u− t0))du
+
H∑
i=2
∫ T¯i
T¯i−1
P(u)(u− T¯i−1) exp(−λ(u− t0))du.
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In order to explicitly compute ACC01, we define
{t1h}H1h=1 =
(
T1 ∪ T¯2
)
∩ [t0, T¯1]
{tih}Hih=1 =
(
T1 ∪ T¯2
)
∩ [T¯i−1, T¯i] i ≥ 2
so that each of the intervals between standard coupon maturities is divided into
subintervals on which the forward rate is constant and equal to f ih ∈ {fjk}.
Observe that t01 = t while, for i ≥ 2, ti0 = Ti−1 and tiHi = Ti; this results in:
ACC01({fjk}, λ) =λ
H1∑
h=1
∫ t1h
tih−1
(u− t0) exp(−L1h(u− t1h−1)− λ(u− t0))du
+λ
H∑
i=2
Hi∑
h=1
∫ tih
tih−1
(u− T¯i−1) exp(−Lih(u− tih−1)− λ(u− t0))du
Define the risky discount factors {Λih} = {f ih + λ} and solve the integral, obtaining:
ACC01({fjk}, λ) = λ
H1∑
h=1
L¯(t1h−1) exp(−λ(t1h−1 − t0))
Λ1h
·
( 1
Λ1h
+ t1h−1 − t0−
exp(−Λ1h(t1h − t1h−1)) · (
1
Λ1h
+ t1h − t0)
)
+ λ
H∑
i=2
Hi∑
h=1
L¯(tih−1) exp(−λ(tih−1 − t0))
Λh
×(
1
Λih
+ tih−1 − T¯i−1 − exp(−Λih(tih − tih−1)) ·
(
1
Λih
+ tih − T¯i−1
))
where L¯(·) is computed as in (C.3.5).
Notice that also the coupon spread refers to a year of protection computed in
ACT/360 day count convention; hence, the Premium Leg is
PremLeg(S, {fjk}, λ) =
365
360
· S · (Prem01({fjk}, λ) + ACC01({fjk}, λ)).
where S could be either the standard or the conventional spread, depending on the
contract.
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